The US and UK are apparently preparing for air strikes against the Syrian Assad regime, claiming there is little doubt that it is responsible for horrific chemical weapons attacks. Syria has allegedly crossed President Obama’s ‘red line.’
Britain’s Foreign Secretary William Hague claims that “We can not in the twenty first century allow the idea that chemical weapons can be used with impunity, that people can be killed in this way and that there are no consequences for it.”
Several problems here:
This rush to judgment is happening before the UN has established beyond reasonable doubt who is responsible. Do we really need to be reminded that WMD-related claims are worth subjecting to a decent standard of proof before going to war?
There is a greater amount evidence from the UN to date that Syrian’s rebels, or at least some of them, may have also used chemical weapons, which has been substantiated though not conclusively found by a formal investigation. If so, they did it in the twenty first century, killed people and so far the US and its allies have not applied punishment.
Why? Is this because somehow we apply a greater standard of proof to the Syrian opposition than the state? If so, why? Syrian rebels thus far have also committed atrocities, such as beheadings, and one rebel commander threatened cannibalism. Hard to see why the same elements would blush at using sarin gas.
And for that matter, what about this latest attack? Russia may have its own unspeakable motives for suggesting that the rebels may be the ones using chemical weapons, but the Syrian opposition may have form on this and the suggestion is not so outlandish that we shouldn’t await further proof.
Or is it that the taboo on chemical weapons use applies only to sovereign states? That would be odd, given the determination with which the US-led coalition has tried to prevent terrorist groups getting their hands on such weapons.
Or is it because in Western coverage of these brutal, complex wars, we still strive to classify warring sides into predators and victims, the good and the wicked?
More broadly, if chemical weapons atrocities must not be abided (except when they are), why should this not also apply to lethal mischief carried out by small arms, or indeed machetes? As Peter Hitchens argues, the military regime that recently came to power in a coup and which has been abided by the West, is shooting people down at a steady clip in the street, and on tv at that.
For the sake of argument, lets say chemical weapons attacks are exceptionally barbaric, that it did happen and that the Syrian government is responsible. Is bombing on the justification that this behaviour can never be tolerated without punishment really prudent? Is the US preparing cruise missile attacks because of its President’s bold words about red lines and are fearful of a credibility problem? In that case, is the US rhetorically locked in to bombing every state that is suspected of using chemical weapons from now on? What happens when our own clients or allies start gassing cities? Obama and Hague’s rhetoric is pretty categorical, and sets a high standard by which it will be judged.
Once violent punishment is applied from afar, in this case from submarines and warships, Washington may achieve what missile diplomats pursue – gratification without commitment. But what then?
If history is any guide, the first strikes will not topple the regime. Innocents will die. It may turn a regional mutipolar war into a truly international escalation, in which America’s patient efforts to restore a working relationship with Moscow are strained, and where the Assad regime now has an unambiguous enemy to unite its followers against. This could lead to further escalation and mutual atrocities on the ground, and may then lead to downstream pressure to escalate again. Are we ready for this? What if Assad’s stature grows rather than shrinks in Syria, and he becomes a symbol of defiance against the hypocritical West? What if this increases rather than removes the driving force for Western intervention, the fear of embarrassment?
Finally, the US and its allies, whether it likes it or not, will be objectively taking sides with militant Islamists (something it is fashionable to mock them for in its proxy war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan), an alignment that has gone just so well in Libya and Egypt so far.
But then again, maybe it will all work out for the best.
Not to mention that attacking Syria is illegal and Obama might be tried for the crime of aggression. Moreover, what if Syria did not use chemical weapons and the US attacks it. Where can Syria sue the US?
There are some issues with your suggestions.
1. Yes here is no 100% proof behind the Syrian government having used chemical weapons but, please, don’t believe the ‘it’s all a conspiracy!’ brigade. This line of argument comes simply from not knowing much about what is actually happening in Syria. First, the (many, many) videos online clearly demonstrate that some form of chemical agent has been used; if you believe this is a propaganda trick then you are crediting the opposition’s theatrical skills too highly (I know this is the land of bab al-hara, but still). I don’t know anyone who thinks there was not a massive chemical attack of some kind. Secondly, the idea that this was an opposition attack is rather odd. For a start, we have to presume that a poor rebel movement has suddenly gained the ability to synthesise a large amount of a highly lethal chemical agent and use a highly effective delivery system; possible, not likely. But the more important fact; where are all those videos from? A rebel-held suburb of Damascus. What you are suggesting is that the rebels used chemical weapons against themselves; again, possible, but rather unlikely (FSA fighters are confirmed among the dead). Naturally enough the rebels could have bombed themselves to provoke intervention! Except, there would be better places to do that, where they have more control.
2. Most people commentating here have -no idea- what kind of regime we are talking about here. If you know Syrian history, you know the idea of the regime bombing their own people with nerve agents is very, very possible.
3. I am against ‘western’ intervention. Not because Asad has not gassed his own people (again), the 100,00-200,000 people already dead seem as important to me. But because I don’t trust any of the powers intervening in any uncertain terms.
4. The only good thing about a western intervention now is that it will end very very badly for them (the interveners) and really cannot hurt the Syrian people any more than the current situation (those who believe in ‘stability’ [‘support the dictator’] do not know who they are supporting and should read some Syrian history before they start.
5. The best situation; Asad dead, the West in the West.
Hi John,
thanks for this – some important points there.
On point 1 – I don’t doubt that an attack has taken place, and that this regime gassing its own is ‘very very possible’, but if we are contemplating waging war (again), then the threshold must be high as must the standard of proof. We should soberly review the evidence for who is culpable, and in cold blood, before resorting to violence. I don’t think we have met this standard yet.
Possibly unlike you, I also think there is some possibility that a ruthless faction of the opposition may have done this (also against their ‘own people’) in a move of strategic victimhood to trigger the reaction that the West is now having. I agree that this is less likely, but again, civil wars are brutal things and given the manners of some of the rebels in this war, and the historical willingness of revolutionaries to break eggs to make the omelet, its not out of the question, even if they do it incompetently. Just as many outsiders don’t grasp the depravity of this regime, so too with some of its enemies.
I sympathise with your other points, except number 5. An Islamist version of Assad, or a regime where Islamists get to work on those they hate and wish revenge upon, could be even worse, and we’ve put quite a lot of effort over the past twelve years in trying to make life harder, not easier, for AQ and its ilk.
There is, of course, some possibility that a ruthless faction of the opposition may have done this but were this to be the case then it would most likely be one of the Jihadi-linked groups because, as I said, FSA fighters are confirmed to have been killed in this attack (I think we can agree bombing their own people is ‘possible’ but bombing themselves seems rather unlikely). This raises a question; if such a group has done this then why have they not done it before? For example, Jihadis have had very significant freedom of movement in Iraq, and yet during those years of civil war nobody managed to do this; even when there were U.S. troops around. Are the Jihadis in Syria (many of whom are crossing from Iraq) somehow suddenly extremely technically capable? Moreover, why have they not attacked Asad’s forces in likewise fashion, the few cases of chemical attacks attributed to the rebels thus far were very crude; so they have developed a much greater capacity and use it first against their own people? I am certainly sympathetic with the burden of proof argument but I don’t think there has been a case in recent history where the U.S. and its allies have been more cautious and less willing to intervene than Syria.
Now I know people like to think many of the Syrian rebels/jihadis are savages but beheading is only aesthetically worse than shooting prisoners in the head, and the ‘cannibalism’ case reflects one man’s insanity after years of fighting. All things being considered Amnesty International and HRW have repeatedly said that while both sides have committed atrocities, the vast majority are attributed to Asad’s forces. This does not make what some of the rebels have done better, but it does, I think, highlight the fact that the former tend to be random consequences of disorder (small groups of jihadis doing bad things in a civil war), whereas the latter are a systematic campaign of terror.
The last point is the key one but is based on a ‘western’ fear; the ‘Jihadi state.’ Syria is not, nor has it ever been, a Jihadi heartland, quite the opposite. Syria is multicultural and multiethnic; the Jihadis there are without a doubt dangerous people but they are exceptionally unable to be likely to take over Syria if the Syrian people are allowed to decide their fate. At the moment they a lot of freedom of movement because the fight is directed against Asad; were he to fall and some (however unstable) coalition of Syrian forces could emerge, then the Jihadis would be in serious difficulties. The country might become more ‘Islamist’ but that is quite a different matter; I know many are against the Ikwan et al, but Islamists can be very moderate and pragmatic indeeed, and I would certainly rather have a MB state (you know, whether in Egypt or Gaza they have never launched a coup or stopped elections, unlike the secularists) than an Asad led state. The ‘Asad’ or ‘Jihadi Syria’ claim is the position of the regime, and we should not adopt it.
What depresses me about this debate is that we are being forced into either supporting intervention or questioning, on the flimsiest of pretexts, a war crime on par with Halabjah. I oppose intervention but I am 99% certain this was a (most likely Maher) Al-Asad led crime. The arguments against intervention can be much better made than simply copying Asad’s own line!
Moreover, even more depressing, is the Asad or Jihadi claim. This revolution began for Syria not in 2011, not in Cairo, nor in Tunisia, Libya, or elsewhere. It began in Damascus in 2002 during the ‘Damascus Spring.’ The Syrian people stood up against Asad then, and he imprisoned, tortured, and disappeared them, they did the same in 2011, and he slaughtered them. We must not let our fears about the future dictate that he stays in power. A Syria without Asad, for those who have lived in and loved that country, may have many difficult and violent paths to cross before it gets there, including a battle with jihadi elements, but is more likely to return to its peaceful vibrant roots than anything else. The first step towards getting to this latter optimistic outlook is the removal of Asad.
All very good points, but I think at this point a clear statement in support of international law needs to be made. Of course, a smart and strategically achievable military intervention is going to be tricky – and I’ve argued in the past that no intervention, humanitarian otherwise, has ever succeeded in creating a new political order. And, one could argue that international law establishes a range of norms, from non-intervention to no use of chemical weapons. But, I would argue that the use of these weapons violates not only international law but international morality. And, oppositions groups are unlikely to have access to these weapons. Syria has long held these weapons in their arsenal, and the regime has a history of brutal treatment of its citizens. So, i would be 80% the regime used them. Finally, a punitive intervention, one intended to simply hurt the regime, can be morally justified. So, in my view, such an intervention is justified.
“This rush to judgment is happening before the UN has established beyond reasonable doubt who is responsible.”
I believe the UN mandate is to verify the fact of a chemical attack, not who was responsible.
Thanks for this. Very succintly laid out points. Agree with almost everything except am a bit mystified that you would not even consider the possibility, however faint or improbable, that there could be other actors involved in the chemical attack than Syria’s government or the rebels. I’m not a conspiracy theorist and I am not trying to absolve the Syrian government, but since we’re hypothesizing who could be behind the attack without it having been established, surely even a 0.001% chance of some other actors being involved is worth being accounted for in considering what it might mean in terms of a Western response.
Is it even remotely not possible for the chemical attack to have been a red flag operation, especially considering what was revealed in Wikileaks’ dump of Stratfor emails? In one leaked document dated Dec 2011, e.g. in discussion about Syria with USAF Strategic Studies group, and British and French military representatives, the group more or less admitted that the Free Syrian Army was assembled by the Western powers and there were Special Forces on the ground to “commit guerrilla attacks, assassination campaigns, try to break the back of the Alawite forces, elicit collapse from within.”
In addition they told the Stratfor representative that “They dont believe air intervention would happen unless there was enough media attention on a massacre, like the Ghadafi move against Benghazi.”
Here’s the link to the document: https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/1671459_insight-military-intervention-in-syria-post-withdrawal.html.
Now, I know this is no proof at all and all of this may simply be mere coincidence and/or opportunism, but considering Western strategic interests extend beyond Syria and may in fact be focused more on the real prize, Iran, shouldn’t this at least be taken into account in ‘Questions about Syria’? This is a genuine question, not trying to sidetrack your other valid points.
The basis of your post is a Stratfor email, these guys know less than ForeignPolicy.com!
The idea that you think the FSA are ‘assembled by the Western powers’ is really odd… certainly ‘western powers’ have been meddling in FSA affairs, mainly by manipulating internal divisions, but where does the FSA come from? The Syrian Army! They are all defectors. Why did they defect? They hate Asad. Unless you think all these Syrian-accented soldiers, with Syrian army weapons, with Syrian army uniforms at the beginning, and with many bad things to say about Asad, were just magiced out of thin air by the ‘western powers.’ Dear god…
Actually, the basis for my post was NOT the Stratfor email (and the email itself is not so much about what Stratfor ‘knows’ than what was being discussed in Western military circles). And I never asserted either that there is no disaffection in Syria against Assad or that FSA consists of ‘fake Syrians’ – if you wish to disregard the difference between disaffection/hatred for Assad and army deserters on on the one hand and the arms supply/training/info required to assemble a cohesive fighting force in a police state like Syria that is your prerogative. But you have created a silly straw man argument in your response. My point was simply that in your consideration you had left out one possible component – which could still be considered without any Stratfor email. Obviously despite reams of evidence to the contrary from around the world, it seems even a possibility of dirty covert ops is more than US academics are willing to consider. Thanks anyway.
Not a US academic ;)
I am perfectly willing to consider ‘covert ops’- and know of the many confirmed examples in the Middle East. However, in this case, it seems so incredibly unlikely/futile, that I get particularly annoyed when tiny ‘possibilities’ are used to undermine the moral status of a people fighting against a dictator- ‘disaffection’ does not come close- and yes I know very well that not all Syrians think that way, but many, many, do, not to mention the Kurds; hell, he even bombed Yarmouk; the ‘best’ place to be a Palestinian refugee and they still hate him. So… ‘dirty covert ops’ give some evidence other than that email, yes the FSA has foreign funding/resources but they did not emerge from that and are quite clearly not being controlled by that [what is the FSA anyway? About a hundred different groups…]