As a callow undergraduate, I kind of supported the Iraq War for all of the normal reasons; see The Republic of Fear and The Threatening Storm. (I say “kind of” because I was in college and, frankly, tuned out in favor of studying.) A little while ago, it struck me in one of those blinding moments of self-awareness that not only had I been wrong but that Get Your War On (probably NSFW, but basically R-rated) was more accurate than my quasi-sophisticated arguments (or the analysis in the New York Times).
Given that support for intervention in Syria hangs somewhere in the single digits, it’s at times like these that I wish that I wasn’t so convinced that the presidency is largely unresponsive to the public in terms of foreign policy. I do wish, however, that political science took the presidency a little more seriously and therefore had something a little more conclusive than the extant literature about why bombing Syria now seems more likely than not. As it is, the Yes Minister quip about “politician’s logic” (“we must do something, this is something, therefore we must do it”) seems like a pretty good working hypothesis.
So, as I said, I had my Damascene moment. But it seems likely that the Obama administration hasn’t.
Here’s a hypothesis for you. Maybe the absence of public support might not dissuade presidents from “doing something”, but it might very well determine (loosely) what it is they do–or, more likely, don’t do. Public support for an intervention in Libya wasn’t quite as sparse but was in the very low double digits before it happened and only marginally improved after it started, but one could imagine the type of intervention being different had public support existed for boots on the ground. The total lack of support now might partially explain the particularly feeble attack seemingly underway.
Public support for the bombing will rebound once it happens. That’s not necessarily ‘rally round the flag, it will probably just be elite partisan cueing. But I’d be shocked it it got to 50% levels, given the low level today and the strongly mixed cues from elites.
The idea that public support is a constraint, not a determinant, is of course plausible and many scholars work within that framework. But on the other hand, how many initiatives with 9% support get even minimal policy action?
https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/zaller/Latent%20opinion%20%20final.pdf
Thanks for the link. (That’s not a polite thanks but a “that looks really interesting.) Also relevant, same author: https://www.uky.edu/AS/PoliSci/Peffley/pdf/Zaller%201996%20Pol%20Comm%20Government's%20little%20helper_%20U.S.%20press%20coverage%20of%20foreign%20policy%20crises%201945-1991.pdf
Also relevant, different author: https://www.kktg.net/kurt/publications/pubs/Election%20Cycles%20and%20War%20I.pdf
Anyway, I have read a lot of the literature on this, but this isn’t the post for a fine-grained assessment–more a blunt sense of resignation that something that most people don’t want and which most experts apparently oppose is something that’s going to/is likely to happen.
“we must do something, this is something, therefore we must do it” – oh, that really just sums it up so well. Thanks for reminding me of that quote!
Low public support presumably means little political benefit – I think we’re probably a bit past Obama having to bomb things to avoid appearing ‘weak.’ He’s in his second term and his enthusiastic militarism isn’t really in question any more. So, he has little to gain from this politically. Will he calculate that he also has little to lose? There do appear to be substantial *risks*, by anyone’s estimation, but will he calculate that the actual *costs* will be minimal? That seems possible. Less ‘shock and awe’ and more ‘short, sharp shock’ – it’s perfectly possible that he’s been convinced, against all history, that a limited, airborne intervention could work with minimal blowback. Washington is another country, they see the past differently there!
“why bombing Syria now seems more likely than not”
A bit surprised that neither the post nor the comments consider the possibility that the admin takes its own rhetoric seriously and believes it, viz., that letting the violation of this particular norm/taboo go unpunished would have bad consequences. Exactly what those consequences (of lack of punishment) might be has been left rather vague. However, Jay Carney, pressed on this by a reporter yesterday, said that the admin views the use of chemical weapons not just as a threat to the region but to the U.S. itself. This may have been hyperbole generated by the reporter’s question, which cited candidate Obama’s statement in ’07 that only an imminent threat to the U.S. would justify a president ordering an attack on Iran without prior congressional authorization.
Anyway, norms etc. maybe have as much to do w this as the sorts of considerations adduced by the post and comments. There is something about CW, there is the CW Convention etc. Just a thought, I don’t really know for sure.
As for U.S. public opinion not wanting to attack/punish/whatever Assad, isn’t foreign policy an area in which presidents and their advisors pride themselves on doing what they think is ‘right’ or ‘necessary’ and then trying to bring public opinion along w them?
P.s. I am not expressing an opinion on the merits about any strike vs Syria. But when the pres. says “this crosses a red line” and then does nothing, that looks bad.
After writing this comment I quickly read Jon Western’s post, below, which makes some good pts, imo.
p.s. though I’m not entirely persuaded by everything he says