Here is an answer to Jon Western’s good question. Here is Steve Walt saying nice things about Ron Paul, and Layne has a nice recent piece in the National Interest, and another at ISQ, about looming US retrenchment. Earlier I argued that I think lots of people in IR now both expect and want some measure of US pullback. The argument is pretty well-known by now – empirically, the US is doing more than it can afford, like the Iraq war (trillion dollar deficits and ‘overstretch’); normatively, we are violating far too many of our liberal values against a comparatively minor terrorist threat (torture, indefinite detention, unoverseen drone strikes). But I don’t see too much on what specifically could be cut if absolutely necessary. The British retrenchment east of Suez in the 70s is probably our best model, but of course, the Brits had different sets of commitments, so it’s not a great blueprint.
So I try below to compile a list of who would/could/should get the axe and who not. Just like the intense competition over the periodic BRACs, one could imagine US allies making their case for a retention of US bases, troops, aid, etc. In one of his speeches, I heard Ron Paul argue that we have 900 overseas bases, so the field of choice is very wide.
I can think of 3 basic criteria for judgment of whom should be cut loose and who not:
a. Direct US national security interest: This is fairly obvious. For example, no matter what the Israelis or Japanese may say, Mexico and Canada’s fate will always be more important to the US than theirs, because they so directly impinge on US security.
b. Need/Vulnerability: Some states may want the US to stay but don’t really need us. They just want to free-ride. Germany comes to mind. Modern Germany is irrevocably democratic, liberal, aging, with a small, barely deployable military, and surrounded by other democracies. There is no need to keep it ‘down’ anymore, nor is Russia a big conventional threat to Europe.
c. Values: Some places aren’t that relevant to US security, or they may have the means to defend themselves. But they represent crucial values in high-profile contests. SK is a good example. SK’s GDP is 26x NK’s; it can take care of it itself (even thought no one wants to say that publicly here). But the Korean stand-off has become a such global symbol of liberal democracy vs. tyranny, especially next to rising China, that US retrenchment would be see globally as a real setback.
So here is quick-and-dirty ranking of allies and commitments in order of importance:
1. Canada and Mexico: I imagine the Tea party would blanche at the idea of Mexico as one of America’s very highest national security priorities, but it is for the reasons mentioned above. Yes, Mexico is vastly more important to the US than Israel.
However, the rest of Latin America, including that now-pointless embargo of Cuba, really isn’t. How damaging has Chavez really been to the US? Honestly, if we were really strapped for cash and over-committed, we could cut the Monroe Doctrine loose. Latin America doesn’t really need us or the fairly condescending ‘Roosevelt Corollary’ anymore.
Strictly speaking, Canada does not need America commitment; Mexico does somewhat. But proximity alone means they are America’s most important allies. We can’t retrench from North America.
2. Saudi Arabia: Wait, what? But yes, it’s true. If you think about what the US needs (acute demand for cheap, reliable carbon, at least until the green economy gets on its feet), SA’s extreme vulnerability, and the pan-umma chaos that would result from its collapse, means that SA has to be very high on the list. I agree that places like Germany or Korea are more sympathetic, but they have also a lot more wherewithal to defend themselves. SA does not, so it needs the US more. The majority of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudis, and all were stewed in Saudi anti-western pathologies, yet we invaded Iraq??… Well, here’s why.
3. Taiwan: This one mixes need and values. Taiwan is modern and capable, but its opponent is so big, it will never even come close in that race. Also, Taiwan has emerged as a major global values contest relevant to China’s rise and Asia’s future order. Everyone’s watching. Given that China is a real long-term peer competitor to the US now, Taiwan has a global bellwether status. But is really important for US national security? Not really; that’s true.
4. India: This one mixes all 3 criteria. In Geopolitics, I argued that India will be America’s big future ally, because it shares America’s values, and both its big threats – salafism and China. No other US ally does that. Bolstering India pushes back on Islamic terror in Asia and balances/distracts China, and reaffirms democracy in a region where democracy is often seen as a luxury that inhibits growth.
5. Indonesia: Here’s another unexpected one, but the argument is similar to India. If you think about places where a US presence could really make a difference (i.e., where we would get some dividend and not just encourage free-riding), then I think this is obvious too. For starters, it’s huge – the fourth biggest state in the world. It is a bulwark against salafism’s spread into the biggest community of the umma – southeast Asia. (No one ever seems to remember this, btw; Islam is a lot more than the Arabs and Persians.) As with India, there is a strong values case for supporting Indonesian democracy – its big, Muslim, and worried about China too.
6. Israel: I think the case for Israel is slipping. Yes, it is the only democracy in the Middle East, but not so much anymore actually. Arab Spring has changed a lot, and Israel’s own internal politics, especially its now effectively permanent occupation of the Palestinians, damages that ‘we’re the only state in the Middle East that shares US values’ line. This doesn’t mean we should abandon Israel, only that it’s rank is sliding. America’s national security interest in Israel is not particularly obvious now – the Cold War is over, S Hussein is gone, Assad is on the ropes. Nor is it clear that Israel really needs us. It needed us to survive the Yom Kippur War, but now? Its got the best military in the region, plus nukes. The real ‘values’ link between Israel and the US now is more tribal (a Judeo-Christian struggle against Islam) rather than liberal.
7. South Korea: Like Israel, the case for SK is slipping, primarily because SK so obviously outclasses NK. NK may be very scary, but a real SK military build-up (including vastly superior nukes) would be scarier still. SK’s GDP is at least 25x NK’s. Its military technology is two generations ahead. Its social capacity – health, education, institutional durability – vastly outstrip its opponent. Like Israel, SK needed us once, but not really anymore. Like the EU and Japan, wealthy SK has ‘graduated’ from the need for serious US extended deterrence. South Koreans I talk with about this worry about ‘abandonment,’ but then, SK only spend 2.5% of GDP on defense. The US spends more than twice. That’s not free-riding as bad as Germany or Japan, but its still free-riding. If you consider that Taiwan or India would represent a greater return for the US’ extended deterrence investment, you understand why Ron Paul always mentions Korea as a basing obligation to eliminate. However, the intra-Korean contest has acquired a ‘freedom vs tyranny’ global profile. Like Taiwan, it is something of a bellwether now that would send big signal, especially now that we’re ‘pivoting’ to Asia. So the current US small commitment – 28.5k warfighters under USFK away from the DMZ – is probably about right.
Part two will come in four days
Cross-posted on Asian Security Blog.
Good stuff. But Canada does need American commitment–the Arctic is the new playground, and Russia is the threat. Canada cannot thwart Russia on its own, but can with the help of the US. And the US has heaps of interests up there as well. A deal will need to be struck between the US and Canada on arctic stuff–the hardest conflict to resolve will be navigation through the Northwest Passage. But eventually saner heads will prevails and the US/Canada will double down on the old NORAD commitment.
I look forward to your take on Europe. Free-riding varies, and US does get some value added, so I don’t think they can be dumped (I would put NATO way ahead of Israel, for instance).
Thank you.
Europe is more important than Israel, yes, but also more capable of defending itself. I want to argue that America’s commitments should not just be driven by interest, but also by the ability of others to defend themselves, and by their symbolic significance. For example, Korea may not be too important post-Cold War, but its symbolic importance lingers. Conversely, Germany and France may have loathed each other in the past, but not anymore, so why does the US permit them to free-ride, when they can carry their own defense costs?
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But not all Europeans are free riders. France did carry its share, more or less, after Sarkozy became President. Denmark bled far more per capita and served in more parts of Afghanistan than anyone else except US/UK. The Baltics sent what they could (more than Greece), Romania was willing to send folks to southern Afghanistan (perhaps with caveats), and the Poles sent significant troops to RC-East. Re Libya–France and UK did most of the heavy lifting with Danes, Norwegians and surprising Belgians (plus Canada). So, it is easy to focus on the Germans (Italians, Spaniards, Hungarians did less than Germans in A-stan and got little of the attention that the Germans got).
NATO does provide added value despite its limits and difficult processes because it does make it easier for other countries to join the US. Ad hoc coalitions of the willing actually have the same problems as NATO (caveats, etc) with less of the advantages (interoperability, legitimacy, domestic support).
I understand your point that Europe could take care of itself more than Israel. On the other hand, NATO provides more added value to US interests in the world whereas Israel takes more off of the table these days.
Hmmm. All this is very good, but if the US can’t scale back commitments in Europe, then where can we scale back? NATO is ground-zero for retrenching, if we are going to do it at all, no? Also, only 3 non-US members meet the NATO minimum defense spendign floor of 2%: France, Greece, UK: https://www.acus.org/files/ISP/111910_ACUS_Kordosova_NATOBudget.pdf. Not even Turkey (which really surprised me). Given that the US spends more than double most members (even higher if one includes all the US defense spending that is artifically routed outside of DoD [like Veterans’ Affairs] to keep the official DoD figure lower), I’d call that a free-ride.
I don’t think Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East if you include Turkey in the region.
On an unrelated note, it’s a good thing Dr. Saideman didn’t forget Poland: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mahTGNIk4q4.
All depends what the ‘criteria’ are. Your chosen analytic is predominantly realist in orientation; what’s essential for US strategic/national interest. Basically your analysis is sound, but only as sound as the realist assumptions that ground it.
Ok, but I tried to emphasize vulnerability and values too. I do think placing national security interests, like Mexican stability, should certainly come first. That said, I did try to just reach beyond borders and oil. I still support the US commitment to SK, even though it encourages a lot of free-riding. Does that work?
I question the need to keep Saudi Arabia high on the list; oil production will seek a global market regardless of who’s in charge. & of course it’s long since past the time at which we should inform Israel that unless they step waaaay back from the colonialism to which they’ve been addicted since 1967, it’s back to some technical assistance and “pay as you go” for everything else. That (and other nitpicks) said, the notion of impending “imperial overstretch” is a bit too hysterical. As the WSJ pointed out today, the current administration is not given to reckless spending — budget growth (annualized) is the lowest in half a century. https://www.marketwatch.com/story/obama-spending-binge-never-happened-2012-05-22?pagenumber=1
I sort of agree on SA. I didn’t like putting them in there, but we are so dependent on carbon, and that is the sort of thing we don’t see properly until there is a cut-off. The real point is to get us off of carbo, out of personal automobiles and onto our feet, bikes, and public transportation. But SA also has a unique role in Islam, so…
I think imperial overstretch is not unreasonable. We are borrowing 9% of GDP and 33% of the budget, and 25% of the budget goes to national security with 8 % unemployment. Our ‘exorbitant privilege’ is the only reason we can get away with imbalances like that, but let’s fight a war with Iran instead of rebalancing at home…