Germany benefits from US signal intelligence. When we consider the widespread industrial espionage carried out by the Chinese, it is helpful to remember France’s extensive track record of stealing secrets from its friends and neighbors.* Israel is a major espionage threat to the United States. The British collect a lot of intelligence on allies and adversaries, even if deploying fake rocks in Russia might not have been the best idea in the history of spying. Russian and Chinese spying should require little in the way of elaboration: they both engage in a lot of it. There’s nothing unusual about all of this. International espionage implicates friends and foes in a web of  conflict and cooperation. In other words, US Secretary of State John Kerry is right:
Secretary of State John Kerry on Monday said he would look into claims the National Security Agency bugged offices of the European Union, but downplayed the reports, saying such spycraft is “not unusual.”
“Every country in the world that is engaged in international affairs of national security undertakes lots of activities to protect its national security and all kinds of information contributes to that,” Kerry said at a news conference in Brunei, according to the BBC.
“All I know is that is not unusual for lots of nations. But beyond that I’m not going to comment any further until I have all the facts and find out precisely what the situation is,” he added.
So what does it mean that EU and European officials are expressing outrage over the latest revelations from Ed Snowden? Maybe they’re really angry. After all, it is one thing to know that the US is collecting information on your policies, preferences, motives, and dispositions. It is another to face revelations that US agencies read your emails, tap your phone calls, and listen to your private meetings.Maybe they have to be really angry because that’s what their public expects. Or perhaps this provides an opportunity to exert pre-bargaining leverage in the upcoming free-trade agreement negotiations.
Regardless, I think it is time for Snowden’s defenders to admit that we’re well beyond whistle blowing. Whatever one thinks of disclosing information on the US domestic surveillance regime — what with its questionable oversight and legal justification — leaking information on US foreign espionage serves little purpose other than to harm American interests. I’m sure there’s some kind of argument about cosmopolitan ethics here… but I’m having trouble seeing one that isn’t hopelessly utopian. Even if we stipulate that the US should not be spying on its allies, that the alleged espionage crossed a de facto line in terms of their intrusiveness, or that the US is at fault for having engaged in it in the first place, that doesn’t make disclosing this kind of information right or appropriate.
Actually, I’m not entirely sure how to characterize Snowden’s more recent disclosures. I agree with Hertzberg that they don’t make him a “traitor” in the framer’s sense of the word. I suppose the relevant calculus is simply that “whistleblowing” no longer applies, and thus that particular moral shield is gone. Snowden is now, for bette or worse, no different from any other spy who goes “rogue.”
*I can assure you that I am well aware of the irony involved in linking to stories based on leaks, including wikileak documents, in this post. [back]
I don’t quite understand how you get from “even if we stipulate that the US should not be spying on its allies, that the alleged espionage crossed a de facto line in terms of their intrusiveness, or that the US is at fault for having engaged in it in the first place,” which basically admits there is a serious problem here that we would not know about otherwise, to “that doesn’t make disclosing this kind of information right or appropriate.”
Yes, everybody spies on everybody. However, effectively tapping the entire communication systems of some of your closest allies smacks of totalitarian urges. There is a reason Germany is upset about this; they remember the Stasi. What is especially important about this information is how it provides real proof (not just hearsay) about the vast extent of U.S.-imperial surveillance operations, rendering any claim to critique China’s comparably minuscule efforts laughable. The real test of whether Snowden has provided a public good here is to ask somebody from outside the United States; for whom it is relevant that the U.S. can read all our emails with impunity. For this he will receive a much warmer welcome outside his native shores, and if that makes him a spy gone rogue, then it is only from the perspective of the jingoistic.
I don’t quite understand how you get from “even if we stipulate that the US should not be spying on its allies, that the alleged espionage crossed a de facto line in terms of their intrusiveness, or that the US is at fault for having engaged in it in the first place,” which basically admits there is a serious problem here that we would not know about otherwise, to “that doesn’t make disclosing this kind of information right or appropriate.”
Yes, everybody spies on everybody. However, effectively tapping the entire communication systems of some of your closest allies smacks of totalitarian urges. There is a reason Germany is upset about this; they remember the Stasi. What is especially important about this information is how it provides real proof (not just hearsay) about the vast extent of U.S.-imperial surveillance operations, rendering any claim to critique China’s comparably minuscule efforts laughable. The real test of whether Snowden has provided a public good here is to ask somebody from outside the United States; for whom it is relevant that the U.S. can read all our emails with impunity. For this he will receive a much warmer welcome outside his native shores, and if that makes him a spy gone rogue, then it is only from the perspective of the jingoistic.
“[W]hich basically admits there is a serious problem.” Nope. Doesn’t do that. Nor does the fact that we’re talking about two different disclosures. Even if I spot you extensive data collection on email flows, that’s *not* the most recent set of leaks that I refer to.
You say “that is only from the perspective of the jingoistic.” Nah. Not at all. You’re trying to force us to choose strong cosmopolitanism by characterizing obligations of citizenship as “jingoism.” Same with loaded and irrelevant terms such as “imperialism.” Moreover, I’m not sure how to evaluate a phrase such as “totalitarian urges.” I’m *sure* German, French, Syrian, British, South African, Chinese, Japanese, Russian, and foreign intelligence agents worry about “totalitarian urges” when they intercept and make use of SIGINT.
Also, how do you know that “China’s comparably minuscule efforts” are “laughable”? Does Beijing give you access to their programs? Do you have access to European or American intel about Chinese activities? And do you know if any limitations on Chinese programs are driven by capabilities or intentions? if the former, then I think you’ve misunderstood the point of my post.
Indeed, I’m pretty sure you have, as I’m discussing Snowden’s status vis-a-vis the US. You’re making a point about how citizens of other nations ought to view him. Apples, organes, lemons, and strawberries.
I think a better argument in defense of Snowden’s international revelations might be that surveillance programs concerning Europe–if they were not authorized by Congress–represent the kind of policy that should have specific legislative authorization (or notification). To the extent that snooping on allies is bad policy, and is pursued without democratic authorization, the role of a whistle blower is to bring the issue to national attention for discussion and debate, bypassing the executive branch.
Obviously there are problems with this argument when the program needs to be secret to be successful. But, I still think there is a line being walked nearish to whistle blower if Snowden legitimately thought that US espionage programs were way out of whack with the national interest, and there needs to be checks on these programs.
Intelligence is premised on the idea that it has to be secret to be successful in most cases, at most times. As the CIA saying goes, “The secret of our success is the secret of our success.” People who want to manipulate information for the purposes of manipulating others, e.g. many politicians and some large countries, and do so on a regular basis can only be evaluated through non-public means, i.e intelligence. If the means become public, then they change their tactics, their inner circle, and/or the means of communication.
Intelligence arises out of two circumstances. The first, alluded to above, is competition. If there is ongoing competition, then there is every reason to try gain information about an adversary’s (not necessarily enemy’s) capabilities and intentions. Both are important on a recurring basis.
The second reason for intelligence is dependency. Westerners, especially Americans, are prone to thinking that friendly/allied relationships preclude espionage. However, if the success of one’s policy initiatives (e.g. U.S. initiatives against the Iranian nuclear program) or state survival (e.g. Taiwan and Israel) depend on another country, then one cannot not use intelligence means to gather information. From the moral position of that state’s government, dependency is a reason for knowing… How could a Taiwanese government not spy on the United States, albeit within limits, when the island’s defense strategy relies on the United States for equipment and support? The friendliness is really more of a restriction on the means one is willing to use. Signals intelligence is simply not as invasive or provocative as human agent operations, which involve getting people to break their trust.
The only way in which Snowden could possibly make a judgment about the national interest is if he had some idea of how the information collected was being used. Given his statements in interviews that suggest he has no idea of why Chinese research institutes (all state- or military-owned) were reportedly being targeted for collection suggests that he has such little understanding of U.S. foreign policy concerns that he lacks the moral standing for that argument to hold water. To make a judgment about whether “US espionage programs were way out of whack with the national interest,” Snowden would need to know the national interest, the policy concerns, what information was being collected and for what purpose among several other things. Nothing in Snowden’s interviews demonstrates that he made that kind of systematic analysis of what information he chose to reveal.
For now, Dan is right. Snowden does not qualify as a “traitor” in the framers’ sense of the word. However, the moment he talks with an agent of foreign power about classified information, that line will have been breached.
I’m not sure that I agree. The question I am raising is whether we can justify the revelations of US spying on the basis of democratic control, thereby treating Snowden as a whistle blower. If one believes that intelligence operations should be subject to strict democratic control, then the revelation of programs that are not explicitly authorized by the appropriate bodies (likely the legislature) might be considered whistle blowing.
Imagine, for example, if the program were a covert assassination program that was not authorized by Congress. If this program were revealed, it would likely harm the program and US interests, but the program might be justified on grounds of democratic theory because the revelation makes democratic control possible.
Your argument hinges, I think, on Snowden not being all that together. I agree with this in general. I think Snowden is certainly not the brightest tool in the shed.
But, unlike Dan, I would not want to treat the revelation of secret government programs with overseas targets as necessarily espionage, when they might serve important accountability functions. The precedent seems very broad. Would revelations about US torture that is conducted overseas, for example, then count as espionage?
The targeting of foreign governments and entities for intelligence collection is specifically and explicitly authorized. Different programs would have different degrees of oversight, because of the potential political implications. The president ultimately is the only one responsible for making these judgments and there is a Supreme Court decision that backs this up related to Lincoln’s handling of espionage (forgetting the name right now). Executive Order 12333 is a great place to start to identify what exactly is acceptable as normal procedure.
Torture is not explicitly authorized under existing statutes and, evidently, there are reasons why it might be illegal or legal (depending on what arguments one is prepared to accept about presidential powers, war, and the authorization to use force….irrespective of moral considerations). That distinction means they are not the same thing. Moreover, torturing requires custody and custody begets responsibility. Intelligence collection most often does not require such custody, and, when it does, real issues emerge about the rights of agents, e.g. Nosenko.
A covert assassination program not authorized by Congress is illegal. Period. There are specific, legal controls in place over covert action—-basically anything that does not involve the collection & analysis of information for decision makers. Congressional review decides whether such a program is legal or illegal. Once you are on the illegal territory, then all sorts of protections may kick in to protect and that would be the definition of whistle-blowing, namely the exposure of government waste, fraud, and abuse.
The reality is that, as John Adams tried to warn people, sovereignty in a representative democracy is endowed (or given up) to those elected. If the president considers it in the national interest to have foreign intelligence collection on a particularly country or organization, then it is the national interest. The president by law has all the explicit authority necessary to make this judgment and act upon it. If we want a different view of intelligence, then we have to vote on it as a consideration that forces elected officials to be responsive to those concerns. As Amy Zegart chronicled, such elective incentives do not exist and so the situation exists as we have it with the president in the driver’s seat.
Are there hard headed and practical (if not politically feasible)
reasons to ignore people who engage in espionage, make these programs
public (if not the specific details of how they operate) and make the
default transparency (engage in widespread declassification etc)?It seems ‘the cure’ (the big bruhaha that naturally develops every time something like this happens)
is worse than the ‘secrets’ they release (and is there any evidence
that prosecuting people like Snowden actually disincentivises anyone
from leaking? Are there really any rational reasons to care about these leaks? – not from my perspective as an onlooker, but institutionally)