I’m currently working on a few difference pieces that deal with the relationship between liberalism and empire. I also, as long-team readers of the Duck know, consider neoconservative understandings of international politics as a variant of liberalism that constitutes a specific flavor of the US commitment to democratic enlargement as transformative of international politics. Neoconservatives reject the idea that international institutions, at least as currently configured, and US self-restraint pacify global politics; their liberalism is strongly inflected by particular currents of American nationalist exceptionalism.
Most published international-relations scholarship concurs with this assessment, thus I read with great interest Jonathan D. Caverley’s “Power and Democratic Weakness: Neoconservatism and Neoclassical Realism” which appeared in Millennium: Journal of International Studies (May 2010, pp. 593-614) [earlier, but ungated, version]. Here’s the abstract:
While realists and neoconservatives generally disagreed on the Iraq invasion of 2003, nothing inherent in either approach to foreign policy accounts for this. Neoconservatism’s enthusiasm for democratisation would appear to distinguish the two but its rejection of all other liberal mechanisms in world politics suggests that the logic linking democracy and American security shares little with liberalism. Inspecting the range of neoconservative thought reveals a unifying theme: the enervating effects of democracy on state power and the will to wield it in a dangerous world. Consequently, the United States enjoys greater safety among other democracies due to a more favourable distribution of relative power. Viewing regime type through the prism of state power extraction in a competitive, anarchic world puts neoconservatism squarely in the neoclassical realist camp. The article concludes by suggesting why the rest of International Relations should care about this new ‘neo–neo’ debate.
Caverley contends, in consequence, that we should see neoconservativism as a form of neoclassical realism. After all, neoconservatives see anarchy as characterized by unforgiving power-political competition and worry that the domestic politics of liberal states render them vulnerable to authoritarian and totalitarian rivals. They recommend civic virtue and strong political leadership — along the lines of Theodore Roosevelt’s “New Nationalism” — as an antidote.
This combination looks, as Caverley argues, rather similar to Gideon Rose’s description of neoclassical realism as holding that
The scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by the country’s relative material power. Yet it contends that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers’ perceptions and state structure.
While most of Caverley’s claims are well-rehearsed in the “how to make sense of neoconservative foreign policy” debate, I’ve never before seen his argument that neoconservatives support democratizing other countries as a way of making them weaker. It turns out there’s a good reason for that: they don’t make any such claim.
Before I explain how Caverley’s arguments combine esoteric readings of neoconservative texts with both invocation of non-existant arguments and quotations taken plainly out of context, I should touch upon a set of even more basic problems with Caverley’s claim that neoconservativism isn’t liberalism. The crux of Caverley’s reasoning looks like this:
G. John Ikenberry identifies six ‘big ideas’ shared by Wilsonianism and modern liberalism. The first four cover various paths to peace: democracy, free trade, international law and international bodies, and collective security. The final two are a progressive optimism about modernity coupled with the need for American global leadership as a ‘moral agent’. Neoconservatism clearly accepts both the importance of democracy as an American national interest and of American moral global leadership, but explicitly rejects the remaining four points of liberalism/Wilsonianism [emphasis original].
First, liberalism, of course, is not identical to Wilsonianism; liberal internationalism represents only one of many ways of translating liberalism into grand strategy. In the United States, liberal principles have undergird foreign-policy approaches ranging from a complete rejection of foreign “entanglements” to the establishing of formal empire.
Second, it is a bit silly to say that neoconservativism isn’t liberal because it overlaps with neoclassical realism. Neoclassical realism is a somewhat amorphous container for some pretty heterogeneous scholarly theories; in consequence, it provides a poor benchmark for assessing non-scholarly debates about the proper guiding principles for American foreign policy.
Third, the Hobbes-Locke debate over the relative unpleasantness of the state of the nature–which Hobbes distinguishes from the texture of relations between sovereign states–is an intra-liberal debate about the parameters of the social contract. Liberals can disagree about whether institutions such as the League or the United Nations are sufficiently robust to mitigate anarchy, let alone whether concessions of sovereignty necessary to create such institutions would be worth the consequent threat to domestic freedom and self-determination in liberal democracies.
Indeed, it isn’t difficult to understand why neconservative praxis is incompatible with realism:
- It holds that relations among democracies are fundamentally different than those among democracies and non-democracies;
- It holds that global politics should be understood as an ideological struggle between the forces of freedom and their antagonists; and
- It sees no contradiction between the pursuit of liberal values, at least properly understood, and national interests.
Although specific academics who call themselves realists might accept one or more of these propositions, none are “realist” in any meaningful sense. No realist would, as many neoconservatives have, advocate a “League of Democracies” as a superior alternative to the United Nations.
Consider Caverley’s discussion of the neoconservative rejection of “liberal, transnational norms.” Caverley quotes Krauthammer as writing that “moral suasion is a farce,” but here’s what Krauthammer writes:
Moral suasion? Was it moral suasion that made Qaddafi see the wisdom of giving up his weapons of mass destruction? Or Iran agree for the first time to spot nuclear inspections? It was the suasion of the bayonet. It was the ignominious fall of Saddam–and the desire of interested spectators not to be next on the list. The whole point of this treaty was to keep rogue states from developing chemical weapons. Rogue states are, by definition, impervious to moral suasion.
Moral suasion is a farce. Why then this obsession with conventions, protocols, legalisms? Their obvious net effect is to temper American power. Who, after all, was really going to be most constrained by these treaties? The ABM amendments were aimed squarely at American advances and strategic defenses, not at Russia, which lags hopelessly behind. The Kyoto Protocol exempted India and China. The nuclear test ban would have seriously degraded the American nuclear arsenal. And the landmine treaty (which the Clinton administration spent months negotiating but, in the end, met so much Pentagon resistance that even Clinton could not initial it) would have had a devastating impact on U.S. conventional forces, particularly at the DMZ in Korea.
This is pretty par for the course in terms of US nationalist exceptionalism: bad regimes don’t care about their image in the “international community,” the US needs strength to pursue liberal ends, treaties with autocratic rivals only weaken US power, etc. Similarly, Caverley quotes Robert Kagan, who writes in “End of Dreams, Return of History” that “there is little sense of shared morality and common political principle among the great powers.” But Kagan’s piece, with a title rebutting Francis Fukuyama’s claim that great ideological struggles are over, is a call for the US to recognize the new authoritarian threat to liberalism. And here’s the full context:
Today there is little sense of shared morality and common political principle among the great powers. Quite the contrary: There is suspicion, growing hostility, and the well-grounded view on the part of the autocracies that the democracies, whatever they say, would welcome their overthrow. Any concert among them would be built on a shaky foundation likely to collapse at the first serious test.
American foreign policy should be attuned to these ideological distinctions and recognize their relevance to the most important strategic questions. It is folly to expect China to help undermine a brutal regime in Khartoum or to be surprised if Russia rattles its saber at pro-Western democratic governments near its borders. There will be a tendency toward solidarity among the world ’s autocracies, as well as among the world’s democracies.
For all these reasons, the United States should pursue policies designed both to promote democracy and to strengthen cooperation among the democracies. It should join with other democracies to erect new international institutions that both reflect and enhance their shared principles and goals. One possibility might be to establish a global concert or league of democratic states, perhaps informally at first but with the aim of holding regular meetings and consultations on the issues of the day. Such an institution could bring together Asian nations such as Japan, Australia, and India with the European nations — two sets of democracies that have comparatively little to do with each other outside the realms of trade and finance. The institution would complement, not replace, the United Nations, the g-8, and other global forums. But it would at the very least signal a commitment to the democratic idea, and in time it could become a means of pooling the resources of democratic nations to address a number of issues that cannot be addressed at the United Nations. If successful, it could come to be an organization capable of bestowing legitimacy on actions that liberal nations deem necessary but autocratic nations refuse to countenance — as nato conferred legitimacy on the conflict in Kosovo even though Russia was opposed.
Given such overwhelming evidence against neoconservativism’s illiberalism, much depends on Caverley’s claim that neoconservatives favor liberal enlargement as a way of weakening rivals by saddling them with democratic institutions. As I’ve alluded to already, some of this argument depends (fittingly enough) on a Straussian-style esoteric reading of neoconservative writings. Neoconservatives worry about the erosion of republican values in modern liberal polities. They advocate strong leadership and “new nationalism”-style programs to counter this tendency. They consider Europe as a cautionary example for the United States. But to read their various worries and exhortations as containing a hidden message that Washington should spread democracy for instrumental purposes–to enfeeble rivals–is, as one of my professors once noted of Straussian esoteric readings, “fascinating, ingenious, and totally wrong.”
How wrong it is becomes clear when Caverley moves beyond esoteric inference and claims to cite neoconservatives making this argument.
Fukuyama observes that the advocates of trans- forming Iraq into a Western-style democracy are the same people who question the ‘dangers of ambitious social engineering’. This apparent paradox becomes coherent given this idea of democratic enfeeblement. Kirkpatrick points out that because totalitarian states are inherently more threatening, the United States should focus its democratisation efforts there. Her famous essay does not criticise neoconservative enthusiasm for democratisation so much as connect it to a grand strategic logic. Because of the military advantage enjoyed by non-democracies, a United States interested in self-preservation should aggressively spread this cost aversion Muravchik succinctly states the core (and inherently power political) logic: ‘The spread of democracy offers an important, peaceful way to weaken our foe.
But by this logic would not other regime types attempt to spread democracy, preferring to be the only autocrat in a world of Kantian peaceniks? Kagan and others address this question by claiming that the existence and success of democracies is inherently threatening to the stability of authoritarian regimes. This autocratic support (perhaps unlike democracy) is not based in ideological affinity but on self-preservation and the desire to maximise power. Moreover, autocrats:
see their comparative advantage over the West when it comes to gaining influence with African, Asian or Latin American governments that can provide access to oil and other vital natural resources or that, in the case of Burma, are strategically located.
Why am I so dismissive of all of this? It seemed odd to me, so I checked the footnotes.
Kirkpatrick nowhere in “Dictatorships and Double Standards” argues that the US should focus democratization efforts on totalitarian states because they are “inherently more threatening” (at least in the sense Caverley implies). She argues that, in the struggle against communist totalitarianism, the US should support friendly anti-communist authoritarians as both, whatever their flaws, morally superior and more amenable to subsequent democratization than totalitarian regimes. The Carter Administration, as well as the American left, both weakens US interests and the cause of democratic liberalism insofar as its weakens its autocratic allies in favor of self-styled liberation movements. As she concludes:
For these reasons and more, a posture of continuous self-abasement and apology vis-a-vis the Third World is neither morally necessary nor politically appropriate. No more is it necessary or appropriate to support vocal enemies of the United States because they invoke the rhetoric of popular liberation. It is not even necessary or appropriate for our leaders to forswear unilaterally the use of military force to counter military force. Liberal idealism need not be identical with masochism, and need not be incompatible with the defense of freedom and the national interest.
Caverley’s ‘smoking gun’ quotation from Muravchik, moreover, is completely out of context. When Muravchik argues that “The spread of demcoracy offers an important, peaceful way to weaken our foe” he has a specific foe in mind: militant jihadism. As Muravchik notes earlier in the article:
what is undeniable is that Bush’s declaration of war against terrorism did bear the earmarks of neoconservatism. One can count the ways. It was moralistic, accompanied by descriptions of the enemy as “evil” and strong assertions of America’s righteousness. As Norman Podhoretz puts it in his powerful new book Bush offered “an entirely unapologetic assertion of the need for and the possibility of moral judgment in the realm of world affairs.” In contrast to the suggestion of many, especially many Europeans, that America had somehow provoked the attacks, Bush held that what the terrorists hated was our virtues, and in particular our freedom. His approach was internationalist: it treated the whole globe as the battlefield, and sought to confront the enemy far from our own doorstep. It entailed the prodigious use of force. And, for the non-military side of the strategy, Bush adopted the idea of promoting democracy in the Middle East in the hope that this would drain the fever swamps that bred terrorists [emphasis added].
That’s right: Moravchik’s argument has zilch to do with Caverley’s “democratic enfeeblement” hypothesis. Rather, it amounts to a fairly standard neoconservative claim that democratization weakens radical Islamism.
There’s something perverse about using an out-of-context quotation from this particualr Muravchik piece. Here’s what Muravchik has to say about neoconservativism in the early pages of his article:
The term “neoconservative” was coined in the 1970’s as an anathema. It was intended to stigmatize a group of liberal intellectuals who had lately parted ways with the majority of their fellows.
As a heretical offshoot of liberalism, neoconservatism appealed to the same values and even many of the same goals—like, for example, peace and racial equality. But neoconservatives argued that liberal policies—for example, disarmament in the pursuit of peace, or affirmative action in the pursuit of racial equality—undermined those goals rather than advancing them. In short order, the heretics established themselves as contemporary liberalism’s most formidable foes.
Two distinct currents fed the stream of neoconservatism. One focused on domestic issues, specifically by reexamining the Great Society programs of the 1960’s and the welfare state as a whole. It was centered in the Public Interest, a quarterly founded and edited by Irving Kristol. The other focused on international issues and the cold war; it was centered in COMMENTARY and led by the magazine’s editor, Norman Podhoretz.
The former current has little if any relevance to the controversy surrounding neoconservatism today. Much of the domestic-policy critique mounted by neoconservatives eventually became common wisdom, symbolized by President Bill Clinton’s welfare-reform program and his declaration that “the era of big government is over.” In the meantime, several of the seminal figures of the domestic wing—Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Daniel Bell, and Nathan Glazer—drifted back toward liberalism.
It was the foreign-policy wing that was, all along, more passionately embroiled in ideological disputation.1 For one thing, the stakes were higher. If a domestic policy fails, you can try another. If a foreign policy fails, you may find yourself at war. Also, the battles that rived the Democratic party in the 1970’s, at a time when virtually all neoconservatives were still Democrats, principally concerned foreign affairs. These battles sharpened ideological talons on all sides.
The divisions stemmed from the Vietnam war. Not that all neoconservatives were hawks on this particular issue; some, including Podhoretz, were (qualified) doves. But when opponents of the war went from arguing that it was a failed instance of an essentially correct policy—namely, resisting Communist expansionism—to contending that it was a symptom of a deep American sickness, neoconservatives answered back. Whatever problems we may have made for ourselves in Vietnam, they said, the origins of the conflict were to be found neither in American imperialism nor in what President Jimmy Carter would call our “inordinate fear of Communism,” but in Communism’s lust to dominate.
Contrary to Carter and the antiwar Left, neoconservatives believed that Communism was very much to be feared, to be detested, and to be opposed. They saw the Soviet Union as, in the words of Ronald Reagan, an “evil empire,” unspeakably cruel to its own subjects and relentlessly predatory toward those not yet in its grasp. They took the point of George Orwell’s 1984—a book that (as the Irish scholars James McNamara and Dennis J. O’Keeffe have written) resurrected the idea of evil “as a political category.” And they absorbed the cautionary warning of the Russian novelist and dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn against yielding ground to the Communists in the vain hope “that perhaps at some point the wolf will have eaten enough.”
Many in our history, both statesmen and scholars, had drawn a distinction between Americans’ sentiments and America’s self-interest. Where Communism was concerned, the neoconservatives saw the two as intertwined. Communism needed to be fought both because it was morally appalling and because it was a threat to our country.
And, as he notes a bit later on:
Even those traditional conservatives who distrusted the readiness of Nixon and Kissinger to make deals with the Soviet Union tended to share the underlying philosophy of foreign-policy “realism.” As opposed to the neoconservative emphasis on the battle of ideas and ideologies, and on the psychological impact of policy choices, realists focused on state interests and the time-honored tools of statecraft. That was one reason why, for the neoconservatives of the 1970’s, the great champions in American political life were not conservative or Republican figures but two Democrats of unmistakably liberal pedigree: Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson and George Meany, the president of the AFL-CIO. When President Ford, on Kissinger’s counsel, closed the White House door to Solzhenitsyn upon his expulsion from Soviet Russia, these two stalwart anti-Communists formally welcomed him to Washington.
It was only with the accession of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1981 that the neoconservatives made their peace with Republican-style conservatism. Reagan brought several neoconservatives—notably Jeane Kirkpatrick, Richard Perle, Max Kampelman, and Elliott Abrams—into pivotal foreign-policy positions in his administration (and, on the domestic-policy side, William J. Bennett and others). With time, most neoconservatives moved into the Republican fold. As for Reagan’s “belligerent” approach to the cold war, it was criticized as loudly by both liberals and conservatives within the foreign-policy establishment as it was cheered by neoconservatives. But there can be no question that it issued in a sublime victory: the mighty juggernaut of the Soviet state, disposing of more kill power than the U.S. or any other state in history, capitulated with scarcely a shot.
So, while Muravchik does describe neoconservativism as sharing elements with both ‘realism’ and ‘idealism,’ his account amounts to a refutation of Caverley’s core thesis:
The military historian Max Boot has aptly labeled it “hard Wilsonianism.” It does not mesh neatly with the familiar dichotomy between “realists” and “idealists.” It is indeed idealistic in its internationalism and its faith in democracy and freedom, but it is hardheaded, not to say jaundiced, in its image of our adversaries and its assessment of international organizations. Nor is its idealism to be confused with the idealism of the “peace” camp. Over the course of the past century, various schemes for keeping the peace—the League of Nations, the UN, the treaty to outlaw war, arms-control regimes—have all proved fatuous. In the meantime, what has in fact kept the peace (whenever it has been kept) is something quite different: strength, alliances, and deterrence. Also in the meantime, “idealistic” schemes for promoting not peace but freedom—self-determination for European peoples after World War I, decolonization after World War II, the democratization of Germany, Japan, Italy, and Austria, the global advocacy of human rights—have brought substantial and beneficial results.
Belief in deterrence, alliances, and force does not a “realist” make if those instruments are deployed on behalf of a global crusade for liberalism.
Given all of this, it should come as no surprise that Caverley takes Kagan out of context in order to answer why, given “democratic enfeeblement,” autocracies don’t support democratization. Here’s the full pargraph, with the part that Caverley quotes underlined:
Neither Russia nor China has any interest in assisting liberal nations in their crusade against autocracies around the world. Moreover, they can see their comparative advantage over the West when it comes to gaining influence with African, Asian, or Latin American governments that can provide access to oil and other vital natural resources or that, in the case of Burma, are strategically located. Moscow knows it can have more influence with governments in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan because, unlike the liberal West, it can unreservedly support their regimes. And the more autocracies there are in the world, the less isolated Beijing and Moscow will be in international forums such as the United Nations. The more dictatorships there are, the more global resistance they will offer against the liberal West ’s efforts to place limits on sovereignty in the interest of advancing liberalism.
I suppose there might be something to Caverley’s arguments; as I’ve noted, one can make a case for fitting “neoconservativism” under the rubric of “neoclassical realism.” But doing so requires us to ignore not only the evidence of intellectual DNA, but also to reduce “liberalism” to its Wilsonian variant. Still, his conclusions about academic neoclassical realism might have some punch. I just find it difficult to overlook the fact that Caverley’s novel claims concerning “democratic enfeeblement” find no textual support.
All of this dovetails in interesting ways with recent discussions of peer review. This article, at least in its present form, would not have survived adequate peer review. Any reviewer familiar with recent neoconservative writings should have wondered about some of these quotations, all of which come from articles available online. So either Millennium couldn’t find appropriate reviewers, those reviewers were too “overburdened” to do due diligence, or they just didn’t care.
Update: my claim about this being a failure of peer review only involves the out-of-context quotations that I discuss at the end of my critique–those specific to Caverley’s “democratic enfeeblement” argument. Peer review is supposed to catch that sort of thing. The rest of the issues I raise are, I think, subject to debate; reasonable people will disagree about them. Reviewers should either have rejected the entire piece or suggested a revise-and-resubmit with either (1) better evidence for “democratic enfeeblement” or (2) an abandonment of that argument in favor of more general points about how neoconservatives work themselves into a place quite similar to that of some neoclassical realists. But the current “evidence” for that hypothesis should not have made it into a published article.
This is interesting stuff. You might also throw Fukuyama’s argument about shifting the functions of the UN to NATO (as he did in America at the Crossroads). These sort of label questions are always fun to read. Beyond the rejection of making the neorealist into the neocon — are there any realist comparisons that are apt? Is a neocon a hegemonic stability theorist (like Gilpin)? Is Fukuyama and other muscular Wilsonians — who might also be described as neocons — really a variant of cosmpolitanism?
Dan, I’m not sure if Millennium has changed its peer-review system since I was part of the editorial team, but in 2000-01, the tradition (probably going back to the start of the journal) was for the editorial board, consisting of a varying group of PhD and MSc students, to vote articles up or down. There was some editorial discretion involved in weeding out articles which got rotten reviews, but I remember at least one occasion when an article with lukewarm reviews (two R&Rs if I remember correctly) got voted into the journal. This process is part of what makes Millennium so charming an quirky, and probably also the reason why a lot of cutting edge stuff has been published there over the years. On the other hand, this is also why you sometimes just shake your head.
I have no idea if this is what happened to this specific article, and if it was a special issue article, then probably not. But the contextual info might nevertheless be useful (in particular to anyone planning to send a piece to Millennium). I personally like the journal a lot.
My comments should not be read as a knock on Millennium per se. But editorial review is part of the peer review process, as I see it.
Given the current conditions where a) there’s too much out there if you really want to read widely, and b) nobody’s got enough time (and as has been mentioned, these two factors help explain how/why things can get a bit sloppy in the peer review process), there still must be a point at which a reader makes a judgment call: “I’ve had enough of this, I can’t let this go by.”
If you get to this point, what are your options? Seems to me: a) blog piece (you’ve done this), b) reply/review piece (or forum piece or 1-2 page corrective, etc.) in the journal, or c) attach this to something new but related. Are there others?
I take it you think this isn’t good enough–that peer review should catch this. However, would you encourage people to pursue these options?
(Sadly, I think the height of the bar to get folks to invest the time and energy for a corrective is probably pretty darn high given current conditions.)
But then again, Millennium has PhD students as editors, so editorial review is bound to be less stringent than in other journals. Based on the wisdom of groups, Millennium does (or at least did) pretty well, although I believe the N might not be big enough to warrant that comparison.
What I’m saying is that peer review in the strictest sense (external double blind) might not be the problem with this specific article, and that the Millennium process is bound to produce more outliers than other processes, both negative and positive.
Well Dan, as a current student at LSE, I can offer some feedback about the review process. I don’t, of course, speak for the current or past editorial team. Halvard is right, the structure remains as follows: the senior editors are PhD students, as are the associate editors. The exception are book review editors and members of the editorial board which is open to MSc students as well. Normally, the senior editors decide which articles to bring to the board’s attention; otherwise, the review process gets worked out between them and scholars who are selected to peer review the articles. Granted, the board does not see every article–this is at the senior editors’ discretion–but, scholars who specialize in that particular area are usually (if not always) involved in peer review. Two things could have happened: 1) given that the board itself also includes MSc students, they might have voted an article in which should have been a reject, and the board has the final say, or 2) the selected scholars for peer review did not take the process as seriously as they should have. I think that is the one key challenge Millennium faces at times is to convince scholars (even peer reviewers) to be academically open given Millennium’s reputation, and yet also be rigorous at the same time. I think the unfortunate perception that’s out there is because it is run by graduate students, academics do not have to take the process as seriously (though this is not the case most of the time I’d say), but as a staff member myself at the journal, I know it is an issue we run into sometimes. I’m a book review editor at the journal, and have sometimes had to tell senior and tenured academics to revise and resubmit pieces that were not up to the journal’s standards.
On one occasion a few years ago, I sent an email to Millennium’s book review editors indicating an interest in reviewing a particular book. I never received a reply and eventually decided I wasn’t that interested in the book after all. On another occasion, somewhat more recent, I sent an email indicating interest in reviewing a book and again received no reply after several months. I then a made a (long-distance) telephone call to Millennium’s offices, just happened by chance to find staff members in at the time, and it turned out that the book I had requested was available and sitting on the shelf, whereupon they proceeded to send it to me. (The review was eventually published, after some rather frustrating interaction with the editorial staff.) I know someone else who requested a book for review by email from Millennnium and never received a reply.
If these experiences are in way typical, it’s a bit miraculous that the journal manages to publish any book reviews at all. I know it’s a student staff and that there is a frequent turnover, but that’s no excuse for this kind of thing.
Clarification: for those who don’t know, Millennium doesn’t ask person X to review book Y, but rather relies on people emailing them and indicating an interest in a particular book that’s on their available list.
The good news LFC is the journal is switching to longer book review articles, and I think this will help matters greatly. At present, when we have shorter reviews, this contributes to an overload of requests, and secondly, it is questionable if the overall quality is worth attention. However, by switching the system to fewer (and longer, also more analytical and thought-provoking) reviews, I think it motivates contributors to submit better pieces, and moreover, is more manageable for the staff in terms of requests. So as Rathburn noted earlier, less really can be more.
Well, a switch to longer and fewer reviews may indeed make sense, at least in these circumstances.
I wonder why you took issues with this article, when there is so much worse around. Especially if you look at what Millenium publishes! Yes, it was not perfect. But Hello: have you ever read anything on Millenium?Related to the issue of peer-reviewing, let me ask you something.For the past 20 years, scholars in IR have advanced in their careers by misrepresenting realism (“Realism ignores domestic politics”), by furthering the claim that realism cannot explain the end of the Cold War, or by inventing puzzles that are not puzzles (“Realism cannot explain cooperation”).
I guess the reviewers of all these works never really read Waltz (or maybe, it was just fashionable to skip page 71…), they never read the works by Brooks and Wohlforth, and they never really understood that alliances are, by definition, a form of cooperation.
So, with so many cases of poor peer reviewing around, you focused on a work that – Caverley will not take it personally – is really at the margin of the discipline, given that nobody cares about neoclassical realism, and even less about a new neo-neo debate. So, really? If we want to raise a debate about peer-reviews, let’s do it. But let’s do it seriously. Let’s focus on those works we ask grad students to read, even though their case selection borders with farce and their historical accuracy is similar to that of a novel… I bet we would do a much better service to the discipline than taking issues with an article published in Millenium.
I wrote this primarily because the out-of-context quotations pissed me off. I also think that peer review is supposed to catch that sort of thing.
I don’t disagree with your overarching point about misreadings of structural realism and the trajectory of a number of debates in the 1990s. I’ve even co-authored an article on that point.
Millennium may not publish the kind of stuff you like, but it is an important journal in its niche, as Halvard notes below.
On poor standards and what we ask our students to read, I would like to promote the article by Benjamin de Carvalho, John Hobson and yours truly in the current edition of
(wait for it)
Millennium.
https://mil.sagepub.com/content/39/3/735.full.pdf+html
I think this post shows one thing. Don’t f**k with Nexon. I was on the receiving end of one of his reviews once, an R&R but still. Great review, but I think he copy-edited by works cited. Dan is committed enough to write a 4,000 word review on an article already published! Damn, son! Bring your A-game or he will break out the whoop-ass.
Unfortunately I’m coming upon this post late in the evening so have read it pretty quickly.
But one of the central points of the Caverley article judging from its abstract — that neocons favor democratization (of other countries) b/c democracy enervates (i.e. weakens) state power — would have to rest on Straussian ‘esoteric’ readings and out-of-context quotations b/c, as anyone who knows the first thing about neoconservatism will understand, it is a ludicrous proposition.
Was Caverley on another planet during the debate that preceded the ’03 invasion of Iraq? The constant neocon drumbeat, or one of them, was that a democratic Iraq would produce a contagion effect leading to a democratic Mideast, which would serve US interests not b/c the resulting states would be weaker but b/c they would be more in tune with US values (which in the neocon and some liberal views have universal validity), etc. GW Bush constantly repeated that ‘freedom’ is everyone’s birthright b/c each human being is God’s creature (ok, that’s not verbatim, but you know the line I’m talking about). Of course Bush had a constricted understanding of ‘freedom’ (identifying it mostly with voting), but that’s not the point.
In short, one hardly needs an advanced degree in IR to realize that the ‘neocons believe in democratic enfeeblement’ thesis is bizarre and contrary to everything they have ever said. Now of course a democracy (read the US here) could, in some neocon-ish views, decay from within as a result of cultural permissiveness, feminism, multiculturalism, tenured “radicals,” or whatever their particular imaginary bugbear of the moment is, but the notion that neocons think a democratic regime type = state weakness is bonkers.
Odd one this as I thought very similarly to Dan when I read the article the other week. I was all the more bemused because I hadn’t been asked to review it by the Millennium team, despite the fact that neoclassical realism and US grand strategy (and in particular neoconservative doctrine) are my central areas of expertise. Which wouldn’t be that odd, were it not for the fact that my office is in the next building from Millennium’s editorial office at LSE.
Peer review may have been the problem here, but the first step in peer review is picking the right reviewers.
Sorry, but in the internet era, peer-reviewer need not be selected on the ground of geographical proximity…
I agree with Potter.
First, having participated to Millenium’s editorial meeting and having read a lot of what this journal publishes (I am a former LSE-guy), I think Caverley’s article is still much better than most of what they publish.
Second, there is really so much bad stuff around that your attack on a relatively marginal article seems quite bizarre. I could make a long list, I just focus on one article: Pouliot’s 2008 piece on IO.
The guy is able to say that the transatlantic rift observed earlier this decade was due to people like Bob Kagan and their rhetoric.
Not satisfied, he claims that his logic of practicality (or whatever he calls it) explains why the US did not invade France during the 2003-Iraq controversy.
1) Can anybody remain serious?
2) Were the peer-reviewers drunk when they read these statements?
Well, in that article Pouliot does much worst than that. He quotes Kissinger to support his logic of practicality in a way that is simple laughable. That passage (while the analyst can choose the problem to solve, the statesman cannot) is famous because corroborates Kissinger’s classical realist position. Pouliot plays with that to support a completely different logic that is not even coherent with what Kissinger had in mind…
Just a quickie-reply here: agreed that peer review has problems, and that DN’s points speak to structural inadequacies that are likely general to the discipline. Only would reiterate that this journal, in particular, is a grad student effort. Many of us may be accustomed to seeing Millennium as rather more, because at key moments it has really punched above its weight in terms of bringing important arguments and debates to light. But it may be that lapses in professionalism and keeping the pluralism and innovation channels open (viz., one of the earlier comments) are necessary trade-offs…further, that the space for something less professional and more freewheeling is important, and that Millennium serves it well.
On the Caverley piece itself: when it came out, I found the piece a most interesting read, and it did make me think about the interconnections between Neoclassical realism and neo-conism: the ‘Schweller-Schweller’ convergence, as it were. I’m less well-qualified to weigh into the weeds of this conversation than are other commentators: but don’t some important neo-classical realists reject the democratic enfeeblement argument entirely? Friedberg’s big book on the garrison state comes to mind here: the US’s power is _because_ it is a contract state, in AF’s argument, not despite. Suggests that the ostensible consensus is not a consensus.
It seems to me the more relevant question is not whether “some important neoclassical realists reject the democratic enfeeblement argument entirely,” but whether there are any contemporary IR writers, regardless of label, who actually make the ‘democratic enfeeblement’ argument, or whether it’s just a figment of the article’s imagination.
That’s schweller’s argument: underbalancing. (Viz. “Unanswered threats”) There’s also a broader literature about democratic states being either unable to galvanize public consensus (viz. Krasner’s 1975 book), or democracies being ineffective because they are subject to stasis, misrule and demogoguery — from thucydides and the sicilian expedition to republican security theory (Deudney, onuf, tjalve, etc.)
Very few neoclassical realists argue that democratic institutions weaken states, but Schweller essentially does. It is a weird argument, because his examples of cohesive, effective are fascist ones. I don’t think Germany or Italy made, on the whole, particularly good security choices.
OK.
Incidentally I was just looking quickly at the ungated version of the Caverley article and the line that jumped out was that neocons believe democracy is weakening not in the sense that it reduces military or economic power, but in the sense that democracy reduces the willingness to spend ‘adequate’ resources on the military and to use military power. Probably no more convincing, but a somewhat more specific claim than generic ‘state enfeeblement’.
It would be fine if Caverley argued that neoconservatives see liberal democracy as sapping the will to fight, etc. They do worry a great deal about this, which is why Roosevelt’s “New Nationalism” and other patriotic projects keyed to modern life appeal to them. The tendentious part of the argument concerns the extrapolated claim that neoconservatives want to export democracy to other countries in order to weaken those other countries. That argument does not appear in the material Caverley cites, and the few quotations that suggest it does are out of context.
Got it.
Yeah, it is a weird argument…he essentially replies to your argument (that germany & italy made bad choices) by saying that this is not overdetermined: “I see no reason this ‘had’ to have happened.” Odd, b/c he uses schmitt; and schmitt (at least one reading, let’s call it left-straussian-tragic) would argue that it _is_ overdetermined: fascism is the reaction to the weaknesses of liberalism, which are structural and endemic…Weimar failed b/c it had to fail…. Got a piece on this going out (for review!) next week…
Dan, I have a question:
You now have shown that Caverley pulled a bit too much this quotation. Fair enough. Caverley is a young (yet bright and promising) faculty. He will redeem himself in the future.
Yet, if his article triggered this passionate reaction, can you tell me what did you do when you read Mary Kaldor’s New and Old Wars? I guess you must have two tomes of notes. Please: share them with us!
Well, John has asked for, and will get, a chance to post a response to the Duck.
Although I should probably post something about this, a number of people emailed me to point out another such dustup:
https://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/28/mccallister_rips_caverley_over_shoddy_scholarship_in_who_lost_vietnam
https://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/31/caverleys_response_to_mccallister_and_to_that_headline_on_fridays_item
I haven’t read anything by Mary Kaldor since I was an undergraduate.
Those who are interested in pursuing this issue further might want to read the articles on Vietnam war strategy in the 2010-2011 issue of International Security.