I found this image here.
So the US pivot toward Asia is all the rage in foreign policy now. Obama and Secretary Clinton genuinely seem to believe in this, and there good reasons for it. Briefly put, Asia has the money, people, and guns to dramatically impact world politics in a way that no other region can now. But I think the US Asian pivot won’t happen much nonetheless, because: 1) Americans, especially Republicans, don’t care about Asia, but they really care about the Middle East (a point the GOP presidential debates made really obvious); 2) Americans know less about Asia than any part of the world, bar Africa perhaps; 3) intra-Asian soft balancing (i.e., almost everyone lining up informally against China) means we don’t really need to be that involved, because our local allies will do most of the work; 4) we’re too broke to replicate in Asia the sort of overwhelming presence we built in the Middle East in the last decades.
On the face of it, a US pivot seems like a good idea, and if the US followed secular, rationalist, (realist-defined) national interest criteria, we would indeed pivot. Looking at global regions, Asia pretty clearly outweighs the rest. Europe and Latin America are mostly democratic, fairly prosperous, and at peace. We don’t really need to be in these places, and we shouldn’t either abet Euro-free-riding or worsen our already bad history in Latin America. Getting out serves our (and their) interests. Africa, sadly, remains a backwater of US interest, with no clear (national security) reason for an already overstretched US to do much. The Middle East, to my mind, is wildly overrated for us. Like Walt, Sullivan, Friedman, and so many others now, I think it’s fairly obvious, ten years after 9/11, that: our relationship with Israel has become unhealthily close, almost obsessive; Islamic terrorism is a wildly overrated threat to the US which we risk worsening by the inevitable blowback to all our action in the Middle East; and we should be moving toward alternative energy so that we can get out of the Gulf. In short, Europe and the Western Hemisphere are basically democratic peace zones, Africa is (sorry) irrelevant, and the ME needs to be cut down to size in our foreign policy phobias.
That leaves Asia, and the reasons for attention should be blindingly obvious. Asia’s economies are growing fast, almost uniformly so. Even place like Cambodia and Vietnam are clocking 5+% growth now. Asian savers and banks fund the ridiculous US budget deficit and export lots of stuff we buy. The number of people Asia has added to the global labor pool (2 billion in the last 25 years) has kept global inflation down for a generation (the largest ever one-time shift in the ratio of capital to labor). Asian markets are now major export destinations for American industries (including academia).
Next, there are a lot of Asians. This seems trite, but if you consider that there are only around 500 million people stretching from Rabat to Islamabad, but 3 times that just in India (!), you quickly get a sense that sheer demographics plays a role. Half the world’s population lives in South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia. And unlike many people in the greater Middle East, Africa, or even Latin America, these people participate in the global economy a lot – as low-cost labor, big savers, importers, exporters, etc.
Third, lots of people means inevitable friction, and lots of money means lots of weapons. Especially NE Asia sometimes feels like Europe before WWI: big, tightly-packed, fast-growing economies; lots of money for bigger and bigger militaries; lots of nationalism and territorial grievances to create sparks. Regional conflict in Asia would dwarf anything since the Cold War. And specifically, China’s rise to regional hegemony would have very obvious security ramifications for the US.
So all this says Asia’s important, but the trends of US domestic politics run strongly against this. I think the Asian pivot for the US won’t take off, at least not for another decade:
1. Who is the constituency for a US shift to Asia? Who in America actually cares about this region enough to drive a major realignment away from long-standing US interests in Europe and the Middle East? I guess the business community cares; they pushed PMFN for China 15 years ago, but they’re souring on China today because of its relentless mercantilism. Perhaps Asian-Americans would like to see this, in the same way that Hispanic-Americans impact US south-of-the-border policy. But there aren’t that many Asian-Americans (4-5%), and they don’t strike me as an organized voice loudly demanding this pivot. Perhaps foreign policy elites want this, but to my mind the think-tank/op-ed pages set (AEI, WSJ, NYT, Fox, Heritage) still seem more interested in the Middle East – when is the last time you read an op-ed about US basing in Japan or Korea, or US CT cooperation with Indonesia? The relevant Asian security stuff regarding the pivot is still scarcely on the radar of the regular media (compared to the coverage of US domestic politics or the Middle East). Finally, does Obama’s electoral coalition care about or want this? As a rule of thumb, the less wealthy you are, the less you care about far-off issues like foreign policy, so it’s unlikely that the underprivileged and youth who helped Obama win want or even care about this. While college educated whites, who also broke for Obama, likely support this, the rest of the Democratic coalition traditionally focuses on domestic issues like education, social mobility, the courts, redistribution and safety nets, etc. Maybe labor unions care a bit, but their trade concerns are dated and generic, rather than Asia-specific, and they probably want less not more engagement with Asia.
But most importantly, the Republican Party, which I think worries about foreign policy a lot more than the Dems, really cares about the Middle East. Remember that something like 30-40% of Americans claim to have had a born-again experience. For them, Israel is, easily, America’s most important ally. Their post-9/11 Kulturkamp with Islam is a central value; they know that worshipping Allah is blasphemous. In that fetid Christianist mindset, what are Korea or China but factory floors far away who make stuff for Walmart? Asia doesn’t activate or mobilize these ‘Jacksonian-Christianist’ voters. When Santorum said in the New Hampshire debate that Iran’s nuclear program is the most important issue in US foreign policy, he was channeling probably one-third of the electorate. Romney and Gingrich too discuss Iran constantly and pledge ‘no daylight’ with Israel. By contrast, what does the Tea Party know or care about China or India? At least Islam looks like a ‘heathen’ analogue to Christianity (a book, similar godhead, prophets) to the US right, but what to make of Hinduism, Confucianism, Shintoism, Taoism? Does anyone really believe Joe Tea-partier cares a wit about that stuff? It’s all about culture and religion to the base of the American right these days, and Asia is like outer space to those voters. Where is the ideology, the excitement, the fervor that created the wild paranoias like ‘WWIV’ or the ‘long war’ regarding Islam, in regard to Asia? Zippo…
In short, the Democrats don’t really care about Asia one way or another, besides a vague sense that China is ‘cheating,’ and Republicans want to keep the focus on the Middle East.
More in a few days.
Cross-posted on Asian Security Blog.
I am going to have to disagree that Africa is unimportant. Some parts of Africa are a lot better off economically and growing a lot faster and are of far more importance to US interest than some parts of Asia. Really how are the Maldives or Laos more important than South Africa or Nigeria?
Yeah, I thought I might take some heat for that one. My point was only to support the notion of an Asian pivot against other regions comparatively.
Many good points. This pretty much iterates why I’ve been slightly confused by the ‘pivot towards Asia.’ At the same time though, you could almost make an argument for why the pivot is a good move strategically for the administration, based mostly from evidence above. True, the smart money is on getting out of the ME while beefing up domestic security and energy self-sufficiency. Also true, constituents (especially of this administration) largely are unaware or don’t allow IR to influence their voting much. Asian powers are growing at a rapid clip, economically and militarily with China as the major power in the region. Lastly, business leaders therefore do have a vast interest in Asian growth. So if the US isn’t in Africa or Latin America, and is pulling out of Europe and the Middle East, why not beef up America’s presence in Asia (as is currently being done)? Especially if voters here could care less about IR and business is up with war casualties down.
I think the US business community is actually souring on China, and that will slow the pivot. The Chinese tech-‘sharing’ and import-replacement strategy has aliented the same folks who’ve argued for years to engage China. Combine that with American voters who couldn’t care less about Asia, and your pivot is driven mostly by the military at a time when Americans are burned out with war and interventions.
Re the OP’s remark on the increase in the Asian labor pool having kept global inflation down: when you consider the effects on wages and mfg employment in parts of the ‘developed’ world, the impact is arguably more mixed, at least from a parochial standpoint.
Re the preceding comment: the US is not getting out of Europe (check the number of US soldiers still stationed in Germany) or the ME/N.Africa. (The admin sends drones all over the horn of Africa and adjacent areas (Yemen) and increases drone strikes in Pakistan, even while having ended direct US combat presence in Iraq.)
1. LDC externalities were beyond my orignal argument, but ok. The classicist in me would argue that low inflation is almost always good, so maybe.
2. That’s my whole point – we aren’t really drawing down elsewhere, so an Asian pivot would mean even more extension and commitment at a time when we are broke. As I will argue in the next few posts, I don’t think we can afford all this anymore – not if Americans want the welfare state (which they do).
My #2 was not a reply to you; it was a reply to the commenter named Dan — sorry for not making that clearer. As for my #1, perhaps I was not clear enough on that either: I was referring to the impact on the ‘developed’ world esp U.S. (lost mfg jobs etc), not on the LDCs. (Or perhaps I am misunderstanding your ‘LDC externalities’ — been a while (to put it mildly) since basic econ.)
On reflection, perhaps I did misunderstand the phrase, since externalities = costs (or public ‘bads’) that one forces others to bear, iirc.
#2: I understood. I was just adding a thought.
#1. I misread you.
Robert – fascinating and great post. I’m not sure US policymakers will follow the same kind of sober and measured analysis that you offer, as mythology and a commitment to some kind of primacy in Asia is too deeply rooted, and while the Gulf region might attract more emotive current attention, the notion of the US as guardian and security guarantor in East Asia is a powerful (though not always acknowledged) assumption.
But I’ll be quiet! great post on a vital subject.
What anti-american, left-wign twaddle. Only a socialist would say that we have a “bad history” in Latin America. Anyone attache to reality would know that we stood up to communism down there. Next thing you know you will be lauding Castro, Allende and Peron, trotting out the usual hackneyed “United Fruit” communist propganda.
(And, BTW, “Latin America” is not composed of those mostly fictitious, coffee bean picking and virtuous proletriates of the imagination of the Starbucks crowd; it is a highly corrupt, decadent, violence and venal place lacking real liberty, prosperity, opportunity or freedom for the vast majority of people. As comparable societies they hardly are co-equal to the USA by any meaningful positive measure. We certainly need not apologizes for ourselves so far as they are concerned.)
As for Europe, the home of our civilization whether you are able to understand that or not, we have profound moral obligations. (Not that a leftist like you understand the notions of civilization, history or morality, let along “obligations”. Being clear on these concerns and honoring them are most certainly in our ‘national interest”. You would understand that if you understood what honor was.)
This too is complete hogwash:
On the face of it, a US pivot seems like a good idea, and if the US followed secular, rationalist, (realist-defined) national interest criteria, we would indeed pivot.
None of this has to do with “secularism” nor is “secularism” synomous with either “rationalism” or “national interest”, as the collectivists of last century so viciuously proved. You really need to stop confusing your loopy Leftwing nincompoopery and loony beliefs with all three concepts: they as a whole amount to a religion of sorts, are not rational, and are most decidedly completely inimical to our national interest. You are most manifestly no such thing as a “realist”. Merely by regurgitating the cant of the Left wing group-think you clearly betray yourself here. You spew this sort of swill most precisely because you loathe reality and would flee from it, not because you reside in it. Too funny.
Beyond that, a Germany de facto ruling the EU and in time turning to alliance with a resurgent (and nuclear) Russia is certainly something which should profoundly concern us, morally and pragmatically, and should concern us much more so than China. China will most likely implode soon and take most of Asia with it. You leftists who love to prompote American decline under the shadow of you coreligionists in Communist China are once more in for a disappointment.
We have been down this path with Asian Tiger before, It will end the same.
https://alturl.com/3nnzp
https://alturl.com/i4xog
We live in a great country, but that doesn’t mean it hasn’t done bad things.
Per Santorum, I am an academic pinko de-christianizing the heartland and destroying students’ patriotism. Glad to be of service. J
Thanks for the comments. I could have done without the ad hominems, but let me respond to a few things:
I was making no real comment on the internal problems of Latin American governance. You and I are probably closer than you think on that, but it’s not really relevant to my argument on Asia. Also, our history of intervention in LA is pretty troubled. I would encourage you to read a LA specialist from the left to be genuinely challenged in your views (try Walter LaFeber). Consider just pre-Castro Cuba: its evolution into a US semi-colony, our support for Batista, our informal tolerance of the huge US mafia presence in Cuba, then our use of those mob ties in Operation Mongoose in which both the attorney general and FBI director had a hand. Honestly, Bobby Kennedy is lucky he didn’t wind up in jail; Hoover personally knew Johnny Roselli; and Eisenhower may have approved the first assassination attempt. Wow. That’s pretty hairy stuff no matter how you cut it. Or, consider if you were Latino and read the ‘yankee’ Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary. That must be fairly humiliating, no? This doesn’t justify the awful leftist populism that has damaged so much of LA for so long, but our record ain’t that great, which of course was the whole reason for the Alliance for Progress.
I do agree with de Gaulle that the US is effectively a European-descended state and is a part of the West. (I make this point more clearly in the next two sections of this post coming this week.) Indeed, this is one of the big reasons why I think the pivot won’t happen much. We are a western country to whom Asia is very, very foreign. Hence the public (not-elite) interest in the pivot is shallow. I am not an ‘Asia firster’ or ‘Asia hand’ type even though I live here. In fact, the more I live here, the more I think the cultural gap between Asia and the US is yawning. I think Asians wildly overrate America’s interest and commitment to Asia; I am always asked by Koreans what Americans think of Korea, and my answer is, we couldn’t care less – which is why I wrote this post.
On secularism, I think it’s hard to deny the influence of religion on US foreign policy. Just go read Walter Russell Mead or watch the GOP primary debates. It is really, really obvious that something like 30-40% of Americans want the US deeply tied to Israel and heavily involved in the Gulf for theological reasons. You wouldn’t really deny that would you? But if you strip out the religion, the argument for Asia’s value over the Middle East is pretty clear. You wouldn’t really suggest that Iran is more important to the US than China, Japan or India, would you?
As for my sympathy for communism, well, just read these: https://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2011/11/07/5-bad-options-for-dealing-w-nk-3-defense-build-up-to-harden/; https://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2012/02/19/even-uncle-hos-hand-weights-contributed-to-the-revolution-1/; and https://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2011/12/19/kim-jong-il-the-don-corleone-of-north-korea-has-died/.
Thanks for reading.
I’m unconvinced domestic disinterest will keep the pivot at bay, but this has forced a good rethink – much appreciated.
Well it’s sort of an open question isn’t it? As I argued, there are good reasons to pivot, even if most Americans know less about Asia than any other part of the world. So it’s a good test of the Primat der Aussenpolitik vs Primat der Innenpolitik. I’m up in the air myself.