I just finished reading Dominic Tierney’s new book How We Fight: Crusades, Quagmires and the American Way of War. As the title suggests, he presents the standard American exceptionalism argument about why and how the US begins wars — that both the public and elites hold deeply entrenched beliefs of America’s “benign power” to transform the world. But, these same wars often end when the public and elites turn against these “crusades” after those we are there “to help” fail to appreciate the self-evident benefits of American military support and liberal values and institutions.
It’s hard to say when the US will end the war in Afghanistan given that there is still a tenuous elite consensus backing it. But a majority of Americans want out and reporting like the clip shown below from the Pech Valley — in which mid-level commanders and soldiers now openly question whether or not the US presence is making things worse in their area of operation — directly challenges the pro-war narrative and will almost certainly weaken elite cohesion. (It’s also striking to see a battalion commander state that the American presence helps the enemy.) Apparently, the Afghans are failing to appreciate the “self-evident benefits” of the American presence.
The video clip reminds me of the broad narrative in the documentary film “Restrepo” (set in the Korengal Valley) in which the soldiers and officers seem to have little understanding of why they are posted out there (other than to get shot at) and they make no notable progress in winning over or even understanding the desires of the local elders (e.g. the locals actually don't want the road that the Americans are offering to build because it would threaten their independence). The film ends by noting that despite the number of US soldiers killed defending the outpost, the US withdrew from the valley in 2010.
The only real difference between the Korengal and Pech valleys appears to be (according to the video clip) that the US has given up the hearts and mind strategy altogether in the latter… Â Of course, I have heard US soldiers argue forcefully that Pech is more operationally important than Korengal or Waygal or Kamdesh… if for no other reason than the fact that the Pech Valley hosts a significant portion of the population in the province. They also argue that levels of violence in these areas are due to a failure to patrol and dominate the rugged terrain. But these voices seem to be getting drowned out by the “abandon Pech to save it” side. (As I have no military background I don't know which side is technically correct, but it does seem that the “pull back” narrative is winning out over the “push on” side).
So I think you are right that as the narrative of a thankless and pointless war gains ground (albeit mainly through anecdotal evidence from Korengal and Pech), the elite consensus behind what was once dubbed “the war of necessity” will erode… at least until the next war of necessity emerges….
Political support for the Iraq war was doomed once enough security analysts and soldiers started arguing that US operations and presence there made the situation worse. This video provides evidence that we may be approaching a similar tipping point for Afghanistan as well. In Iraq, the anti-war narrative conclusion was muddled by the alleged success of “the surge,” so this may pose a more difficult case given on-the-ground realities.