Tag: libya (page 1 of 3)

The Era of Austerity or the Era of Intervention?

Tuareg_rebel_in_northern_MaliA variety of commentators listened to President Obama’s Inauguration speech and, having heard few words devoted to foreign policy, declared that the second term of this Administration will be marked by less activism on the global stage.  The draw downs from Iraq and Afghanistan readily reinforce this view, as do a variety of academics peddling recommendations for a new grand strategy of restraint.  I am more circumspect, for inauguration speeches are by nature more domestic in focus.  More importantly, America’s national security interests have not changed fundamentally.

The Obama Doctrine of robust burden sharing—being multilateral when we can, unilateral when we must—will continue to cope with a world that may be in rapid flux but has little propensity to generate the stability and security that would justify a restraint-based grand strategy.  Al-Qaeda was quiescent in one form, but in its new decentralized affiliate-based form it is anything but.  With the global campaign against terrorism continuing amid a constellation of constrained economic resources, robust burden sharing is an appropriate grand strategy; moreover, it is here to stay (at least for the duration of this Administration and likely well beyond).

Opponents of the President have had a heyday with the unintentional phrase “leading from behind.”  Ever since an unnamed Administration official spoke these tongue-in-cheek words to The New Yorker’s Ryan Lizza, critics have twisted them and/or ascribed their own meaning more along the lines of “retreat to the back.”  Some grew so agitated, they practically fell over themselves in their clarion call for robust American leadership practically at all costs—case-in-point a certain presidential candidate’s “No Apology” book that aptly captured this sentiment, and a certain senator’s delight in singing “Bomb-bomb-bomb Iran.”

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Foreign Policy to the Fore: Is Romney Below the Bar?

U.S. Consulate in Benghazi 9/12/2012

I heard Dan Drezner in the car on NPR yesterday talking about whether foreign policy might matter in this election. And, last night and today, with the events in Egypt and Libya, he may be more right than even he anticipated.

We may have an incident, in the wake of the 11th anniversary of the 9-11 attacks, that will shape the contours of the election and have wider repercussions for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa. Politically, does it constitute a disqualifying moment for Mitt Romney?
Like Dan, I’ve been of the mind that foreign policy doesn’t matter for most Americans in this election, and that barring a crisis, Mitt Romney only minimally needed to be seen as above the bar to serve as commander in chief. Foreign policy might affect the election on the margins with military families in key swing states.

As Dan suggested in recent posts, Romney did himself even more damage in recent months and during the convention in which he unnecessarily antagonized our closest allies on his foreign tour and then failed to mention our troops in Afghanistan during his convention speech.

Both actions, somewhat minor at the time, may now be overshadowed by Romney’s ill-timed and intemperate rush to blame the Obama administration for apologizing for actions by private actors in the U.S. that might have outraged Muslims (namely a bizarre and crude anti-Muslim propaganda “film” by a mysterious person who claimed Jewish, American, and Israeli roots who appeared to be none of those things). Never mind that the so-called “apology” was a tweet issued by the U.S. embassy in Cairo at a time before the protesters’ attacks were launched where the embassy sought to defuse a volatile situation. Never mind that the Obama administration quickly distanced itself from this tweet.

All of this would have been small beer had it not been for the tragic events that unfolded over the night that took the life of U.S. ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens, who was killed by a mob apparently outraged by the same film (or, what may have been an pre-planned attack by Islamists taking advantage of the moment to exact revenge for a recent assassination in Yemen).

All of these events remain murky (here’s a timeline) so what’s the sensible thing for a presidential candidate to do in the face of incomplete information? Well, most Republicans issued outrage about the loss of life of Ambassador Stevens and three other Americans. Senator John McCain, for example, along with Senators Lindsey Graham and Joseph Lieberman issued a statement: “We are anguished and outraged by the death of four citizens of the United States.” Most politicians said something along the lines of President Obama who said that there was “no justification” for the kinds of violence that had occurred in the wake of publicity of the film.

So what did Romney do? Romney issued a statement last night blaming the Obama Administration for what he called a “disgraceful” apology, that is the tweet by the embassy in Cairo:

I’m outraged by the attacks on American diplomatic missions in Libya and Egypt and by the death of an American consulate worker in Benghazi. It’s disgraceful that the Obama administration’s first response was not to condemn attacks on our diplomatic missions, but to sympathize with those who waged the attacks.

Then, this morning, Romney doubled down with a press conference sandwiched in between Secretary of State Clinton’s remarks and the President’s. By this time, it was clear that the events had escalated in the region and between the time Romney issued his first statement and today, the Obama administration had rejected that so-called apology and, more importantly, our Ambassador in Libya and three other Americans were now dead.

Romney’s statement to rally our country at a potentially perilous moment went like this:

“It’s a terrible course for America to stand in apology for our values.”

“America will not tolerate attacks against our citizens and against our embassies. We’ll defend, also, our constitutional rights of speech and assembly and religion.” 

“Apology for America’s values is never the right course.”

The reaction by many in the media as well as a number of establishment Republicans is that this statement was unseemly and ill-timed political opportunism, especially since the situation is dangerous and as we mourn the loss of life (look at my Twitter feed for today for a long list of detractors like Peggy Noonan, David Frum, Ed Rogers, Joe Scarborough, Nick Burns, even Romney flak John Sununu).

Ben Smith captured a number of off the record reactions by Republicans that were scathing (“Bungle… utter disaster…not ready for prime time… not presidential… Lehman moment.” It is certainly too soon to elevate this moment to be more than it is, but the swift condemnation by both the media and many Republican insiders could redound upon those handful of undecideds for whom presidential candidates must at least meet a basic threshold of competency.

Beyond the politics, with the situation in the Middle E
ast and Afghanistan especially volatile, the next 24 to 48 hours may determine whether or not this moment is more consequential in terms of U.S. interests in the region. While the Libyan government has repudiated these attacks, Egypt’s leader Mohamed Morsi was slow to condemn them. Let’s hope the situation settles down and this doesn’t become a bigger issue.

Foreign Policy to the Fore: Is Romney Below the Bar?

U.S. Consulate in Benghazi 9/12/2012

I heard Dan Drezner in the car on NPR yesterday talking about whether foreign policy might matter in this election. And, last night and today, with the events in Egypt and Libya, he may be more right than even he anticipated.

We may have an incident, in the wake of the 11th anniversary of the 9-11 attacks, that will shape the contours of the election and have wider repercussions for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa. Politically, does it constitute a disqualifying moment for Mitt Romney?
Like Dan, I’ve been of the mind that foreign policy doesn’t matter for most Americans in this election, and that barring a crisis, Mitt Romney only minimally needed to be seen as above the bar to serve as commander in chief. Foreign policy might affect the election on the margins with military families in key swing states.

As Dan suggested in recent posts, Romney did himself even more damage in recent months and during the convention in which he unnecessarily antagonized our closest allies on his foreign tour and then failed to mention our troops in Afghanistan during his convention speech.

Both actions, somewhat minor at the time, may now be overshadowed by Romney’s ill-timed and intemperate rush to blame the Obama administration for apologizing for actions by private actors in the U.S. that might have outraged Muslims (namely a bizarre and crude anti-Muslim propaganda “film” by a mysterious person who claimed Jewish, American, and Israeli roots who appeared to be none of those things). Never mind that the so-called “apology” was a tweet issued by the U.S. embassy in Cairo at a time before the protesters’ attacks were launched where the embassy sought to defuse a volatile situation. Never mind that the Obama administration quickly distanced itself from this tweet.

All of this would have been small beer had it not been for the tragic events that unfolded over the night that took the life of U.S. ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens, who was killed by a mob apparently outraged by the same film (or, what may have been an pre-planned attack by Islamists taking advantage of the moment to exact revenge for a recent assassination in Yemen).

All of these events remain murky (here’s a timeline) so what’s the sensible thing for a presidential candidate to do in the face of incomplete information? Well, most Republicans issued outrage about the loss of life of Ambassador Stevens and three other Americans. Senator John McCain, for example, along with Senators Lindsey Graham and Joseph Lieberman issued a statement: “We are anguished and outraged by the death of four citizens of the United States.” Most politicians said something along the lines of President Obama who said that there was “no justification” for the kinds of violence that had occurred in the wake of publicity of the film.

So what did Romney do? Romney issued a statement last night blaming the Obama Administration for what he called a “disgraceful” apology, that is the tweet by the embassy in Cairo:

I’m outraged by the attacks on American diplomatic missions in Libya and Egypt and by the death of an American consulate worker in Benghazi. It’s disgraceful that the Obama administration’s first response was not to condemn attacks on our diplomatic missions, but to sympathize with those who waged the attacks.

Then, this morning, Romney doubled down with a press conference sandwiched in between Secretary of State Clinton’s remarks and the President’s. By this time, it was clear that the events had escalated in the region and between the time Romney issued his first statement and today, the Obama administration had rejected that so-called apology and, more importantly, our Ambassador in Libya and three other Americans were now dead.

Romney’s statement to rally our country at a potentially perilous moment went like this:

“It’s a terrible course for America to stand in apology for our values.”

“America will not tolerate attacks against our citizens and against our embassies. We’ll defend, also, our constitutional rights of speech and assembly and religion.” 

“Apology for America’s values is never the right course.”

The reaction by many in the media as well as a number of establishment Republicans is that this statement was unseemly and ill-timed political opportunism, especially since the situation is dangerous and as we mourn the loss of life (look at my Twitter feed for today for a long list of detractors like Peggy Noonan, David Frum, Ed Rogers, Joe Scarborough, Nick Burns, even Romney flak John Sununu).

Ben Smith captured a number of off the record reactions by Republicans that were scathing (“Bungle… utter disaster…not ready for prime time… not presidential… Lehman moment.” It is certainly too soon to elevate this moment to be more than it is, but the swift condemnation by both the media and many Republican insiders could redound upon those handful of undecideds for whom presidential candidates must at least meet a basic threshold of competency.

Beyond the politics, with the situation in the Middle East and Afghanistan especially volatile, the next 24 to 48 hours may determine whether or not this moment is more consequential in terms of U.S. interests in the region. While the Libyan government has repudiated these attacks, Egypt’s leader Mohamed Morsi was slow to condemn them. Let’s hope the situation settles down and this doesn’t become a bigger issue.

R2P and the "Double-Standard Problem"

Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer (writing at the Fair Observer) argues that there’s no double-standard problem because the Libyan intervention did not establish or reflect a generalized responsibility to protect.


The R2P is a slogan that has some media efficacy but a rather dubious legal existence. That does not prevent the majority of observers asserting that it was the basis of Resolution 1973, authorizing intervention in Libya. That is not true either. The Resolution reiterated the internal responsibility “of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population”, but nowhere did it speak of an external responsibility of the international community to intervene. This does not imply that the concept did not play a role in the motivations of certain permanent members, only that it is not considered as a consensual “norm” worthy of being explicitly mentioned. 

The military intervention in Libya did not represent an implementation of a purportedly universal “responsibility to protect”, but an ad hoc consensus among powerful states. Moreover, it was motivated by both humanitarian reasons and national interests, as British Prime Minister David Cameron explained in his March 18 speeches evoking the security risk for Europe, posed by terrorist threats and potential migration pressure. It is also a question of moral image and political gain. Nicolas Sarkozy used the intervention to consolidate his presidential calibre and keep the failures of French diplomacy in Tunisia and Egypt out of the limelight.

I definitely agree that the intervention was an ad-hoc arrangement where a combination of principles, interests, and opportunities facilitated intervention, but I’ll leave the rest to international-law scholars.

Check it out.

R2P and the “Double-Standard Problem”

Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer (writing at the Fair Observer) argues that there’s no double-standard problem because the Libyan intervention did not establish or reflect a generalized responsibility to protect.


The R2P is a slogan that has some media efficacy but a rather dubious legal existence. That does not prevent the majority of observers asserting that it was the basis of Resolution 1973, authorizing intervention in Libya. That is not true either. The Resolution reiterated the internal responsibility “of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population”, but nowhere did it speak of an external responsibility of the international community to intervene. This does not imply that the concept did not play a role in the motivations of certain permanent members, only that it is not considered as a consensual “norm” worthy of being explicitly mentioned. 

The military intervention in Libya did not represent an implementation of a purportedly universal “responsibility to protect”, but an ad hoc consensus among powerful states. Moreover, it was motivated by both humanitarian reasons and national interests, as British Prime Minister David Cameron explained in his March 18 speeches evoking the security risk for Europe, posed by terrorist threats and potential migration pressure. It is also a question of moral image and political gain. Nicolas Sarkozy used the intervention to consolidate his presidential calibre and keep the failures of French diplomacy in Tunisia and Egypt out of the limelight.

I definitely agree that the intervention was an ad-hoc arrangement where a combination of principles, interests, and opportunities facilitated intervention, but I’ll leave the rest to international-law scholars.

Check it out.

Peace vs. Justice: Is the ICC Doing It Wrong?

Photo from Still Burning

The Canadian International Council has rolled out a series of interviews and essays on “Peace v. Justice: The ICC and its Alternatives”. Far from flogging a dead theoretical horse, it’s a great renewal of a debate on the realities of the seemingly dichotomous choice between peace and justice.

Not to mention it’s a solid dose of Canadian scholarly insight and we debate very politely.

There are interviews with Kathryn Sikkink on the “justice cascade,” Leslie Vinjamuri on the role of the ICC in conflict zones, and Louise Arbour on the general debate. There are also essays on individual case studies that collectively demonstrate how peace and justice can be mutually reinforcing or come to blows when politics inevitably gets in the way. Check out essays by Mark Kersten on Libya, Stephen Brown on Kenya, Valerie Oosterveld on the Taylor trial, Rosalind Raddatz on the infamous General Butt Naked, and Simon Collard-Wexler on Timor Leste.  (More to come on Sudan, Kony 2012 and Canada’s truth commission.)
My own modest contribution is on “The Paradox of Lawfare.” Here’s a snippet:
The International Criminal Court precariously sits at the intersection of law, conflict, and politics. As such, the Court’s judicial intervention in ongoing conflicts and targeting of elite perpetrators of atrocities render it both an agent and a tool of what has been called “lawfare.” On the one hand, lawfare can refer to judicial interventions to curb atrocities through means that are coercive but morally preferable to military force. This form of lawfare is an ideal expression of liberal internationalism. On the other hand, the Court and global rule of law can be abused by states and political elites that seek to eliminate rivals and protect their own impunity. This is the paradox of the ICC – that it has so far been implicated in both legitimate and illegitimate uses of lawfare…

"Truth to Power": Louise Arbour on Human Rights and International Justice

CBC – CP file photo

The Canadian International Council recently organized an interesting public event with Louise Arbour on her role in speaking “truth to power.” The talk is available on line at Open Canada.org. (starts around 22min mark, after the introductions) and is constructed as a dialogue with Stephen Toope, President of the University of British Columbia and notable international law scholar.

Madam Arbour is known for being outspoken on the ICC’s prosecutorial strategy, shortcomings in the human rights regime, and advocacy on the Responsibility to Protect and especially the case of Sri Lanka. Arbour’s authoritative voice on these issues stems from her professional credentials and experience: former Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, former justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and presently the President of International Crisis Group.

It’s worth a listen. But for those interested in just the human rights and international justice stuff here are my selective highlights on the issues mentioned above.
(Note: these are not exact quotes as i’m a sloppy transcriber).

Human Rights
There is a need for adequate institutions, specifically an international human rights court. As long as the protection of human rights is in the hands of the duty bearers – the states – not surprisingly we’re not going to get very far.

Peace vs. Justice
The timing (of the Milosevic trial) was dictated exclusively by prosecutorial considerations. Some were concerned that a peace deal would put him out of reach…What it did to the peace process was not part of my brief.

The indictment of Gaddafi was very precipitous…it’s not an unfair assumption that it might have contributed to closing some doors to a negotiated settlement….The same actors in the Security Council that referred the Libya case to the ICC have not moved on Syria…The tensions between peace and justice are very present and will remain so until and unless we segregate the justice agenda from the political one.

Joseph Kony…probably accurate that the fact that he was indicted, at the end of the day, made it impossible for him to participate in peace talks…Political negotiators cannot deliver on that. The ICC process is a parallel track. It is not negotiable in peace talks.

What we need to do is what we do in domestic systems – we make it very clear that politicians don’t run indictments.

ICC and Africa
It would have been imminently predictable that the docket of the ICC would be heavily African. Apart from the cases of Security Council referral, all the other cases have come from countries that have ratified the Rome Treaty….That is the fundamental premise…The ICC was not engaged when there was, in my opinion and with lots of evidence, massive slaughter of civilians on the beaches of Sri Lanka. Well, Sri Lanka has not ratified the Rome Treaty.

The ICC might have been better advised, rather than try to downplay (the African bias) to really embrace it and engage with African governments – open offices, be there, be very present. As opposed to staying in The Hague and be very defensive that it’s only engaged in African issues.

Cooperation of authorities in the DRC with the International Criminal Court has been problematic from the beginning. It’s very unfortunate that the ICC only has jurisdiction in the Congo since the Court was created in 2002 when in fact the most catastrophic loss of life in the Congo took place in the decade before, from 1993-2003. When I was High Commissioner (for Human Rights) I launched what we called the “mapping exercise” to try to document that decade where between 3-5 million people were killed in the east of the Congo and there’s no legal regime to deal with it. The ICC has no jurisdiction so the idea was to hand this over to the Congolese authorities to try to encourage them to launch some kind of mechanism.

Accountability there (DRC), even with the ICC in place, it’s not almost ten years since the ICC has been in place and what? There are five, six people charged?….The ICC has a long way to go before it can be reflective of its mission in that environment

War on Terror and Sri Lanka
One of the most tangible and perverse effects of the War on Terror is the treatment of the war in Sri Lanka. The last few months, in 2009, of the thirty year old war whereby the government of Sri Lanka finally eradicated the LTTE was achieved at an unconscionable cost to civilian lives, which generated virtually no adverse response because it was under the agenda of the War on Terror. The LTTE had been depicted, quite accurately I might add, as a terrorist organization which had preyed on its own population. There’s not much to be said very positively about its methodology. And a lot of casualties in the last few months of the war are attributable to the LTTE itself – it’s not just government forces. But the way this was achieved would not have been tolerable if it had not been under the umbrella of one of the few so-called success stories of the War on Terror.


“Truth to Power”: Louise Arbour on Human Rights and International Justice

CBC – CP file photo

The Canadian International Council recently organized an interesting public event with Louise Arbour on her role in speaking “truth to power.” The talk is available on line at Open Canada.org. (starts around 22min mark, after the introductions) and is constructed as a dialogue with Stephen Toope, President of the University of British Columbia and notable international law scholar.

Madam Arbour is known for being outspoken on the ICC’s prosecutorial strategy, shortcomings in the human rights regime, and advocacy on the Responsibility to Protect and especially the case of Sri Lanka. Arbour’s authoritative voice on these issues stems from her professional credentials and experience: former Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, former justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and presently the President of International Crisis Group.

It’s worth a listen. But for those interested in just the human rights and international justice stuff here are my selective highlights on the issues mentioned above.
(Note: these are not exact quotes as i’m a sloppy transcriber).

Human Rights
There is a need for adequate institutions, specifically an international human rights court. As long as the protection of human rights is in the hands of the duty bearers – the states – not surprisingly we’re not going to get very far.

Peace vs. Justice
The timing (of the Milosevic trial) was dictated exclusively by prosecutorial considerations. Some were concerned that a peace deal would put him out of reach…What it did to the peace process was not part of my brief.

The indictment of Gaddafi was very precipitous…it’s not an unfair assumption that it might have contributed to closing some doors to a negotiated settlement….The same actors in the Security Council that referred the Libya case to the ICC have not moved on Syria…The tensions between peace and justice are very present and will remain so until and unless we segregate the justice agenda from the political one.

Joseph Kony…probably accurate that the fact that he was indicted, at the end of the day, made it impossible for him to participate in peace talks…Political negotiators cannot deliver on that. The ICC process is a parallel track. It is not negotiable in peace talks.

What we need to do is what we do in domestic systems – we make it very clear that politicians don’t run indictments.

ICC and Africa
It would have been imminently predictable that the docket of the ICC would be heavily African. Apart from the cases of Security Council referral, all the other cases have come from countries that have ratified the Rome Treaty….That is the fundamental premise…The ICC was not engaged when there was, in my opinion and with lots of evidence, massive slaughter of civilians on the beaches of Sri Lanka. Well, Sri Lanka has not ratified the Rome Treaty.

The ICC might have been better advised, rather than try to downplay (the African bias) to really embrace it and engage with African governments – open offices, be there, be very present. As opposed to staying in The Hague and be very defensive that it’s only engaged in African issues.

Cooperation of authorities in the DRC with the International Criminal Court has been problematic from the beginning. It’s very unfortunate that the ICC only has jurisdiction in the Congo since the Court was created in 2002 when in fact the most catastrophic loss of life in the Congo took place in the decade before, from 1993-2003. When I was High Commissioner (for Human Rights) I launched what we called the “mapping exercise” to try to document that decade where between 3-5 million people were killed in the east of the Congo and there’s no legal regime to deal with it. The ICC has no jurisdiction so the idea was to hand this over to the Congolese authorities to try to encourage them to launch some kind of mechanism.

Accountability there (DRC), even with the ICC in place, it’s not almost ten years since the ICC has been in place and what? There are five, six people charged?….The ICC has a long way to go before it can be reflective of its mission in that environment

War on Terror and Sri Lanka
One of the most tangible and perverse effects of the War on Terror is the treatment of the war in Sri Lanka. The last few months, in 2009, of the thirty year old war whereby the government of Sri Lanka finally eradicated the LTTE was achieved at an unconscionable cost to civilian lives, which generated virtually no adverse response because it was under the agenda of the War on Terror. The LTTE had been depicted, quite accurately I might add, as a terrorist organization which had preyed on its own population. There’s not much to be said very positively about its methodology. And a lot of casualties in the last few months of the war are attributable to the LTTE itself – it’s not just government forces. But the way this was achieved would not have been tolerable if it had not been under the umbrella of one of the few so-called success stories of the War on Terror.


Keeping Up With The International Criminal Court: The Realization of Judicial Intervention

The International Criminal Court would “wither and die” was once the prediction of John Bolton, former US Ambassador to the UN. It seems that is not the case. There has been a dizzying amount of activity surrounding the Court lately, much of which underscores that judicial intervention is becoming a mainstay of conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

Undoubtedly, the ICC will be the hot topic at your department’s holiday party ;) Here’s your cheat sheet so you can nerd out with everyone else. If you get stuck, just wryly remark that it depends on sovereignty, or complementarity, or selectivity. That’s always gold in international justice.

LIBYA: Saif al-Islam Gaddafi (and maybe al-Senussi?) was captured and the jockeying for who gets to conduct his trial began. Ocampo suggested on his recent visit to Tripoli that the Libyan court system might be capable of conducting a fair trial and that the ICC would provide assistance, not competition. But it’s not up to Ocampo. ICC judges will determine whether the Libyan court system is up to snuff. If a Libyan court does try Saif  this is an opportunity for the ICC to affect positive complementarity and help rebuild the rule of law in Libya. But there are valid concerns that Libya courts are not ready so soon into the post-authoritarian transition and after decades in which the courts were an instrument of repression. Louise Arbour, head of the International Crisis Group and former prosecutors at the ICTY and ICTR, explains the tensions of complementarity in this case and why international justice is often a measure of last resort.

SYRIA: The UN Human Rights Council has found that crimes against humanity, including murder, torture, and disappearances, have been perpetrated by Syrian security and military forces and that the death toll is at least 4,000. UNHCR chief, Navi Pillay, is urging the Security Council to refer the situation to the ICC. But the UNHCR’s December 2nd resolution condemning the violence did not explicitly ask for such a referral. Certainly a UNSC referral is warranted and would counter criticisms that judicial interventions are politicized and selective. But China and Russia would veto it so that’s a non-starter.


MEXICO: Human rights activists have petitioned the ICC to investigate and determine whether crimes against humanity have been committed in the context of the state’s “war on drugs.” Specifically, the petition alleges that President Calderon, a top drug cartel boss, and political and security officials are responsible for the murder, torture, and kidnapping of hundreds of civilians in a war that has killed 45,000. It will take a while before the ICC prosecutors can determine if the case meets the “sufficient gravity” criteria and if the crimes were “systemic” and “systemic” to warrant charges of crimes against humanity. Mexico is a State Party to the Rome Statute but the government immediately rejected the accusations and insists that the rule of law is respected and upheld in Mexico. Calderon has called the accusations “slander” and the government issued a statement saying “it categorically rejects that security policy could be considered an international crime.”

KENYA: A Kenyan high court judge issued an arrest warrant for President Bashir of Sudan. The Kenyan chapter of the International Commission of Jurists (and NGO) filed the request. Bashir has visited several States Parties to the Rome Statute, including Kenya in August, and was not arrested – a violation of States Parties’ obligations. The recent ruling prompted the Sudanese government to expel the Kenyan Ambassador and prompted criticisms that this was a political move by the ICJ to put pressure on the Kenyan government to cooperate with the “Ocampo Six” cases before the ICC. This is partially a score for Rome Statute compliance, but the Kenyan government plans to appeal the ruling. One very interesting aspect of the ICC-Kenya situation is the prominence of civil society actors pushing for accountability, and the growing rift with political elites.

COTE D’IVOIRE: The ICC unsealed an arrest warrant for former President Laurent Gbagbo on November 29th and he was promptly transferred from his house arrest to The Hague. This is the first head of state to appear before the Court as Gaddafi met a different kind of “justice” and Bashir is still enjoying his impunity. Gbagbo is accused of being an indirect co-perpetrator of crimes against humanity, committed in the context of Cote d’Ivoire’s post-election violence from December 2010-April 2011. Rival and current President Alassane Ouattara has long welcomed the ICC’s involvement and wants Gbagbo tried internationally. But the arrest still seemed sudden and dramatic – shocking Gbagbo’s supporters who were hoping for an amnesty-for-peace type deal. Gbagbo made his first appearance before the ICC judges today (Dec 5) and judges will announce on June 18, 2012 if the case will proceed to trial.

There are two things to watch for. First, the timing of the arrest appears political as Cote d’Ivoire has parliamentary elections coming up on December 11th and Gbagbo supporters have pledged to boycott the vote. Second, the arrest is stirring up accusations of victor’s justice. The ICC indicates that investigations are ongoing, that there will be more charges, and both sides are being investigated. But locally there’s pessimism that crimes committed on behalf or at the best of Ouattara’s forces will be prosecuted.

SUDAN: An arrest warrant was requested of ICC judges by the Chief Prosecutor on December 2nd for Sudan’s Defence Minister, Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Darfur. At the time of the alleged crimes (August 2033-March 2003) Hussein was Interior Minister and representative in Darfur. Hussein is closely connected to two of the ICC’s other targets – Bashir and Harun. The request for an arrest warrant comes at a time when the crimes and victims in Darfur have fallen off the world’s radar and for a situation in which the Court has made the least progress.

And in a bizarre revelation, Time magazine reports that the ICC’s evidence against Hussein is partly derived from data from the Satellite Sentinal Project – the brain child of the celeb badvocacy efforts of George Clooney and John Prendergast of the Enough Project. See this NPR article for why the satellite project, Clooney, and Prendergast, are a little ridiculous.

CHIEF PROSECUTOR: Ocampo’s term is almost up (we’ll all miss the eyebrows and swagger) and, to no one’s surprise and much acclaim, Fatou Bensouda will be chosen as the new Chief Prosecutor of the ICC. (To be confirmed at the next meeting of the Assembly of States Parties on December 12th). Currently the Deputy Prosecutor, Bensouda comes from the Gambia and worked at the ICTR. It’s hoped that her leadership will mend ties between the Court and African political elites and the African Union. There’s also the expectation that the Court and its prosecutorial strategy will be more victim-focused.

And lastly, in the best possible example of make-believe international justice, a Malaysian tribunal “reached a unanimous verdict that found George W. Bush and Tony Blair guilty of crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and genocide, as a result of their roles in the Iraq War.” The verdict obviously doesn’t have much effect beyond shame and blame, but the tribunal will communicate its findings to the ICC and give a little wink/nudge to states to exercise their universal jurisdiction muscles.

Comprehending Gingrich

Newt Gingrich

Born Newton Leroy McPherson, the man now simply known as “Newt Gingrich” has been surging in the latest opinion polls asking Republican voters to identify their preferred presidential candidate. He also recently won the endorsement of the Manchester Union Leader, which 538’s Nate Silver finds to be important in the early New Hampshire primary:

This analysis finds that The Union Leader’s endorsement has been highly statistically significant in helping to explain the voting results. Consistent with the simpler averaging method that we used before, it pegs the endorsement as having roughly an 11-percentage-point impact.

Academic readers of this blog may well know that Gingrich, as one scholar described him, is “a card-carrying member of the overeducated elite….Gingrich holds the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Modern European History from Tulane University in New Orleans.” He had a tenure-track job at West Georgia College in the 1970s, though he was denied tenure and took up politics full-time.

Today, someone put Gingrich’s dissertation on the internet. Feel free to bookmark and read later the former House Speaker’s lengthy take on “Belgian Education Policy in the Congo, 1945-1960.” Since I don’t have time in the near-term to read this tome myself, I’m dependent upon the prior work of Laura Seay, a young scholar now at Morehouse College, who actually reviewed this work in 2009:

I finally sucked it up and headed to the basement microfilm room in the library to read Gingrich’s dissertation. (When I say “read” here, I mean, of course, that I skimmed through until I found something interesting.)

Seay reports quite a bit of detail about Gingrich’s dissertation on her blog post. I won’t spoil too much of her review (read it yourself), but the take home point is relatively important:

The whole thing is kind of a glorified white man’s burden take on colonial policy that was almost certainly out of vogue in the early 1970’s.

I mention this point because I’m reminded of something ridiculous candidate Gingrich said about Barack Obama in September 2010 to National Review Online:

“What if [Obama] is so outside our comprehension, that only if you understand Kenyan, anticolonial behavior, can you begin to piece together [his actions]? That is the most accurate, predictive model for his behavior.”

Now that we know about Gingrich’s early work as an historian, I ask the following questions:

What if Gingrich is so outside our comprehension, that only if you understand Belgian, pro-colonial behavior, can you begin to piece together [his actions]? What if that is the most accurate, predictive model for his behavior?

For related discussion, see this on Libya, this on Iran, and this on the latest in Afghanistan and Pakistan, etc.

Libya’s Chicken-and-Egg Problem

On October 23, Libya’s Transitional National Council (TNC) declared the country liberated and the transition to a post-Gaddafi state officially underway. Over the following week, we’ve seen the first of what I expect will be many stories about tensions and conflict among the groups over whom the TNC is claiming authority. Here’s the opening to one such story, from today’s Washington Post:

Libya has emerged from its civil war with more than 300 militias and no political consensus on forming a national army, raising concerns that irregular, gun-toting groups could become entrenched and pose a long-term challenge to the government, officials here said. On Monday, Libyan leaders began to establish a new interim government with the authority to create the armed forces, choosing the technocratic Abdurrahim el-Keib as prime minister. But the militiamen who won the eight-month war have made it clear that they will not submit meekly to the new civilian authorities.

In the Guardian, we hear from a reporter who tagged along with rebel militias to Abu Salim, a neighborhood in Tripoli, about the mistrust among those militias:

The plan was simple, Essam said. Gaddafi had distributed a lot of guns to the people of this neighbourhood. The rebels would go from house to house, search for weapons and detain wanted fugitives. Three units were to conduct this operation, one from Misrata, one from Essam’s Freemen of Libya unit, and the local rebel military council of Abu Salim. The Misratans, experienced and well-equipped, had a reputation as ruthless fighters who didn’t trust anyone else. Essam’s unit respected them but didn’t really like them, and both the Misratans and the Freemen mistrusted the local rebels of Abu Salim. “They became rebels after Tripoli was liberated,” said one of Essam’s men, smirking.

In some cases, the mistrust has erupted into open fighting. Here’s a snippet from today’s Telegraph:

Two people died from bullet wounds and at least seven fighters were injured during a battle that started when militia from the town of Zintan were stopped by guards from the Tripoli Brigade from entering the city’s Central Hospital to kill a patient.

These stories illustrate the massive governance problem Libya now confronts. Libya is a collapsed state. It has no functioning central authority. The NTC has proclaimed itself to be the country’s national government, and the international community has endorsed that claim, but that claim is only now starting to get tested. The conventional view is that internal authority and external endorsement are intertwined, but that’s an international legal fiction, not real politics. As places like Afghanistan and Somalia remind us, international endorsement does not magically cause domestic factions to fall in line behind the anointed party.
There’s a chicken-and-egg quality to the state-building problem. To establish itself as a functioning national government, Libya’s TNC needs to build up trust in its authority. To build that trust, the TNC needs to get the country’s disparate militias to start obeying its writ and, in so doing, to demonstrate that it deserves their trust. Those militias are going to be reluctant to follow the TNC’s writ, however, as long as they are worried that the TNC or other rival factions might take advantage of them if they do. So which comes first: obedience, or trust?
I know very little about Libyan politics and society, and I certainly don’t know how this situation will evolve. As a scholar with experience studying state collapse, though, I have to say that I’m pessimistic. In some collapsed states, one faction holds a preponderance of coercive power, and that imbalance can encourage other factions to start falling in line behind it. When coercive power is distributed broadly and more evenly, however, it’s more difficult to get that kind of bandwagoning started. I would be surprised to see another organization make a competing claim to national authority; foreign powers’ endorsement of, and investment in, the TNC should succeed in discouraging that. I would not be surprised to see emerging local governments and the militias that back or control them adopt a “wait and see” attitude, occasionally clashing with the TNC or each other when they step on each others’ political or economic toes. Hopefully, Libya’s factions will manage to negotiate their way out of this dilemma soon, but that outcome would be an exceptional one.
(This post went up earlier this morning on my own blog, Dart-Throwing Chimp.)

Libya's Chicken-and-Egg Problem

On October 23, Libya’s Transitional National Council (TNC) declared the country liberated and the transition to a post-Gaddafi state officially underway. Over the following week, we’ve seen the first of what I expect will be many stories about tensions and conflict among the groups over whom the TNC is claiming authority. Here’s the opening to one such story, from today’s Washington Post:

Libya has emerged from its civil war with more than 300 militias and no political consensus on forming a national army, raising concerns that irregular, gun-toting groups could become entrenched and pose a long-term challenge to the government, officials here said. On Monday, Libyan leaders began to establish a new interim government with the authority to create the armed forces, choosing the technocratic Abdurrahim el-Keib as prime minister. But the militiamen who won the eight-month war have made it clear that they will not submit meekly to the new civilian authorities.

In the Guardian, we hear from a reporter who tagged along with rebel militias to Abu Salim, a neighborhood in Tripoli, about the mistrust among those militias:

The plan was simple, Essam said. Gaddafi had distributed a lot of guns to the people of this neighbourhood. The rebels would go from house to house, search for weapons and detain wanted fugitives. Three units were to conduct this operation, one from Misrata, one from Essam’s Freemen of Libya unit, and the local rebel military council of Abu Salim. The Misratans, experienced and well-equipped, had a reputation as ruthless fighters who didn’t trust anyone else. Essam’s unit respected them but didn’t really like them, and both the Misratans and the Freemen mistrusted the local rebels of Abu Salim. “They became rebels after Tripoli was liberated,” said one of Essam’s men, smirking.

In some cases, the mistrust has erupted into open fighting. Here’s a snippet from today’s Telegraph:

Two people died from bullet wounds and at least seven fighters were injured during a battle that started when militia from the town of Zintan were stopped by guards from the Tripoli Brigade from entering the city’s Central Hospital to kill a patient.

These stories illustrate the massive governance problem Libya now confronts. Libya is a collapsed state. It has no functioning central authority. The NTC has proclaimed itself to be the country’s national government, and the international community has endorsed that claim, but that claim is only now starting to get tested. The conventional view is that internal authority and external endorsement are intertwined, but that’s an international legal fiction, not real politics. As places like Afghanistan and Somalia remind us, international endorsement does not magically cause domestic factions to fall in line behind the anointed party.
There’s a chicken-and-egg quality to the state-building problem. To establish itself as a functioning national government, Libya’s TNC needs to build up trust in its authority. To build that trust, the TNC needs to get the country’s disparate militias to start obeying its writ and, in so doing, to demonstrate that it deserves their trust. Those militias are going to be reluctant to follow the TNC’s writ, however, as long as they are worried that the TNC or other rival factions might take advantage of them if they do. So which comes first: obedience, or trust?
I know very little about Libyan politics and society, and I certainly don’t know how this situation will evolve. As a scholar with experience studying state collapse, though, I have to say that I’m pessimistic. In some collapsed states, one faction holds a preponderance of coercive power, and that imbalance can encourage other factions to start falling in line behind it. When coercive power is distributed broadly and more evenly, however, it’s more difficult to get that kind of bandwagoning started. I would be surprised to see another organization make a competing claim to national authority; foreign powers’ endorsement of, and investment in, the TNC should succeed in discouraging that. I would not be surprised to see emerging local governments and the militias that back or control them adopt a “wait and see” attitude, occasionally clashing with the TNC or each other when they step on each others’ political or economic toes. Hopefully, Libya’s factions will manage to negotiate their way out of this dilemma soon, but that outcome would be an exceptional one.
(This post went up earlier this morning on my own blog, Dart-Throwing Chimp.)

War and the Eurozone

PM and Chancellor Merkel press conference

Last week, at University of Bristol, I gave a talk called “The Future of World Order” to the student International Affairs Society. It was a speculative lecture, based on my 17 years directing the Grawemeyer Award (for Ideas Improving World Order) more than my scholarship per se. I warned the audience from the start of two personal biases: (1) I am an optimist; and (2) I don’t really put much stock in specific predictions. I tried to stick to big ideas more than particular policies.

In the presentation, I argued that any order built on coercion and force would inevitably face a legitimacy crisis — and would ultimately collapse. The implications are twofold, I think. Domestically, people will demand greater control of their own lives. This means the world will see many more emancipatory movements to topple autocrats and unaccountable sources of power — as illustrated just this year by events in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Bahrain, the city of London, Wall Street, etc.

Internationally, it means order built on deterrence, brute force, or even the balance of power will give way to something that is more consensual, such as a security community. In support of this position, I talked a bit about John Mueller’s thesis that major power war is becoming obsolete — an outmoded institution, abandoned like slavery and dueling previously were. Could this thinking become even more pervasive, so that virtually any talk of war — internal or external — becomes outmoded? Eventually.

In the talk, I did not explicitly argue against the traditional state-centrism of international relations, nor call for the end of the states-system. However, I strongly implied that the future of world order will be more cooperative, focused on low rather than high politics (elevating the human security agenda), and much less violent.

This week, recovering from jet lag, I’ve been following the efforts to save the euro and Eurozone. One interesting aspect is that conservative leaders in Europe have certainly made some bold claims to sell their preferred outcomes. For instance, while traveling in Australia, British Prime Minister David Cameron used some classic statist language to highlight his concerns about the implications of ongoing negotiations:

“This is our key national interest, that Britain, a historic trading nation, has its biggest markets open and continues to have those markets fairly open and fairly governed.”

He later told the BBC’s political editor Nick Robinson: “In business often it’s selling more to your existing customers that’s the best strategy.

What his comments reveal is that when – if – the eurozone crisis ends, big political questions will replace the big economic problems”

“We’re big sellers into Europe, we can do better in those markets if we liberalise further.”

Mr Cameron has vowed to protect the UK’s position and said on Friday that the City of London was one “area of concern… a key national interest that we need to defend”.

“London – the centre of financial services in Europe – is under constant attack through Brussels directives,” he said.

Note the words and phrases Cameron used: “key national interest,” “attack” and “defend.”

Next, consider these remarks Wednesday from German Chancellor Angela Merkel:

“Nobody should take for granted another 50 years of peace and prosperity in Europe. They are not for granted. That’s why I say: If the euro fails, Europe fails,” Merkel said, followed by a long applause from all political groups.

“We have a historical obligation: To protect by all means Europe’s unification process begun by our forefathers after centuries of hatred and blood spill. None of us can foresee what the consequences would be if we were to fail.”

Gulp.

Based on these quotes, scholars should perhaps worry about the long-term durability of Mueller’s thesis.

Well, at least slavery is gone. Right?

Qaddafi, Intervention and R2P


I’ve been in the throes of finishing a book and other matters so I haven’t had a chance to blog much lately.

A couple of quick observations on the death of Qaddafi (assuming the reports are confirmed). First, he died with almost all of the country opposed to his rule and celebrating his death. Second, he was killed and his forces were defeated by indigenous forces with the support of NATO. While we have seen a good deal of criticism of NATO, US Libya policy, and of R2P (as a neo-imperialist enterprise) in the past several months, that criticism has tended to dismiss or diminish the fact that the effort to overthrow Qaddafi was fought by a broad coalition of Libyans with widespread Libyan public support –not just a handful of NATO states.

So let’s be clear, we would not be witnessing a celebration in Tripoli, Benghazi, Misratah and elsewhere today without the combined efforts of the Libyans themselves and the international community — motivated by the concept of R2P and the norms embedded in it. Qaddafi clearly had lost domestic as well as international legitimacy. As his forces converged on Benghazi in March a global coalition concluded that a mass atrocity event was imminent. That coalition included the Arab League, leading human rights and humanitarian organizations, as well as much of the rest of the world, and they backed the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. That coalition demanded and endorsed a robust NATO-led intervention to protect civilians and their collective efforts empowered local forces to resist and ultimately to prevail.

It is true that NATO angered many by moving beyond the mandate of UNSC Res 1973 and declaring regime change as one of its key objectives in the pursuit of protecting civilians. But, regime change was not only the objective of NATO, it was also the objective of what appears to be an overwhelming majority of Libyans. Many of whom believed that if Qaddafi had been able to stay in (or later return to) power he would have slaughtered his opponents, including those civilians sympathetic to the revolution.

Critics of the Libyan intervention == or any intervention tend to dismissively proclaim that its important to “Let the Libyans decide it for themselves.” That’s a cop out. What exactly does that mean? In the absence of NATO’s air campaign we would not be witnessing the celebrations today. The Libyans wanted to, but probably could not have, settled it by themselves.

Joshua Goldstein and I have a piece on humanitarian intervention that will be out in the next issue of Foreign Affairs — due out in the next day or two — in which we argue that there is a broader aspect to Libya and to humanitarian intervention. Intervention along with R2P, peacekeeping, and a broad range of civilian protection mechanisms and norms have contributed to a dramatic decline of violence around the globe. Joshua presents this more explicitly in his new book, Winning the War on War and Steve Pinker pads that discussion in his excellent book. In short, there is a reason global violence is down — and the ideas and norms embedded in R2P, peacekeeping, and transitional justice are working.

For what its worth, R2P at its core is a concept that articulates a redefinition of sovereignty. It entails responsibility as well as rights. When a leader commits crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or genocide, the rights and protections of sovereignty are lost.

This is a revolutionary idea. It is also remarkably young. Most of us who teach IR Theory begin with Realism and teach Thucydides and the Melian Dialogue. Realists like to use Thucydides to emphasize the enduring dimensions of Realist logic across a range of international orders and 2,500 years of history. I use it to demonstrate the remarkable youth of civilian protection mechanisms in global society.

I’m not so pollyanish to believe that the death of Qaddafi will lead to full compliance with R2P or that R2P will be able to end genocide or all atrocities. But it will and has stopped many. Critics point out that we still see Assad and Bashir acting today with impunity. Yes, but most of the world recognizes that their conduct is abhorrent. And, we no longer see Charles Taylor, Milosevic, Karadzic, Mladic, or Arkan. And after today, we no longer see Qaddafi. This has all happened in a remarkably short period of time. History may not have turned, but it may well be changing.

Rumors of His Death Have Not Been Exaggerated

Qaddafi has lost his contest with Hussein and Bin Laden for hiding the longest from US/Allied/Local searches.  Lots of folks will make much of this event, as they should.  I have already seen a great tweet/blogpost by Spencer Ackerman predicting everyone’s responses.

What would my readers predict of me?  Woohoo?  Well, sure.  That NATO made a difference despite being hamstrung by the dynamics of coalitional bargaining within and between countries?  Indeed.  That much of the effort and all of the sacrifices (except for tax $$) were paid by Libyans?  Yes.

What does Libya teach us about NATO that we didn’t know before?  Given that I have spent a few years on NATO at war in Afghanistan, the Libyan experience more confirms my beliefs (confirmation bias alert!) than teaches me anything new.  And experts on Kosovo might say that Afghanistan just made things clearer.

We did see how xenophobia can cause even a fragile coalition government to become more enthusiastic about a military mission–Italy’s increased assertiveness as 2011 went on.  We also saw that an absence of government (Belgium on day 4xx of caretaker government) means that no veto points means assertive efforts, at least here.

Once again, the fear that NATO might fail re-energized efforts and commitment so that NATO would not fail (with lots of help from the Libyan rebels).  I ended up making a claim yesterday in class that none of the places NATO has spent heaps of dollars, lives and time really matter that much intrinsically.  Bosnia became a NATO mission not because the US cared about Bosnia but that it cared about NATO.  Folks kept on the Kosovo mission for fear of NATO failure.  Every NATO member showed up to some degree in Afghanistan not because they cared about Afghanistan but because they cared about NATO.  Libya shows that NATO matters in that countries needed NATO legitimacy to participate.  And the US wavering efforts from beginning to end really hinged on how much the US cared about the alliance more so than the lives of folks in Libya.  Which does distinguish Libya, where NATO became relevant, from Syria and Yemen.  Once NATO countries got involved in Libya, the stakes for the US and lots of other countries changed.  France and the UK forced others to get involved via NATO.

And, yes, NATO also matters because the doing of seven or eight months of patrols and strikes and refueling and intel sharing and all the rest requires heaps of military interoperability.  Political interoperability may vary across the alliance, but the practice of coalition warfare requires, well, heaps of practice.  NATO for sixty years has meant that the militaries are more or less in tune with each other.  As we have seen yet again with no stories of mid-air refueling mishaps, for example.

Qaddafi is gone, raising questions about Libya’s future.  I am actually pretty confident that NATO’s future will be … more of the same.

Post-revolution Walk of Shame in Libya: women asked to 'go home' in the afterglow of the revolution


The exciting and tumultuous eve of the revolution in Libya has achieved many of its objectives: the power balance has swung in the rebel’s favor, many national governments around the world now recognize the Transitional National Council (TNC) as the legitimate leadership, and most (though not all) of the country is under their control.

In many ways, this week can be described as ‘the morning after’ the revolution in Libya. Rebels drunk on gun battles are now waking up with adrenaline hang-overs to the realities of post-revolution Libya. There’s mortar rounds everywhere, hundreds of displaced Libyans are crashing indefinitely in Tripoli, and- perhaps worst of all- Cameron and Zarkosy showed up way too early, keen to help get the revolutionary council on its feet/ensure their financial interests.

In keeping with classic ‘morning after’ politics, men are waking up with only hazy memories of which women were at the party and what they did to contribute to the revolution. The TNC are trying to get their house in order for Cameron and Zarkosy as well as for the international media and for some reason these women just keep hanging around asking about what kind of future there is for them together, wanting some kind of commitment. The TNC’s responses so far reminds me of the scene in the movie Bridesmaids when Jon Hamm’s character turns to Kristen Wiig after a one night stand and says “I really want you to leave, but I don’t want to sound like a dick.”

Women supported the revolution in Libya in countless ways- from hiding and feeding rebel fighters to taking up arms themselves- yet now that the post-revolution glow has worn off, the TNC seems to be asking women to take their walk of shame. The party is over, and this morning, the Transitional National Council has just one woman. Will the rest of the women who sacrificed for the movement- taking up new roles, and fighting for political change- be asked to get out of the political bedroom? Can the TNC really expect to rebuild Libya and move forward without acknowledging the significance of women’s role in the movement?

Unfortunately, women’s walk of shame post-conflict or post-revolution is all too familiar. Women have struggled to maintain a significant voice in the new Egypt; similarly, women who fought as soldiers within rebel forces in countries like Sierra Leone and Angola often found themselves left out of post-conflict political agenda setting. For these women, as is likely for many Libyan women, the last thing desirable post-conflict/revolution is a ‘return to normal.’ For women, this means giving up any power gained and fitting themselves back into traditional patriarchal gender hierarchies. The TNC and the international community must stop the pattern of revolutionary one-night stands and work not only to acknowledge women’s role in the political movement, but also to secure political space for women as Libya faces a new day.

Post-revolution Walk of Shame in Libya: women asked to ‘go home’ in the afterglow of the revolution


The exciting and tumultuous eve of the revolution in Libya has achieved many of its objectives: the power balance has swung in the rebel’s favor, many national governments around the world now recognize the Transitional National Council (TNC) as the legitimate leadership, and most (though not all) of the country is under their control.

In many ways, this week can be described as ‘the morning after’ the revolution in Libya. Rebels drunk on gun battles are now waking up with adrenaline hang-overs to the realities of post-revolution Libya. There’s mortar rounds everywhere, hundreds of displaced Libyans are crashing indefinitely in Tripoli, and- perhaps worst of all- Cameron and Zarkosy showed up way too early, keen to help get the revolutionary council on its feet/ensure their financial interests.

In keeping with classic ‘morning after’ politics, men are waking up with only hazy memories of which women were at the party and what they did to contribute to the revolution. The TNC are trying to get their house in order for Cameron and Zarkosy as well as for the international media and for some reason these women just keep hanging around asking about what kind of future there is for them together, wanting some kind of commitment. The TNC’s responses so far reminds me of the scene in the movie Bridesmaids when Jon Hamm’s character turns to Kristen Wiig after a one night stand and says “I really want you to leave, but I don’t want to sound like a dick.”

Women supported the revolution in Libya in countless ways- from hiding and feeding rebel fighters to taking up arms themselves- yet now that the post-revolution glow has worn off, the TNC seems to be asking women to take their walk of shame. The party is over, and this morning, the Transitional National Council has just one woman. Will the rest of the women who sacrificed for the movement- taking up new roles, and fighting for political change- be asked to get out of the political bedroom? Can the TNC really expect to rebuild Libya and move forward without acknowledging the significance of women’s role in the movement?

Unfortunately, women’s walk of shame post-conflict or post-revolution is all too familiar. Women have struggled to maintain a significant voice in the new Egypt; similarly, women who fought as soldiers within rebel forces in countries like Sierra Leone and Angola often found themselves left out of post-conflict political agenda setting. For these women, as is likely for many Libyan women, the last thing desirable post-conflict/revolution is a ‘return to normal.’ For women, this means giving up any power gained and fitting themselves back into traditional patriarchal gender hierarchies. The TNC and the international community must stop the pattern of revolutionary one-night stands and work not only to acknowledge women’s role in the political movement, but also to secure political space for women as Libya faces a new day.

Late Summer Tour of NATO

Happy NATO Day!  Okay, this is not an anniversary of anything NATO-esque.  But heaps of posts a-twitter about NATO, its members and so on.  So, some semi-random shots at some semi-random NATO members and NATO in general.

First, France is the best-est ally ever!  Lots of people linking to this article.  Yes, the Libyan adventure certainly raises France’s profile as an active contributor, assertive military and the rest.  But to be fair to the French (yes, completely out of character for me, given how easy it is to make jokes in my big lecture class), the Libyan crisis is not the first time that the French have been assertive.
       During the Afghanistan war (which, by the way, is still an on-going NATO mission), France moved from being relatively restricted to being quite willing to take risks.  When Sarkozy replaced Chirac, we all got a NATO-friendly (to say the least) President.  Sarkozy moved some and then nearly all of French combat forces from the safety of Kabul to the more dangerous areas of Kapisa.
        Postwar French have never been pacifists–they just have been known for pursuring their own interests.  A lot of those interests were in Africa, with Qaddafi serving as a critical obstacle to French ambitions.  So, the French are so very bold now, taking the lead in the effort, even willing go without NATO.  Still a fun time and an interesting contrast to:

Second, the Germans look more feeble than ever, when the Foreign Minister (for at least a few more days) Westervelle* said that Qaddafi is falling due to economic sanctions.  Now, we have German politicians across the spectrum from Helmut Kohl to Joshcka Fischer saying that Westerwelle is as bad a foreign minister as Colin Powell Condi Rice they can imagine.

*Unless you are Italy, having a Foreign Minister named Guido is always going to raise questions about credibility.

Here is Fischer’s first question and answer:

SPIEGEL: What is it about Germany’s current foreign policy and Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle that bothers you?
Fischer: Pretty much everything. As the former foreign minister myself, the lack of fundamental convictions pains me. This is fundamentally much worse than losing your compass. We are being governed by those who have lost touch with reality and are denying what’s obvious to everyone else.

I am sorry, but Fischer is being oblique.  I really wish he could open up and say what he is really thinking.  Fischer then goes on:

No, the behavior of Germany’s government during the Libya conflict, its abstention in the UN Security Council (vote in March on whether to impose a no-fly zone in Libya), was a one-of-a-kind debacle and perhaps the biggest foreign policy debacle since the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany. Our country’s standing in the world has been significantly damaged.

Okay.  Now, Fischer is being a bit less opaque.  Actually, this entire interview makes me want to vote for the guy.  Anyhow moving on:

Third, I found this on twitter: “Dutch Defence Minister calls for pooling and sharing military capabilities in Europe.”  Sure, smaller means working harder and smarter.  Sharing and pooling would be smart, but we can only pool and share with countries that will release the forces (troops, planes, ships, whatever) to the multinational effort with few conditions.  That is: NO CAVEATS and few requirements for phone calls home for permission.
Maybe it is not wise to write here one of the conclusions for the forthcoming book on NATO and Afghanistan, but one of the implications of the Afghanistan experience (and of the Libyan one and so on) is that countries will rarely give up national control of their militaries even when they are delegated to the most institutionalized, robust, interoperable alliance on the planet.  So, if you build a military so that it can only do certain things and needs to depend on others to fill critical gaps, you have to gamble that when you are deployed, you will be partnered with countries that have pretty loose rules.  Otherwise, you might be asking for, say, helicopters to extract your troops from a battle but the helo pilot has rules about not being close to the battle or it being night-time or whatever.  You cannot pool if the other guy cannot be counted on to pool right back.

No wonder Napoleon apparently said: I would rather fight a coalition than be in one.  On the other hand, he lost to a series of coalitions, right?  So, there is really no alternative for the Dutch or the Germans or the Canadians or, with their latest cuts, the French and the British, to working together.  But don’t expect it to be easy, simple or efficient.

Defense budget cuts make sharing and specialization sensible.  The politics of participating in alliance warfare make sharing and specialization very, very problematic. 

Precision Guided Words? Libya and International Law

Guest Post by Betcy Jose-Thota, Assistant Professor, University of Colorado-Denver.

According to al Jazeera’s English language website, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Mahmoud Jibril, head of the National Transitional Council, met on Wednesday to discuss what a post-Gaddafi Libya would look like. After the meeting, Sarkozy told reporters that NATO would continue its military operation in Libya as long as Gaddafi remained a threat, stating:

“We will continue acting within the mandate given to us by the UN to protect civilian forces.”

If President Sarkozy was not misquoted, his pronouncement contains two misstatements about both the NATO mandate and international humanitarian law.

UN Security Council Resolution 1973, the resolution under which NATO is conducting its military operations in Libya, enables


Member States… acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements… to take all necessary measures… to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack…

By its plain language, UNSC Resolution 1973 authorizes member states to use force to protect civilians, not civilian forces as Sarkozy states. “Civilians” and “civilian forces” are two distinct concepts as the following discussion (hopefully) illustrates.

International humanitarian law (IHL), the body of law which regulates armed conflict, obligates belligerents to distinguish between civilians and other belligerents. This is the so-called distinction principle housed within the civilian immunity norm. Once belligerents make this distinction, IHL prohibits them from deliberately targeting civilians. To do so is a war crime.

However, it’s not as simple as that. Not all civilians are protected from deliberate attack under IHL. And this is where Sarkozy commits his second misstep. According to the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions civilians lose the protections of the civilian immunity norm when “they take a direct part in hostilities.” When civilians directly participate in hostilities, they can be targeted. Deliberately targeting such civilians is not a war crime.

So, when is a civilian considered to be directly participating in hostilities? Well, this is a dissertation-worthy question, too complex to be tackled within the confines of a blog post. Suffice it to say that the ICRC offers its explanation for what this phrase means in its Interpretive Guidance for Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law. Based on this document and past practices, civilians engaging in armed resistance, like those in “civilian forces”, would likely lose their protections under IHL. They would not be the civilians for which UNSC 1973 enables the use of force to protect.

So what’s the significance of this legal rambling, you ask. Well, it means that NATO soldiers can use lethal force against civilians who use armed force against them. It also means NATO doesn’t have to put its soldiers in jeopardy to protect civilians who engage in armed force.

Sarkozy isn’t the only one who’s misstated IHL. That the lack of clarity is so widespread on this issue of when civilians can or cannot be targeted during armed conflict is precisely the reason why the ICRC had to issue its Interpretive Guidance. It will be interesting to see whether (and if so, how) this confusion may manifest in the ICC’s investigations into possible war crimes in Libya.

What Exactly is the Point of Foreign Policy Analysts?: Lessons from Libya (and any other crisis in history)

I don’t follow the news as closely as I should. I am not up on everyone’s blogs. I don’t check the Brookings Institution for every new report it issues. I am a lazy blogger. But I do seem to recall when this whole Libya thing started and didn’t end successfully immediately that all kinds of “foreign policy analysts” came out of the woodwork to say it wouldn’t work, that we were merely facilitating and prolonging a protracted civil war stalemate. We couldn’t will the means that would be necessary.

Dumbasses.

I say that not because they got the prediction wrong, but rather that they tried to make a prediction at all. I wish we could just admit that we generally have no earthly idea how a civil war, humanitarian intervention, tsunami response, military coup, financial crisis, etc. will work out. I


Eat humble pie, boys. I said, “Eat it!”

am an international relations academic not because I don’t want to be on TV, but because I have a sense of shame and dignity. I simply could not get up in front of millions, or even dozens, of people and claim that I had any notion of how any of those things was going to work out. We can only work out explanations well after the fact when we know what was going on on the ground, what people were thinking, etc. Every social phenomena of interest is simply too complicated. I appreciate it when folks like Steve Saideman tell us the mistakes of the past. But I wouldn’t like it if he predicted the future. And he doesn’t.

I am not going to name names, because I’d have to look them up. Like I said, I’m lazy. But the next time that one of these things happens again, like tomorrow, and someone offers you a prediction of how it will end, respond like this: “Ew, get that away from me. That’s been up your butt.”

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