All wars end. Or do they?
Rather too often, we are being reminded that the ‘war on terror’ against the Al Qaeda terrorist network is far from over, in fact that it will never end and even, that it can never end. One military analyst, for example,
a former employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency in the US, states OBL and his closest circle in Pakistan were hardly influential to AQ franchises and affiliates. In his last few years as AQ’s leader, OBL was never concerned in the operational aspects of AQ. This perhaps means that the death of OBL, though a great success for counterterrorism, will not greatly affect AQ and its operations around the world, for example, AQ in the Arab Peninsula has been permitted to operate against the Gulf rulers without any open meddling from AQ’s inner leadership.
Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies states AQ has had ten years to attain another leader, has formed strong and international cells and superfluous networks, and has found alternative sites throughout the world. AQ is still a large threat and the US and its allies still have a long way to go in the war against terrorism.
Really? Firstly, the body of evidence uncovered from Osama Bin Laden’s hideout contradicts these statements. He was far more than a figurehead or ‘rock star’ icon of dark charisma. He tried to maintain an intricate bureaucratic chain of command while realising that there were franchises that were semi-autonomous. OBL was still influential, he was giving orders, he took great interest in the operational side of his movement, and he did have resources at his disposal. And in the cases where he was not fully in control, OBL recognised what some Western observers don’t, that the loosening of the structure came at a high price, enabling the counter-productive behaviour of Al Qaeda affiliates, imitators and franchises and leading to a crisis of legitimacy for the network, from Algeria to Iraq. Indeed, in their own audits and self-assessments, Al Qaeda Central were more willing to entertain the idea of their own failure than many Western analysts.
Secondly, how is AQ still a ‘large threat’ to the security of the United States and its allies in any measure? Against Western targets, it has failed to pull off a complex, mass casualty assault of the 9/11 variety in over ten years since 9/11, and since 2003-2005, none of the lesser scale of a 7/7 or Madrid bombing. It has become wildly unpopular and suffered violent blowback in lands it regards as sacred to its cause, like Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Its attempts at even low-tech attacks in the West have been disrupted and/or ineffective. Third-order nuisance maybe, non-trivial concern in places like Somalia and Syria perhaps, downright lethal still in its car bombings occasionally in Iraq, but ‘large threat’? When its brand is at best marginal amongst most protesting masses in the Arab Spring, how dangerous is it, in terms of translating violence into political results?
The killing of Bin Laden removed one of the networks most skilful, iconic and seasoned players. The regular killing of his subordinate commanders has also drained it of hard-won skills. Terrorism isn’t an instant capability that anyone can acquire at the click of a mouse. It takes experience, group cohesion, a high level of political will, operational security and a range of intellectual and technical abilities.
No doubt violently draining the network of talented folk can produce blowback and have ‘martyring’ effects. But to announce that Bin Laden was just a figurehead, a borderline irrelevance, and that this World War must continue as though the adversary is just as potent as it was on 10 September, is to perpetuate one of the most serious errors of the War on Terror, the failure to measure risks and costs soberly.
There is also a more unfortunate side to this debate: the refusal of professional experts at times to acknowledge not only that AQ has taken hits to its credibility and cohesion, but to acknowledge that it even could. Is it bad for business to recognise when the object of one’s intellectual fascination is fading in importance?
The War on Terror provided many people with a chance to build an industry around worrying about terrorism and warning that the threat is dire and almost never-ending. The last thing they would want would be to admit that the death of OBL and his subordinates has been a serious blow, or the policy implications flowing from it, that we can scale back our global efforts to conventional, day-to-day counter-terrorism. That would be bad for business.
But for those who disagree, please consider this: what would defeat, or marginalisation, look like? If you are saying that Al Qaeda is still a large threat worthy of an ongoing, top-priority war, what are your criteria for our success and their failure?
No question, those who make their living as “AlQaeda experts” have a financial incentive in a credible AlQaeda. And given the requirements for secrecy surrounding defense, any sort of unbiased oversight would be ineffective, if not impossible.
Fareed Zakaria had a good take on this a few months back (ow.ly/aMhA6), stating that the reason the war on terror will go on without end is that it is because it is a war on a tactic which can be quite liberally defined (terrorism) versus an organization of finite capabilities and resources. It is quite possible that the Al Qaeda organization can also be expansively defined to prolong our wars overseas.
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what would defeat, or marginalisation, look like? If you are saying that Al Qaeda is still a large threat worthy of an ongoing, top-priority war, what are your criteria for our success and their failure?”
al-Zawahiri dead would be nice.
Pakistan’s elites understanding that another catastrophic terror attack in the US or against American interests overseas connected to an ISI proxy group will result in an American declaration of war against Pakistan and the destruction of all strategic and economic assets of the Pakistani state. No more 9/11s. No more USS Coles, or no more Rawalpindi and Kamra.
That will do it for me.
Well victory is never bad for business, but if it is get after a wrong deed than it would lead to wrong impact and it would be bad for the business. Otherwise victory inspire people to work hard for the growth and for the popularity of the business.
The very large problem with this piece, Patrick is that it lumps AQ into one big group/problem when it is many. So, yes – the threat from “AQ” core is diminishing but the threat has morphed/transformed into other Islamist extremest groups, or, on the domestic front, ‘home-grown’ (hate that term) and trans-national, etc. If you have an “expert” who doesn’t see or can’t explain that, they’re probably not an “expert”. However, this does not mean the threat of terrorism has gone away – even if it is now less about invading/attacking other countries. For example, instead of worrying about terrorists coming to the West, a large concern is now stopping our citizens from joining the fight abroad.
So – are you talking about the GWOT? Or counter-terrorism at home? There’s a big difference. And, the situation greatly differs across the West. What the threat from Islamist extremism is in the UK is different from Germany, the US, Canada, etc. In some cases, there are other groups which are growing in importance (i.e.: right wing/nationalist extremism).
I completely agree there is an industry – but it is also true that there is a range of experts, going from reputable scholars we can disagree yet debate with to the Pamela Gellers of the world who we should point our fingers at.
I
don’t see any big problems with Patrick’s piece on the terror industry.
Even if the threat has morphed and is no longer just AQ, the key issue
is how large
it is. The “threat” of political violence, some of which will be
labeled as terrorism, will be with us, as it always has been, until
everyone in the world starts singing Kumbaya. John Mueller and Mark
Stewart’s current International Security piece demonstrates yet again, just how minute the threat actually is: https://tinyurl.com/8htc49q
Sure, the threat may vary from country to country, but outside
warzones, it remains very small. Yet the costs of “countering” the
threat are enormous, in both money and civil liberties, far outweighing
any realistic assessment of the damage that terrorists might cause–and
often being counterproductive. Definitions of when the GWOT ends, such
as Zenpundits, are not helpful either. If OBL’s death didn’t satisfy,
why would al-Zawahiri’s? And there can be no end to the GWOT, if the
definition is something that can only be judged retrospectively, such as
no more 9/11s.
As
for the “terror industry,” the concept nicely captures the idea that
since 9/11 there has been a huge proliferation in the number of
companies, government/military institutions, and even “reputable
scholars” with a vested interest in perpetuating the idea that terrorism
is a major threat, justifying contracts, media appearances, or access
to the halls of power.
Cliff, before I reply, please define “small”.
Small? How
about a 1 in 3.5 million chance per year of an American being killed by a
terrorist. That is Mueller &
Stewart’s estimate of the risk (p. 96). They compare that to our annual chance of being killed in a
homicide—1 in 22,000; in a car crash—1in 8,000; or by cancer—1 in 500. By contrast, our spending on homeland
security has increased by $1 trillion since 2001, an increase that, according
to M & S would have been cost effective, only if it had been able to stop “333 very large attacks that would otherwise
have been successful every year.” I have not checked these
figures, but I’m assuming that the International Security editors and peer
reviewers were satisfied with the stats.
Read the article, Stephanie, to put your fears and the gross waste of
money on fighting terrorism into perspective–
https://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/absisfin.pdf. Sadly, even with the article’s publication in IS, the power
and interests of the terror industrial complex likely mean that we’ll see
little diminution in terror-mongering and profligate spending for years to come.
So to be clear, you’re measuring “threat” by “death” or “attack”?
Given how inept most supposed terrorists are, with their attacks failing completely or failing to meet their ridiculous bluster or failing to be anything but entrapment by governments, I’d say we should focus on the risk of death from terrorism outside a warzone such as Afghanistan. I know that in your original post you talked, offhandedly I think, about the threat that terrorists would come to the West or go overseas, but I don’t see those actions as a useful way of measuring threat. In a small way, they also bolster the idea that the entire world is the warzone, now and forever–the kind of claim that “terror experts” use to justify an endless “war,” bottomless spending, and continuing erosion of civil liberties–all to fight a tactic, not an enemy.
Okay – just wanted to see where you are coming from.
Looking at your post it’s kind of hard to know where to begin. I stand by my comment that Porter’s post conflates several distinct terrorism related problems into one AQ strawman. The problems presented by AQ-core are radically different than AQIM, AQI, and AQ-inspired terrorism, not to mention Boko Haram, Al Shabab, etc at and terrorism at home. And how these issues play out in different western countries is, of course, different. Some countries need to be increasingly worried about extremism on the right and others the paramount (terrorism) threat remains Sunni Islamist terrorism. (But of course any real terrorism expert should be able to speak to that.)
So I find it difficult to respond to what seems to be a muddled view of several issues. Are you upset with the War on Terror, policies at home – or (and I think this is it) all of the above. Your reply is also convoluting the equally challenging but separate issues of the number and growth of programs and expertise. (And, of course, your response is America-centric – perhaps understandable.)
I’m not saying that these programs are not too big or perfect or fine. Clearly WAY to much money has been thrown at people who claim to have expertise or who can “talk to Muslims”, etc. But for those scholars paying attention, governments (including the US, UK, Canadian, etc) have been interesting in funding quality research aimed at evaluation of these programs. It’s not perfect, but the Kanishka Project for an interesting example for this. https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/media/nr/2012/nr20120530-eng.aspx
An appetite for knowledge about effectiveness and evaluation is there – certainly more than somewhat clumsy characterizations floating around would suggest.
Further, based on what you have written above, and Patrick’s post, I don’t think anything I’ve seen relating to this post has really offered a considered view of what the “threat” is. And isn’t this required when considering the response? Deaths/plots are, in my view, insufficient. What about plots in the work? What about radicalized and potentially violent individuals? Nothing in the above seems to take those into account.
And – I’m truly surprised I find myself having to explain this – we have to care about our own citizens going overseas to commit terrorism because we want other countries to do the same. (Not to mention the fact that many of these individuals who go overseas come back battle-hardened, with “street cred” and cause serious problems within their communities.) Is it right that Canada should allow radical ethnic Tamils to kill and maim in Sri Lanka? Would we allow the same to happen here? I don’t think so. Or should we allow groups to fundraise for terrorist movements in the same way the US allowed groups on its soil to fund the IRA? To suggest that being concerned about what these groups and individuals do and how they do it is simply justifying a world-wide war on terror is nonsense and insensitivity to the suffering brought to others by our own citizens. Yes – I think we should care if a Canadian Tamil goes to Sri Lanka to kill. No – I do not think this is justifying everlasting war.
I do believe there is much we agree upon, especially the idea that not everything requires a gigantic terrorism apparatus. How you integrate non-violent radicals (or perhaps those on the edge of violence) who reject liberal democratic values requires a policy response, not necessarily a national security one.
But ultimately we do ourselves a disservice when we mischaracterize the security situation and threat no matter what side of the argument we are on. If there’s one thing I’ve learned over the past week is that there also seems to be a glut of experts on expertise.
The annual risk of death from terrorism is the best measure of the
“threat”—and M& S show it to be remarkably low. Other reasonable measures might be the risk of human
casualties of any kind (death + injury), or the risk of economic loss. But measuring threat by such mushy concepts
as “plots in the work” or “radicalized and potentially violent individuals” creates
an open invitation to endless anti-terror war and spending. What constitutes a “plot?” What does “radicalized” mean—or “potentially
violent?” These concepts are so
fuzzy and manipulable that any reliable measure of threat using them is impossible.
Sadly, it seems that the U.S.
government and others are using easily inflatable concepts like these,
resulting in the kind of spending you seem to deplore. If we took a rational response to the
real but tiny threat terrorism poses, your other concerns would fade away.
I am sorry, Cliff – this is a point upon which we simply cannot agree. “Deaths” is an insufficient measurement of threat. i.e. – for example: war can loom, with no one having died – but there is still a ‘threat’ to be measured. Or Wade Michael Page was clearly a “threat” before he murdered the Sikhs in Wisconson. You’re measurements do not account for this.
We can be critical of these measurements (and we SHOULD be) but you are essentially missing a substantial chunk the picture.
But this is beyond the larger point of the original post – there are experts that can intelligently speak to these phenomenon. And they are worth listening to.
Some terror experts worth listening to? I agree–and John Mueller is the place to start!