It won’t be too long before we start to get a better understanding of what foreign policy in a Trump Administration will actually look like. It’s useful to keep in mind that current rhetoric is no guarantee of future grand strategy. Remember when we all worried that the Bush Administration was going to be too isolationist? Good times.
But let’s assume, for a moment, that the past is prologue. Or the prologue is the main part of the book. Or whatever.
This raises an interesting puzzle: what the $@!#* • #!*$$%*(!! is he doing? Seriously. What the !#(&–^&!# stupid #$#(*$!! is going on?
As I noted in another post, on what godforsaken inhospitable bright orange gas giant is it a good idea to attack your most successful alliance at the same exact time that you’re picking fights with your nearest peer-competitor—that is, China? And it isn’t like the incoming administration has been sending unambiguous signals to key Asian allies while it’s been prodding China. Oh yeah, and also North Korea’s in the mix.
As I was thinking about this—duly motivated by a discussion among fellow international-relations specialists on Facebook—I took to the Twitters to work out some alternative theories. Here they are:
“The Chess Master.” Trump is a strategic genius. He recognizes that the US cannot afford to defend Europe while threatening war with China. He needs to take Russia out of the picture. So that means a “grand bargain” that will concede to Russia its privileged sphere of influence, as well as forward some of its other strategic priorities in western Eurasia. Not only does this free up the United States to take on Beijing, but it might even entice Russia to remain neutral—or support the US. It’s like the Austrian Diplomatic Revolution. Which turned out terrific for Vienna.
“The Transactionalist.” This is the conventional wisdom on Trump. He thinks in terms of short-term zero-sum bargains, mercantilist economics, and is deeply insecure about being taken advantage of. In his mind, NATO helps trade competitors. It’s basically a trade subsidy for Germany. But he can make big, splashy deals with countries like Russia. Maybe he can squeeze better deals from the NATO allies as well. There is a “T” in NATO, after all. It doesn’t have to stand for “Treaty.”
“Mirror Universe Teddy Roosevelt.” Trump speaks loudly and carries… a small stick… in his freakishly small hands. He’s all bluster. US foreign policy will largely carry on as normal, under the watchful eye of Defense, State, and second-tier national-security staff. In fact, Trump’s barking might just get a few NATO countries to make token increases in their defense spending, or offer more subsidies for American troops.
“The Buffoon.” This is kind of like Mirror Universe Teddy Roosevelt, but he actually means it; cooler heads aren’t going to prevail. It really is that bad. In other words, Trump is an impulsive narcissist and a walking example of the Dunning-Kruger effect. Don’t worry too much about strategic logic. There really isn’t any. But some nice commentators—at Fox News, NewsMax, whatever new #MAGA journals appear, or the National Enquirer—will be happy to tell us that it’s genius. In a hundred years, Chinese revisionist historians will argue that there actually was a calculated grand strategy. They will be wrong.
“The Leninist.” The Trump ‘brain trust’—some combination of Bannon and Flynn—just want to burn it all down. This is something Cheryl Rofer (blog, Twitter) emphasizes. As reported at The Daily Beast:
“Lenin,” he answered, “wanted to destroy the state, and that’s my goal too. I want to bring everything crashing down, and destroy all of today’s establishment.” Bannon was employing Lenin’s strategy for Tea Party populist goals. He included in that group the Republican and Democratic Parties, as well as the traditional conservative press.
In this scenario, it’s all about shredding globalism and liberal order. And that means watching NATO and the EU burn. Or, at least, gumming them up. Here, the eerie overlap with Russian interests is all a matter of convenience. They hate the liberal order, because it benefits the US and its allies. The Trumpistas hate the liberal order too, because reasons.
“The Transnational Rightist.” The Leninist is to revolutionary Marxism as The Transnational Rightist is to parliamentary socialism. There’s nothing intrinsically wrong with NATO and the EU that a Europe dominated by a mix of right-wing populist and post-fascist parties won’t cure. The enemy is the broad European center—the Social Democrats, the Christian Democrats, and so on. What Trump wants is the rise of political co-confessionals, such as the AfD in Germany, the Front National in France, and the Freedom Party in Austria. Hurting the establishment is good, but burning everything down would be a bit too much. Maybe just the EU. NATO can stay. Is Russia an ally of convenience or a fellow traveller? For now, it doesn’t really matter.
“The Useful Idiot.” Is Trump compromised by Kompromat? Is his overleveraged financial spider web dependent upon, intertwined with, or simply looking for the best deals in Russia? Does Trump just having a thing for strong, buff autocrats? Who knows? It’s all bad.
“Tales of the Incompetent Transition.” Transitions often make for policy instability and amateur-hour mistakes. I arrived at the Pentagon in 2009. The Obama Administration had just rolled out its new plans for European ballistic missile defenses. They were much better than the old plans. They also involved ending the “Third Site” in Poland. That the Bush Administration had so carefully negotiated. Apparently, no one gave Warsaw a ‘heads up’. Things were bumpy for a bit.
Point is, even well-run transitions full of experienced people can go bad. And this is not one of those transitions. Eventually, there will be national-security principals, assistant secretaries, deputy assistant secretaries, and the rest of the crew. People will be briefed. Many will have a clue. Things will settle down.
…. Of course, it could be any combination of these. And perhaps I’ve missed some possibilities. Thoughts?
[cross-posted at the Lawyers, Guns and Money]
The “Austrian Diplomatic Revolution?”
I sure hope the analogy isn’t supposed to be taken seriously. Kaunitz’ plan to ally with France and Russia in order to take on Prussia for a second time was at least a plan. So far as I can see what Trump has is a dog’s breakfast, not a plan. Anyway, the 1756 switch in alliances wasn’t “terrific” for Vienna. Austria failed to get Silesia back and had to accept the reality of Prussian competition for dominance in Central Europe. That eventually did not turn out well for Austria.
“Anyway, the 1756 switch in alliances wasn’t “terrific” for Vienna.”
Exactly. :-)
Thanks for the cite, although I’m not the first to see Bannon’s love of Lenin.
I think this may be covered by “The Transactionalist,” but it’s probably worth noting specifically and inspired by Josh Busby’s businessman model.
Trump prefers to see international relations as a myriad of one-on-one relations, so Brexit makes sense to him and the EU and NATO do not. That one-on-one frame simplifies considerations of who benefits. But, of course, the world is a highly networked mesh, and actions in one relationship affect relations elsewhere. He also sees each “deal” as a one-off, so it’s possible to restart all relations from zero, as in his stated indifference to relations with Putin and Merkel. Or to talk to the president of Taiwan.
I suspect that Trump has elements of all of these models and doesn’t know himself what he’s going to do next.
Thoughtful, here’s my take: “Insecure, Uniformed Bully”–Beset by deep seated feelings of weakness, he feels threatened not just by real threats but by normal competition and disagreement. Hamstrung by lack of experience and information, he responds equally to all of this with the tools he has used in business and entertainment. He overreacts, blusters, and threatens to use all manner of force. The tragic flaw in this is that as President he now no longer has the capacity to bluster, bully, bankrupt, and litigate his way out of messes. Unwinnable war and tragedy ensues.