Regarding my previous post and the very useful comments, first the matter of what do we do once we realize that a policy problem in search of a policy solution is the equivalent of a social scientific puzzle in search of an explanation, for both the solution and the explanation are outcomes. In other words, Step One is to identify the policy problem in question. Â Step Two is to search the academic literature for a published study (in book or article form) whose puzzle is essentially identical to the policy problem. For example, the problem of how to end a civil war in Country X is equivalent to the puzzle of how to do so in an academic study.
The explanation of the study is the academic hook to hang the policy solution on. In other words, if there is a published study that explains the outcome of bringing civil wars to an end, this means that the study contains the cause of the outcome and has the evidence to back up the argument thereby matching the cause to the outcome. Â Once a study is found it is on to the next step.
Step Three is to look for the cause in the study that explains the successful conclusion of civil wars. The scholar has successfully identified a pattern, perhaps examining all previous civil wars and finding that a single cause explained every successful outcome. Step Four is for policymakers to adopt this cause as the policy solution, perhaps a UN armed intervention (leading to a successful peace plan).
As one person commented on my previous post, “OK so what about the real policy process?” Â In other words, I’ve only shone a bright light on how policymakers can find solutions to many of their toughest policy problems, ones that often go without finding a viable solution for years. Â I am convinced, having worked both as an academic who has published studies and a diplomat/policymaker who has implemented policies, that professionals on both sides often are not even aware of the policy problems for which viable solutions have already been identified by academics.
But the answer to the commenter’s question is the next step, which is like any other policymaking process, only now the policymaker knows s/he has a viable policy solution in hand (which often is not the case in typical policymaking processes). Â A policymaker who has a viable solution in hand now needs to do what any policymaker with a “good idea” has to do any day.
First this person’s boss has to be convinced, and perhaps that person’s boss as well. Â Then any other bureau that has a stake in the policy patch that includes Country X has to be convinced. Â If no other bureau has a stake, or no other agency, the policy can be implemented upon coordination with the U.S. embassy in Country X (as long as there is no Administration preference for a different policy). Â Let’s say the State Department has chosen a policy solution it would like to implement, but two other agencies have a stake: Â DOD and USAID. Â If this is the case, then they both have to be convinced. Â If they agree, State is a go.
If they don’t, and there is a fight, then either they forge a compromise or the issue gets kicked up the chain. Â Let’s say USAID concurs but DOD does not, then the dispute gets kicked up to the political appointees–meaning Deputy Secretaries or Principal Deputy Secretaries (or, if the dispute is already at that level, then it’s up to Assistant Secretaries or cabinet level Secretaries and their immediate deputies). Â If the fight makes it all the way to the Cabinet, without the Administration intervening at any prior stage, then the President himself will decide. Â This rarely happens, for normally officials from the National Security Staff intervene earlier down chain to break ties (the understanding being that no one higher than them in the NSS all the way up to the President would disagree).
That’s nothing other than the typical policymaking process, with all the fights there typically are.  When I was in government I enjoyed telling European diplomats that really we have just as difficult as they do–our large powerful government foreign policy agencies all protect their turf like the end times are around the corner.  Because we are so much larger, our internal government sausage making is akin to the European Union’s external sausage making when different EU governments disagree such as we have recently seen with the rest of the EU finally ganging up on Germany’s poor leadership during the Euro crisis after the elections in France, Italy, and elsewhere  (watch for a post to come in which I have a little fun with all those Americans who have predicted doom and gloom in Europe beyond its deep recession, i.e. the collapse of the Eurozone or the EU itself).
Another pertinent comment argued that the town and gown divide often is the fault of academics who obfuscate with theoretical and methodological overload and turn off policymakers. Â She is correct, as my last post failed to lay the blame in equal proportions. Â But there is more to it than the use of abstruse theory (when policymakers may at most recollect only the theoretical foundations of IR theory but not the advances in it) or the hieroglyphics of quantitative methodology (who can blame policymakers for averting their eyes from a statistical fog or the haze of a formal model’s math). Â For even when academics avoid these two things, which are in fact particularly important to establishing a putative cause as successfully explaining the puzzle of a given study, policymakers still are not likely to latch onto the study that actually contains the policy solution they are looking for.
This is because they aren’t looking in academia to begin with, as they simply do not have time. Â In fact, even if a scholar knows a slew of policymakers personally, and sends her study to all of them, odds are they won’t have time to read it. Â So there are two additional problems here: Â the lack of overlapping social networks and the lack of time on the part of policymakers. Â They only read documents that are three pages or less on average, and they better get right to the point (ugh, the quality of writing in government is atrocious at times in part because of this). Â Just the facts, thank you very much.
Naturally I make a few assumptions here, for I don’t speak of resource limitations, or limitations that emanate from Country X, or the frequent limitations from trying to line up the UN Security Council, to name a few.
But the major point is this: Â it’s not that policymakers and academics can’t talk to each other, or that when they do they can’t have a substantive conversation; rather, when I wrote that “they don’t speak each other’s language” I literally meant they don’t find each other very useful for all the above reasons, when in fact they should. Â So short of ensuring the policymakers go far enough in graduate programs that they get to know academic literature in depth, what we need in the foreign policy sphere is what I advocated in my previous post: Â an Academic-Policy Center. Â We could supplement this with resources that would allow for the regular embedding of academics in our various foreign policy agencies for at least a year at a time.
I think Jeff is largely on the mark with this and the previous post, though I do think it depends on where you are and what you are doing within government.
I think the first thing to appreciate, and perhaps the hardest for scientists (across disciplines and across the vast federal bureaucracy, though as political scientists, you’d think we know better) to appreciate, is that the academic literature is but one constituency within the political battle for policy. As we well know, because we have lots of research showing it to be so, policy makers make decisions for largely political reasons, and “working” and “supported by research/data/studies” is but one constituency, vying for influence with a host of other political considerations. We know this, because we have the studies to show how sub-optimal policy outcomes come about, and yet when it happens to us, we are surprised.
I have seen multiple channels where government actively reaches out to bring in the academic knowledge it knows it needs. Some parts of the government do pay close attention to academic research–they have the time and the mission to do so. Others (like, for instance, the bureau in which I currently work), operate in such a fast-paced, rapidly changing environment, that there just isn’t the time to seek out research when making decisions. I have seen, and attended, many seminars–largely organized by the IC or Pentagon–designed to bring experts in to present thoughts on trends of the day. This works in some areas, mostly longer-term planning, but isn’t practical for the day to day churn of rapid response. But, in that case, you do have a number of “experts” (and I know PTJ would classify expert somewhat differently than scholar, as I have seen the matrix on his white-board) who have come in from the academy and the think tank world–places where they were engaged with and familiar with the literature– and brought their knowledge to the policy process. This includes those who come through programs designed to place us in the Bureaucracy as well as those who enter through a more political route.
But, at the end of the day, decision makers need a course of action they can implement with dispatch using the tools available and satisfy the various constituencies to which they are responsible. Of course, its rare that those who have produced a study then do the follow-up mobilization to tout its benefits–not just the condensing of key conclusions into a readable and distributable format–but the creating of a constituency demanding policy action. The literature brings no political pressure. We like to think it should, but our research shows us why it doesn’t.
Of course, you’ll never get tenure forming a lobby to implement the policy relevant conclusions of your latest book. But that’s how you’ll get policy makers to pay attention.
Another piece of this is to consider what agencies or departments have a longer term or shorter term focus. The longer the time horizon, the more likely academic work will be useful. Peter’s point about DoD and the IC running seminars with “experts” is relevant in that regard. DoD and the IC have much longer time horizons than State – there’s a whole dissertation to be written on the topic – but when you’re focused on short term solutions, academic research with probabilistic solutions may not be as useful or relevant.
There’s also a HUGE framing element to this. Stephanie Carvin’s comment in the last thread on methodological fetishism is spot on. At the same time, there’s value in saying “yeah, this is more likely to work than the other, but there’s no guarantee” vice “this will absolutely work in this case.” Some humility can be quite helpful here.
One final point – I think it’s worth distinguishing between think tanks and FFRDCs (federally funded research and development centers) like RAND, IDA, and MITRE. Think tanks are more opinion-centric, sure, though some places like CNAS do more detailed work. But FFRDCs have very methodologically rigorous studies and analyses published, in some respects better than academic work. Good to build out that dynamic a bit.
Will and Peter, some sharp comments here…it’s true that some parts of government, even a few related to foreign policy, do have more time on their hands and do therefore cast a wider net that actually pulls in some academic work…so longer time horizons do help, but things are far from systematic thus leaving a sizable gap…no, the sky isn’t falling, but we need to begin closing the gap if we want better outcomes on the ground…ahead of working on crises, we should work on institutionalizing links that get highly pertinent research in boiled down form into the hands of the right policymakers for normal policy problems…an established link will through its use over time turn into a tool for policymakers…academics will never lobby policymakers consistently, even after they get tenure (one of the reasons building a lasting link is necessary)…I concur that FFRDCs like Rand do far better work than think tanks, but in Rand’s case it is work almost entirely for DoD (the Rand PhDs do very well at sifting through academic literature and pulling out/boiling down the pertinent parts)…but there aren’t resources to pay Rand to weigh in on solving every tough policy problem DoD has, and other key agencies aren’t direct beneficiaries…overall compared to a decade ago things have improved due to blogs, exchanges, and a few foundations, but the gap remains large…finally, humility is always necessary, for the “goodness of fit” between a solid academic study on resolving civil wars and the policy put in place to accomplish it will always be imperfect (and then comes all the imperfections with implementation)…I think we all concur that the aim is to make progress and narrow the gap steadily over time