Category: Environment/Energy (page 1 of 3)

Pondering Planet Politics: A Response to Peltonen

I was fascinated by a brilliantly written, and well-thought out, guest post here on Duck, by Hannes Peltonen, posted over the weekend. If you haven’t had a chance to check it out, you won’t be disappointed. Peltonen presents an argument that digs into recent debates about the seemingly ubiquitous “anthropocene” and its relationship to world politics—and particularly the ways that IR theory should approach issues relating to humankind’s interconnectedness with natural/planetary processes.

I’d like to take the opportunity to engage with Peltonen’s argument, with an eye toward extending the discussion into a few new directions. Specifically, I think the issue of the anthropocene paints an even grimmer picture for the future of IR.

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Can the EU regain its international climate policy leadership lost in Copenhagen?

This is a guest post from Axel Michaelowa  from the University of Zurich. He is also the lead author of the chapter on international agreements in the 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. This is the second in the series from our Bonn panel on leadership in the climate regime. 

For over a decade, the EU was the undisputed leader of the international climate policy process. It had a grand vision for a universal international climate policy agreement modelled on the Kyoto Protocol. This was to be “crowned” during COP 15 in Copenhagen 2009. So the shock was the greater when the EU was ignominously sidelined by an alliance of Barack Obama and the leaders of the large emerging economies. They did not like grand designs and instead embarked on a road towards a “bottom up” climate policy system.

Almost a decade later, the US has abandoned international climate policy leadership after it played a crucial role in helping France in the runup to the Paris Agreement. Can the EU now again lead? The answer unfortunately is “No”. Continue reading

Leadership in the Climate Regime without the US Federal Government

I am just back from the climate negotiations in Bonn where I organized a side event at the German Development Institute (DIE). The event was co-sponsored  by the Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW).

These are my opening and closing  remarks from the session. In subsequent days, I’ll post additional interventions from some of the other panelists.  Panelists included Aimee Barnes, Senior Adviser to Governor Brown of California; Sander Chan of DIE; Arunabha Ghosh, CEO of CEEW, one of India’s leading think tanks on energy and climate; Angel Hsu, of Yale-NUS campus; and Axel Michaelowa of the University of Zurich.

Opening Remarks
I want to thank you all for coming today to this side event. I’m Josh Busby and an Associate Professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas. When Donald Trump was elected to be the 45th president of the United States, I knew that the climate regime was in for a difficult period after the heady optimism coming out of Paris in 2015.

I started a new research project, “Leadership in the Climate Regime without the US Federal Government.” When I heard about the DIE Interconnections side events, I thought this would be a tremendous opportunity to assemble some of the smartest professionals who work on this every day.

I thought it was important to get different perspectives on the role of different actors, not just folks knowledgeable about the actions of the world’s most important polities but also those of sub-national and non-state actors. Continue reading

Planet Politics and International Relations

This is a guest post from Hannes Peltonen, Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Tampere

The State of the Discipline

International Politics/Relations (IR) has allegedly failed, a claim publicized periodically. Barry Buzan and Richard Little began this millennium by highlighting the discipline’s intellectual failure in the journal Millennium. More recently, an influential 2013 forum in EJIR on IR theory, edited by Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen, and Colin Wight, concludes something similar.

IR theorists seem to consider that IR has failed, because it has a one-way relationship with other disciplines and fields. IR research borrows from other disciplines, but other disciplines seem uninterested in what IR has to offer.

One explanation for this one-way relationship could be that IR remains in the shadow of Political Science. According to Justin Rosenberg, IR has failed to develop its own disciplinary “big idea.” Such ideas are based on some characteristic of the social world through which a discipline might define and delineate itself. In Geography, it is space; in History it is time; in Sociology it is the structures of social relations.

Rosenberg’s claim seems to be that without such a big idea, other disciplines are not really interested in IR as independent from Political Science and Political Thought. Much of IR discussions may be of interest to IR scholars, but not to scholars in other disciplines. Other disciplines, however, are of interest to IR scholars exactly because they have their own big ideas which communicate across disciplines, thus being also of interest to IR.

Rosenberg’s own suggestion (“uneven and combined development”) for IR’s disciplinary big idea is promising, but it has also encountered criticism, whether justified or not.

In addition to criticisms presented by others, Rosenberg’s suggestion suffers from its implication, namely that it strengthens disciplinary division at a time, when there is a clear call for innovative interdisciplinarity. Moreover, Rosenberg’s suggestion seems to look back in time while neglecting the future and partially also the contemporary world. Thus, it ignores a rather large detail: the Anthropocene/Capitalocene. Continue reading

The Book Nook: The Authority Trap: Strategic Choices of International NGOs

Our second Bridging the Gap Book Nook entry comes from Sarah Stroup of Middlebury College and Wendy Wong of the University of Toronto, who discuss their new book The Authority Trap: Strategic Choices of International NGOs (Cornell, 2017).

Puerto Rico: What did the delay in the response to Hurricane Maria mean?

Last night, I tried to dig in and understand whether and how the response to Hurricane Maria was delayed. I wrote a Tweetstorm that I Storify-ed below. I wanted to see what evidence if any supported those claims and in what ways a swifter and larger response potentially could have addressed some of the specific problems that buffeted and continue to confront Puerto Rico.

In the last 24 hours, we’ve seen news reports from the Washington Post that criticized the president’s desultory response along with a plea for help from the Mayor of San Juan. President Trump, of course, responded in kind by attacking FakeNews and the Mayor of San Juan (because he’s an asshole). Leaving aside the president’s crass punching down, I think it’s a fair question to try to nail down what could and should have been done sooner. Former Obama disaster official Jeremy Konyndyk wrote a similar tweet thread as well.

Giving the administration the benefit of the doubt, it is true that coordinating logistics for Puerto Rico are harder than for the mainland for hurricanes Harvey and Irma given the distance. It’s also true that Puerto Rico occurred in the wake of those two storms in which FEMA resources were already stretched. It is also true that the extent of the devastation made distribution of aid on the island a real problem since many roads were impassable.

That said, Maria wasn’t a surprise. People knew well in advance that Puerto Rico was going to be hit by Maria and so decisions in the first days in terms of mobilizing ships, including the hospital ship Comfort and other naval assets that could have ferried troops and helicopters, were delayed by days. I think all of that has been consequential for speed of the response, especially compared to the mobilization after Harvey, Irma, Katrina, and the Haitian earthquake. Read on for more detail.

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Duck Forum on extreme weather events and climate change

This forum was edited by Jessica Green, an assistant professor in Environmental Studies Department at New York University.

The one-two punch of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma has revived the conversation about the relationship between climate change and extreme weather events.   Views from the media and politicians range from calls for better climate and adaptation policies to skilled deflection. To provide some insights from political science, I asked experts Josh Busby, David Konisky, Neil Malholtra, Matto Mildenberger, Leah Stokes and Stacy VanDeveer to provide their thoughts on three questions:

1) What are the most important political consequences of Harvey and Irma?  Are they a “game changer” for US climate discourse?

2) What is the role of scientific agencies and organizations is in this “post fact” era?

3) What are the most promising levers for promoting better adaptation policies?

All are skeptical that the recent hurricanes and the associated damage will change the tenor of politics around climate change. The issue is too polarized, and memories of disaster fade quickly. While crises such as these natural disasters can create the opportunity for policy change, it is clear that Republican elites must change their tune if any changes are to be implemented.

The role for scientists is a difficult one to navigate. Stacy VanDeveer suggests that scientists need to be more proactive and strategic about communicating their findings. But Neal Malhotra worries that the politicization of science will further erode trust in these institutions. Long term, the best approach is to “re-establish norms that people who work professionally on topics related to science ought to have seats at the table for decision-making” says Josh Busby. Post-fact era or not, Matto Mildenberger and Leah Stokes remind us that “denying climate change does not change the material facts at hand.”

As for how to effect change, the experts have a variety of helpful suggestions. They all share a common thread: don’t focus on climate change. Switch the emphasis to other issues and benefits, and the likelihood of success grows dramatically.

  • Focus on tailoring adaptation strategies to specific place; this need not require reinventing the wheel, states Konisky. There are already ample resources about best practices available to communities seeking to enhance their resilience to climate change.
  • Emphasize the non-climate benefits of adaptation. To the extent that policies are able to improve resilience and create jobs, expand green spaces, redirect investments into communities or create other tangible local benefits, they will be better received by the electorate.
  • Find ways to help politicians capture the benefits of preparation. If adaptation can, say, help lower insurance rates, then politicians will reap more of the rewards of being proactive about future disasters.
  • Change land use policies to expand natural buffers and make building codes more stringent as a way to reduce the most devastating impacts of storms.

Of course, while adaptation policies become increasingly necessary, and will surely prevent some future damage and hardship, without mitigation, they become a prohibitively expensive proposition. At this point, we have already locked in some degree of climate change, so adaptation must be part of the game plan. But we cannot adapt our way out of climate change. Mitigation may be the more controversial approach, but in the long term, it will lessen the amount of adaptation needed, and reduce its overall costs.

Their more detailed thoughts follow after the jump. Continue reading

Minding Climate Change: Presidential Power and the US National Interest

This is a guest post by Manjana Milkoreit, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Purdue University. Her research integrates international relations scholarship and cognitive theory to study actor motivations and policy design in global climate change politics. She is the author of Mindmade Politics: the Cognitive Roots of International Climate Governance (The MIT Press 2017).

If Harvey’s unprecedented battering of Houston can even partly be linked to climate change, you might wonder if the President’s visit to Texas this week made him rethink his current foreign (and domestic) policies. President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and his apparent misunderstanding of its content stand in stark contrast to his predecessor’s sustained diplomatic effort to create the agreement, join it, and ensure that the US would get global leadership credit for its diplomatic efforts to “save the planet.” How is possible for one President to oppose the agreement and for another to support it if both – presumably – acted in “the national interest?”

An objective, rationally determined national interest would have to be independent of the individual holding the presidency. Any person with the relevant information would end up making the same determination concerning the policy choice that is most beneficial for the survival and success of the US, weighing the costs and benefits of the available options. If that is the nature of the national interest – objective, rational, calculable – either Trump or Obama must be wrong. Alternatively, we might have to rethink the notion of the national interest. From a social constructivist position, the national interest is not objective, but ‘intersubjective’: the constantly changing result of social interactions and contestation among different political actors, who can assign different meanings to the same set of facts.

Integrating the rational-choice approach and social constructivist accounts of the national interest with a little bit of cognitive theory, I argue that two Presidents of the United States can take opposing policy positions on a specific issue, and both act in the national interest. When it comes to foreign policy, the US President holds the prerogative over the interpretation of the national interest. As the vocal responses to President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement have demonstrated, his definition of the national interest can be out of sync with the majority of the American voters, major states and cities and a large portion of the business community and academic observes (“a major unforced error”). As Jarrod Hayes writes, these sub-national actors challenge Trump’s foreign policy on climate change and potentially undermine the authority (and credibility, influence and effectiveness) of the US government in international affairs. Yet, they cannot change the President’s mind or foreign policy. Hence, when it comes to the national interest, much depends on what individual presidents believe, and who or what influences those beliefs (see Elizabeth Saunder’s post on Trump’s decision-making process and Steve Saideman’s comments on the Great Men theory IR scholarship). In essence, the national interest comes down to one person’s brain functions. Continue reading

Climate Change is remaking American Foreign Policy

We all know the traditional narrative in International Relations of the state as a unitary act. Despite substantial volumes of work in the foreign policy analysis subdiscipline as well as in IR theory, the common shorthand in IR scholarship is to say ‘China’ did X or ‘Britain’ bombed Y. At least in the case of the United States, climate change is going to force scholars and analysts to seriously reconsider those assumptions. Continue reading

Duck Forum on Paris Withdrawal

With the news that the Trump Administration has signaled its intent to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement, I reached out to a number of leading experts on global climate governance and U.S. climate policy for advanced comment. Contributors include Jessica Green, Jennifer Hadden, Thomas Hale, Matthew Hoffmann, Angel HsuJoanna LewisJohannes Urpelainen, and Stacy VanDeveer. 

I asked all of them to reflect on the following three questions. 1) What do you think the the consequences of U.S. withdrawal will be for the agreement? (2) How do you think other actors will respond to U.S. withdrawal in terms of their own commitments and actions? (3) What affect will this move have on U.S. standing in the world?

What follows is my synthetic take on people’s answers, my own editorializing, and then each scholars’ full comments unedited. I also have a piece this afternoon on the decision on The Monkey Cage.

Contributors to the forum are sanguine that the agreement will survive and indeed that withdrawal may in the short-run spur a commitment by leading countries, sub-national governments, and private actors to up their efforts. On some level, U.S. withdrawal could be good for the agreement if staying in meant that it sucked up all the energy and time by seeking to renegotiate the terms. Since withdrawal is not immediate, what role the U.S. will play in the interim remains to be seen. If recent discussions in Bonn are an indication, that may mean sending a skeletal crew of junior people to sit on the margins.

U.S. withdrawal creates space for the EU and China to position themselves as they have already done as global climate leaders. Over the longer-run, however, it may be harder to sustain a “race to the top” when other countries observe the United States’ backsliding in the domestic sphere. We should have a better sense in 2018 when progress to date and the rules for how to track and review pledges are set to be finalized. The loss of U.S. contributions on global climate finance appears highly likely, which may, in turn, dampen other contributions, a very bad omen for international efforts to support adaptation and resilience.

While the agreement can survive four years without the United States, eight years of a hostile Trump administration would pose a more significant challenge since the world needs U.S. participation (namely, domestic action) for the agreement to be effective. The commitments made in Paris in 2015 were a down payment on what is required to have an even outside chance of keeping temperatures from rising more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. If we cannot ratchet up ambition in 2020, then we are in for a world of even more significant warming and weird weather than any of us are prepared for.

All of the contributors agree that this is a major unforced error by the United States, which was totally unnecessary given the flexibility of the agreement. After having exercised 8 years of leadership to remove the stigma of previous inaction, the United States has reversed course and punched itself in the face at a moment when the rest of the world is poised to move on to next generation clean energy that will protect the planet and be the source of jobs and wealth in the future. The best case scenario at this point is that United States elects a new president in 2020 who reverses course and promptly re-joins the agreement in January 2021. Until then, we’ve got some work to do.

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Should we try to convince Trump to stay in the Paris Agreement?

This is a guest post from Matthew Hoffmann, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto

Should I stay or should I go now?
If I go, there will be trouble
And if I stay it will be double (The Clash)

The Trump administration is nearing a decision about whether to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate change. A number of commentaries are urging Trump to stay in and my underlying predilection is to join this chorus. Cards on the table, I am a fan of the Paris Agreement—it certainly has flaws, but it is the best thing to happen to the multilateral response to climate change … perhaps ever. I agree with just about every reason for staying in the Agreement I’ve seen:

Under normal circumstances, staying in the Paris Agreement is a no-brainer for the U.S. But circumstances are not normal. What these commentaries have in common (besides being right and well-argued) is that the force of their arguments for the U.S. staying in depends on the U.S. being, at worst, ambivalent about taking action on climate change. Unfortunately, this is simply not the case. I am therefore, uncomfortably, suggesting the need for serious conversation about whether it is better for action on climate change if the U.S. withdraws from the Paris Agreement. Continue reading

Bret Stephens and Climate Change

The former Wall Street Journal writer Bret Stephens has a column today to kick off his new digs at the New York Times that meanders into climate change territory and has raised some hackles. In the piece, he talks about how public opinion on climate change is soft, which some folks have complained doesn’t capture public opinion accurately. Both are true in my view and miss the point. As the Storify thread of tweets below talks about, Republican elites and the fossil fuel industry have poisoned the well so that many Republicans think climate change is a hoax. So, public opinion is soft. Stephens goes on to write about scientific uncertainty, but that’s really irrelevant to the issue at hand, which is the extreme politicization of this issue in a decade which has made bipartisan action on this topic unlikely for the foreseeable future. That leads me to conclude something intemperate in tweet 22!

What the EPA budget cuts mean for North American environmental politics

The negative impact of President Trump’s recent actions to de-fund many Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) programs goes beyond withdrawing support from climate adaptation and mitigation initiatives, and rollbacks on environmental regulations. These budget cuts will potentially hinder the cumulative (and positive) work that the Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America (CEC) has already done for the past 23 years to improve the North American environment.

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Why IR needs the environment and the environment needs IR

This is a guest post from Jessica F. Green and Thomas N. Hale. Green is Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies at New York University. She can be reached at Jessica.green@nyu.eduHale is Associate Professor of Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University. He can be reached at thomas.hale@bsg.ox.ac.uk.

The state of the global environment is terrible—and deteriorating. The globalization of industrial production and the consumptive habits of 7 billion people have created the Anthropocene—a geologic age in which the actions of humans are the primary determinant of the Earth’s natural systems. This shift creates a profound new form of environmental interdependence, of which climate change is only the most salient example. Other “planetary boundaries” include biodiversity; the nitrogen cycle on which plant life and agriculture depend, fresh water; and the world’s oceans and forests. Human activity is putting all of these systems into a state of crisis. Each of them is essential for economic production and human welfare. One does not have to be a political scientist to infer that the implications for politics are profound, even catastrophic.

What do international relations scholars have to say about these looming political and economic crises? Not much.

In a new study (ungated access) published in PS: Political Science & Politics, we use the Teaching and Research in International Policy (TRIP) data to identify and understand what we describe as the “marginalization” of environmental politics in international relations. The results shocked us.

Though IR scholars in the United States see climate change, along with conflict in the Middle East, to be the greatest global threat in the years to come, just 7% of them describe their primary or even secondary research field as environmental politics. More damning, fewer than 2% of the articles published in the top disciplinary journals (defined by impact factor) are on environmental subjects. Continue reading

Fighting for Sustainability in a Post (national) Regulation Era

This is a guest post from Matthew Hoffmann, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto

The environmental policy pronouncements and orders emanating from the Trump administration are tracking the worst fears and expectations of those concerned by the scorched earth, anti-environmental rhetoric of the Trump campaign. The list of egregious (e.g. defunding Great Lakes restoration), just plain weird (e.g. rolling back the ban on lead ammunition and fishing gear in national parks), and inexplicable (e.g. getting rid of the energy star program) decisions and announcements is staggering.

Latest on the chopping block are federal fuel standards for automobiles as a key step in rolling back Obama’s climate policies. On March 15 The New York Times reported that , “granting the automakers their top wish, Mr. Trump halted an initiative by the Obama administration to impose stringent fuel-economy standards by 2025” re-opening a review of the standards.

Fully stemming the tide of the assault on environmental protection will probably require election (or two), but studies of environmental politics show that there are strategies for pursuing sustainability in the face of federal dismantling of environmental policies—go local (or state) and use rhetorical and economic leverage points to target corporations directly. The fuel economy standards fight is a potentially attractive area for environmental activists to use such strategies. Continue reading

Scientists Will March on Washington on April, 22. International Relations Scholars Should Join Them.

As became clear earlier this week in the discussion around how academic associations should respond to Trump’s travel ban in organizing their annual meetings, President Trump’s policy does not only affect national and religious minorities; it does not only affect scientists from Muslim-majority countries. In the case of the travel ban, it is also an existential attack on scientific inquiry – inhibiting scholarly collaboration and exchange on which all scientists rely.  Excluding individuals from freedom to share scientific ideas based on their nationality or faith from is discriminatory and contrary to the US constitution and to human rights law, but it is also an impediment to science itself.

Indeed, a pillar of Trump’s vision appears to be his hostility to science.  Within days of taking office the Administration had issued gag orders and funding freezes for government science agencies and reversed science based policies.  An unrepentant plagiarist who believes evolution should not be taught in schools is close to being confirmed as Education Secretary. The situation is so bad that Dan Drezner  encourages political scientists to assume National Science Foundation grants will be on the chopping block in the next months. And he is probably right.

 

The good news: as with many other issues, the opposition response has been quick and swift, with a March for Science now being organized for Earth Day, April 22:

The March for Science is a celebration of our passion for science and a call to support and safeguard the scientific community. Recent policy changes have caused heightened worry among scientists, and the incredible and immediate outpouring of support has made clear that these concerns are also shared by hundreds of thousands of people around the world. Mischaracterization of science as a partisan issue, which has given policymakers permission to reject overwhelming evidence, is a critical and urgent matter. It is time for people who support scientific research and evidence-based policies to take a public stand and be counted.

Social scientists concerned with international relations have good reason to support, publicize and join this effort. Evidence-based foreign policy has never been more vital, and the authority of scientists and experts never more fragile in the “post-truth” era. Nuclear security and climate change adaptation depend on both physical and social science. Risk analysis is critical to a sensible approach to counter-terrorism and a measured response to media fixation on outlying events. Social scientists have a role to play in slowing or blunting policies based on fear, misinformation, propaganda or logical fallacy.

Of course there is scientific debate about the political significance of marches as a tool for influencing policy change.  Social scientists can and should be and are engaged in many other forms of activism, Weberian and civic at this time: holding the media accountable, writing Monkey-Cage style op-eds, running for office, using our connections and expert authority to visit our Senators in collective delegations, protecting our colleagues, working through our institutions to protect the scientific process and through our social media accounts to correct conspiracy theories, alternative facts and racist logical fallacies circulating in our networks.

Yet a Million-Scientist-March with an army of fact-loving citizens at our backs should be thought of as more than one among many efforts to communicate to the government. Mass marches are a signaling tactic for audiences within and beyond our borders, and a way to influence the national political narrative. Large crowds in the streets on April 22 will affirm to the world that particularly around pressing global issues not all Americans are willing to deal in “post-truth.” And the march will be a focusing event in a discursive effort to inoculate American citizenry against the idea that there exist “alternative facts.”

Earth Day is a moment to think in global terms about our planetary security. I hope scholars of international security will be front and center.

 

WPTPN: An Inconvenient Post-Truth Post

This World Politics in a Time of Populist Nationalism (WPTPN) guest post is written by Robert Y. Shum, an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies at The College at Brockport, State University of New York (SUNY).

Does the Paris Agreement, and the likely withdrawal therefrom by the Trump administration, matter? On the surface, the current situation is not so different from George W. Bush’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. Probing deeper, however, important differences come to the fore. Many independent observers saw the Kyoto Protocol as fundamentally flawed in its lack of obligations applying to developing countries, including China and India. In contrast, an understanding between China and the United States lay at the center of the Paris Agreement.

Critics of the Paris approach to internationally-negotiated national emissions targets nonetheless argue that its effectiveness is limited compared to that of policies made at and by domestic institutions, regardless of the Parisian promise to broaden participation at the international level so as to include developing-country emitters. With the prospect that US participation in the international climate regime will be reduced under a Trump administration, the question regarding the value of participation in international agreements now shifts to the effect of US (non-)participation on the global climate regime. Minimizing this effect has become a source of hope and optimism. Thus, ironically, following Trump’s election, the critical view of Paris takes on a new function as both consolation for environmentalists and apologia for skeptics.

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Climate and Security in the Trump Era

I’ve been asked by some reporters about the significance of Donald Trump’s victory for the agenda of climate and security, the emergent concern that climate change is likely to produce consequences that rise to the level of security challenges for the United States and rest of the world (some background here and here).  Some of my initial thoughts were quoted today in Scientific American and I’ve expanded on them here.  As I noted in my last post, we’ve already seen considerable speculation about what the Trump administration might yield on climate change and wider environmental policy.

We’re kind of entering in to  Kremlinology territory here. We don’t really know what is going to happen, and I think assuming the worst might actually be strategically counter-productive. Donald Trump has already signaled that he was going to walk away from a number of his previous hardline policy commitments like the border wall.

To the extent that he does possess an inner pragmatist as President Obama has suggested, then those baby steps in the direction of the light out to be encouraged. True, it is easy to read too much in to ambiguous statements like Trump’s apparent open mind on climate change policy in his New York Times interview last week.

My general sense is that yes we have reasons to be concerned, but we should also wait to see what Trump intends to do, who he actually appoints to key positions,and whether some of the more out there ideas — like zeroing out NASA’s earth science efforts — actually get taken up in policy.  I also think we need a theory of how to influence Donald Trump personally and the Trump administration broadly. Let me speak to both issues and the significance for the climate and security agenda.

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What Does Trump’s Victory Mean for the Environment?

Much has already been written about the significance of Donald Trump’s victory for the environment, with particular emphasis on climate change. There is some speculation that Trump, based on campaign promises, will try to undo some of President Obama’s signature achievements, namely some scuttle that he’s looking for a fast exit from the 2015 Paris climate agreement that recently entered into force.

The noted climate denier Myron Ebell was named to lead Trump’s transition at the EPA. President Obama in his press conference today made a vigorous case for why his efforts to green the economy could and should live on under a Trump administration. Most analysts fear the worst, though a few see some of the changes, like the fading role of coal, as more long-lived and less subject to presidential influence. I’m going to focus on climate change here.  Continue reading

Why does IR shun global water governance?

I’ve been invited to join the cast of guest bloggers here at Duck of Minerva, and as you may have expected, the first thing I thought of was “well, I’ve made it, and… now what am I supposed to blog about?” On my personal (yet research-focused) blog, I write about a very broad range of topics: academic writing, time management, literature reviews, surviving academia, and heck, even my own research! But here at the Duck of Minerva I wondered aloud whether I could bring more attention to research issues I’ve been concerned about that I haven’t seen resolved (don’t you worry, you may get an occasional blog post on tenure dossiers, or avoiding overwork). So here we go…

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