This is a guest post by Peter S. Henne. Peter received his PhD from Georgetown University in May 2013, and was a Fellow at the Miller Center at the University of Virginia during 2012-2013. His research focuses on religion and foreign policy; he has also written on terrorism and religious conflict.
A recent article in The New York Times illustrates much of what, in my opinion, is concerning about US debate over the crisis in Syria. The piece makes the bold claim that the conflict in Syria is not only affecting the region, it is infecting it with sectarian tensions. The authors use dramatic language, like “a contagious sectarian conflict,” “shaking the foundations of countries cobbled together,” and “simmering” ethnic tensions in the region.
The authors committed a bit of a taste faux pas by combining public health, architectural and cooking metaphors in one relatively short article. But if readers can get beyond these overwrought images, they might notice another thing: there’s not much evidence to back up their broad claims.
The argument of the article goes something like this: The Assad regime in Syria is composed of Alawites, while most of the society is Sunni Muslim. Now that there is a full-blown civil war between Alawites and Sunnis, Shia in the area will identify with the Alawites and Sunnis with their fellow Sunnis.
In order to prove this claim, you’d first have to demonstrate that Alawites and Shia Muslims do indeed identify with each other (the Alawites are a sect of Islam that Olivier Roy has referred to as a “non-clericalized” form of Shiism, and Assad had Iran’s supreme leader declare them Shia). You’d then have to show that this affinity leads everyone in the region to see the Syrian crisis as part of a broader Sunni-Shia conflict (you’d also have to show that exists).
This Times article does none of that.
The authors seem to assume that the defining aspect of countries in the region (they name Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and Iran) is whether they are Sunni or Shia. Te fact that their populations are Sunni Muslim is about the only thing Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey have in common. Their many differences—religion-state ties, ethnicity, size, etc.—probably supersede the broader religious affinity. An article (temporarily un-gated  PDF) I published last year has indicated this is the case, as have numerous (temporarily un-gated PDF) studies (temporarily un-gated PDF) by other scholars.
They also bring up incidents of sectarian violence in the region as proof of the “infection.” Sectarian violence may have increased recently in Iraq and Lebanon, but do I really need to point out that correlation is not causation?
The biggest issue with this article, though, were the quotes they included to support their claims. An opposition fighter and pro-Assad partisan both say Sunni-Shia tensions are driving the conflict in Syria. Trita Parsi, a US-based Iran watcher and activist, provides a quote on Syria’s effects on regional sectarian tensions. These aren’t bad quotes per se, but combined with the less-than-stellar evidence in the rest of the article, they’re hardly slam dunks.
I’m not sure you have to establish that they see a religious affinity. There is an established and growing network of alliances that may be drawing outsiders into the conflict, whether these alliances were formed because of cultural similarities or strategic calculations. You have Hezbollah joining the fight on Assad’s side because Hezbollah will be in trouble if its ally and supplier Assad falls. Hezbollah’s adversaries at home may have just as much reason to help Assad fall. Saudi Arablia and Qatar don’t like Iran for strategic as well as sectarian reasons and may view this as a way to get at Iran, but they are unquestionably arming the Sunni opposition. You have al-Qa’ida in Iraq declaring a merger with Jabhat al-Nusrah, and you reportedly have Nuri al-Maliki worried that the Sunni rebellion in Syria will inspire his enemies at home, which may have already led him to retaliate preemptively. There are numerous routes that could lead to a regional conflict, and that conflict couild look very much like a sectarian war. The argument that it really isn’t (or wasn’t originally) about religion doesn’t seem to offer much consolation.
thanks for your comments.
I think you’re right that things are bad enough with no religious aspect to the crisis. But it does matter in US policy debates. Arguing that intervention in Syria will prevent the next Thirty Years War and Iran dominating the region gets more attention than pointing to a humanitarian crisis that might spill over into neighboring countries.
Also, as someone who studies religion and politics, overwrought claims of religion’s importance make my job harder…
I completely agree: the notion that the Syrian civil war is ‘infecting’ the region with sectarian conflict employs an awful epidemiological metaphor. I feel like MTT’s ‘Dynamics of Contention’ (and later revisions) provide us with a better set of cognitive tools (surprise!) by focusing our attentions on processes of diffusion, brokerage, and coordination between parties. While it certainly appears as though sectarian divisions are becoming increasingly salient, particularly with what appear to be reprisal rocket attacks by Syrian rebel forces against Shi’i communities in the Bekaa Valley, we can hardly use an ‘epidemiological’ model when Gulf funding brokers and the entrance of Lebanese and Iraqi parties – already formed around a nexus of sectarian, ideological, geographic, and economic factors – seem to be so significant. It might be a bit hard to imagine that Hizballah and Iran care all that much about the Alawites for religious reasons, but it would be strange to suggest that the alliance between the two does not rest to some extent upon shared experiences of sectarianism. It also doesn’t appear that Hizballah has been all that successful in their attempts to frame their involvement as ‘resistance’, and even if everyone everywhere views that involvement in wholly cynical terms, it nevertheless drives sectarianism simply because sectarian divides are political divides in Lebanon.
In line with the question of sectarian divides and the effects of them : I propose that the experience of Iraq and the targeting of sects by US forces illustrates a dynamic of calculated interference exploiting religion as a disruptive influence. This would explain why Saudi madrassa schools teaching their variant of Islam which considers others ‘the enemy’ is in fact a perfect counterpoint to Dominionism expropriating old line ‘Christian’ churches…and even the Bush White House support for extremist right wing Israeli partries in the Knesset ( I recall an article outlining such by a staff writer in Ha’aretz late April 2006, but of course such is behind their paywall )
Related : JAARS and Wycliff Bible trandslators
North Vietnam comments about missionaries
Bible verses on rifle sights – U.S.
Proselytizing in and by US forces in Afghanistan
Hatemongering in both US and Israeli military training institutions is likely aimed at hampering development of guilt and PTSD – cult style indoctrination by dehumanizing the enemy in the style of WW II propaganda about the Japanese.
WAFF | World’s Armed Forces Forum: Former drone operator says …
Former drone operator says he’s haunted by his part in more than 1,600 deaths A former Air Force drone operator
who … -person glimpse into what its like to control the controversial
machines that have become central to the U.S. effort to kill
terrorists. He says that as an operator he was … network54.com/Forum/211833/thread/1370599205/last-137…
This puts the Syrian infection in context with identifying the infecting agent : sponsors of al CIAda foreign mercenaries in the styled ‘revolution.’
Random tip… Ha’aretz paywall? Their systems don’t mind how many times you register for their 10 free articles a month & don’t check email addresses upon registration. Just saying.