Always good to start out blogging with a non-controversial topic, like the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.  But just before the Israeli Knesset went into recess, they advanced a bill requiring that any land ceded in a peace process be approved  in a national referendum. The bill could become a Basic Law–tantamount to a constitutional amendment–when the Knesset returns in the fall.  My take on this is in the  International Herald Tribune/New York Times:
The argument in brief: Far from undercutting the peace process, a referendum is necessary to the legitimacy of a two-state solution. Formal public support of a potential deal could, in fact, be one of the keys to long-term sustainability of peace. Supporters of the peace process should get behind the referendum proposal.
You’re argument speaks only of Israel. I would be interested in your opinion as to whether a Palestinian referendum is equally vital before any ‘peace’ agreement is implemented; and given Israel’s siege on Gaza, how exactly that would even be possible (the democratic process is a luxury denied to the Palestinians by Israel & the U.S.). Moreover this Palestinian referendum would complicate your claim that:
“Any agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians — still a long shot — must do two things: Israel must cede some West Bank settlements to the Palestinians, and the parties must reach a compromise on the status of Jerusalem.”
This is wrong; refugees, status of Gaza, status of Israeli troops surrounding Palestine by Jordan, right to real-state status in Palestine (i.e. military, ports [gaza], etc.). All these and more are important. It is just that they are only important to the Palestinians.
Now a counterfactual; if Israel votes no, it’s the popular will, if Palestine voted no?
While I agree that in theory a referendum among both Israelis and Palestinians would increase the legitimacy of a two-state solution, I am skeptical that an agreement could be found that could be passed by both. Furthermore, Stacie doesn’t mention the potential for violence around a referendum. The assassination of Rabin is certainly a reminder of this potential. However, if you delve into recent Israeli polling on a two-state solution, there is a generation divide; those over 40 tend to support it, those under 40 tend to oppose it. Those over 40 are more likely to vote, those under 40 are more likely to engage in the streets.
In a case of shameless self-promotion, here are some counter-arguments: https://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/08/a-referendum-on-peace-is-a-bad-idea.html and https://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/07/24/what-would-a-referendum-on-peace-ask.html
First off, congrats on a great and provocative editorial in the NYT, Stacie. Second, welcome to the Duck! Third, I’d love to hear more (esp after Stephen’s comment above) about the current state of public opinion. Talking to Israeli friends and reading the occasional piece in Haaretz, I’ve been operating on the perhaps misguided assumption that public opinion was shifting in favor of settlement / ceding of land over time. So my first thought upon reading your piece was “well, maybe we’ve reached a demographic inflection point at which a referendum could succeed.” But then I remembered this: https://www.haaretz.com/news/national/survey-most-israeli-jews-wouldn-t-give-palestinians-vote-if-west-bank-was-annexed.premium-1.471644.
Like other commenters so far, I worry that there’d have to be a fair amount of fine-tuning on any agreement — probably with an eye to some serious polling in both Israel and Palestine — to make it passable. … And, even if politicians somehow sufficiently free themselves from their vocal minorities to work this magic, it doesn’t do anything about potentially violent spoilers on both sides.
Legitimacy is central to politics (and thus the efficacy of the negotiations), that much I agree with you, but it leaves open the question of civil society in Israel. How would you square the recent efforts by the Knesset and non-state actors to diminish the capacity of civil society? Would having plebicites or referendums strengthen civil society, or is their existence a sign that political parties think they’re the only game in town?
Great piece Stacie! I think this is an important conversation to have now – and I’m happy you opened it. In response to Adrienne’s comment, I’d like to explain the reasons why many in the Israeli left oppose a referendum: First, there’s the questions of who drafts the referendum and how it is administered. Although the first vote in the Knesset has passed, there are no explicit provisions in Israeli law for this sort of political move, and there is also no precedent for it. As we know, referendum’s can often be devised to serve the political goals of those who administer them, although I would concede that there can be unintended consequences. Second, and related, the Israeli Right is the Leadership right now. Not only Bennet, but also Lapid is very likely to oppose any settlement that can be acceptable to the Palestinians. In that case, the Leadership’s interest (=government) would be to jeopardize a peace agreement by ensuring the referendum fails. This is one of the chief concerns of the opposition, and in the last few days Israeli government members have been publicly expressing precisely this sentiment — that they’re going through the motions “to expose that the Palestinians are not serious” or to “please the Americans”. That may lead us outsiders to favor a referendum to a Knesset vote, since the government may be more hawkish, but I don’t think that’s the case — the current Israeli right wing government reflects its constituents pretty accurately. Third, there’s the question of citizenship and who votes in the referendum: About 20% of Israel’s citizens are not Jewish (the majority of the non-Jewish citizens are Arab-Israelis, many of whom identify as Palestinian). The right, including the Likud, will surely not accept a referendum result that is determined by this population. And although Arab Israelis participate in elections and can run for office, no Arab party has ever been part of a governing coalition and Israeli law blocks Arab Knesset members from national security positions. Thus, it’s clear that the next debate will be on whether Israeli Arabs are allowed to partake in this crucial security decision. As it stands, the majority of Israel’s current Knesset will likely vote to exclude Arab citizens from a referendum. This is a slippery slope for a democracy that is already struggling to remain democratic (and if, by chance, the Knesset votes to include the Arabs in the referendum, increased violence from Jewish extremist is likely to follow). Finally, I think Israel has much to learn from Northern Ireland’s experience, but we shouldn’t discount a comparison to Israel’s own past experience with peace agreements — especially the one with Egypt in 1977. That was the agreement that coined the idea of Land for Peace, and included settlement evacuations from the Sinai. Begin, a Likud Hawk, did not have his party’s support. He had the solid backing of an eager American government, and found a partner in Sadat. For example, Sharon, one of the Likud’s prominent leaders at the time voted against the Camp David Accords. We’ll never know what result a referendum would have yielded, but we do know that despite the fact that Begin passed this very controversial agreement leaning on his opposition’s crutch, he was elected for a second term, and the peace with Egypt has been stable since (much like Clinton’s experience with NAFTA). Personally, I think at this juncture, there is a higher likelihood for an agreement to pass if Netanyahu can put it to a vote in the Knesset, risking much opposition in his coalition, but the support of his opposition. He can rise to be a statesman — just like in recent days when he explained to the Israeli public why leaders have to make unpopular decisions for the sake of the future and security (in relation to the freeing of 104 Palestinian prisoners – a measure that would not have likely passed a referendum, judging by the public discourse).
I hope to hear more thoughts on all of this. Like I said, I think it’s very important to start this conversation early in the process — so thanks Stacie for this important editorial!
These are all great comments and questions; thank you! Ruth,
in particular, thanks for getting into the details on current Israeli politics,
something that was absolutely not going to happen in a mere 800 words.
A few thoughts (and I know I will leave many of the comments
here unanswered, so my apologies). I guess what I would like to hear from everyone is, what is the alternative here? Stephen, you mention the possibility of violence. I think there is likely to
be violence with or without a referendum. My hope would be that it would be more difficult to legitimate violence
in the case of a referendum—that is to say, you can point at a vote and say, there is the mechanism for protesting peace.
I don’t want to push the Northern Ireland comparison too far—I do
understand the differences—but part of what has been satisfying in that case is the fact that violence is now framed as illegitimate and beyond the pale of normal politics.
Ruth, I think your discussion of 1977 is interesting, and suggests the obvious alternative of forceful leadership. But I wonder what you think about the backlash after 1977? Begin gave back the Sinai, but then was faced with a host of attacks on his legitimacy from
religious-nationalists, most notably from Tehiya. By 1980, the Golan had been annexed, the Basic Law on Jerusalem was passed, and Likud had become much more hardline.
I think where Ruth and I would agree is that a referendum would entail a ferocious contest, and that there has to be real leadership from the proponents of peace to make this work. This is the point I make at the end of the op-ed; indeed, I think that because my focus in the piece is on the referendum, it actually downplays howsignificant I think leadership will be if it comes to a referendum. I don’t think the referendum in Ireland works without Gerry Adams and David Trimble pushing it through, and if those type of actors don’t step forward in Israel, then there is indeed a problem.
These are great points, and I completely agree on the bottom
line – for this to work, both leaders have to fully back an agreement, including in selling it to voters. I also agree that a successful referendum that is viewed as legitimate would help
solidify an agreement and provide important political capital for the government to stand behind its decision in the face of violence. But right now, I think the chance of a referendum being successful is too small, making the alternative more
attractive. And the alternative to a referendum is an agreement between the leaders that is taken to a vote in the Knesset. I think Bibi is more likely to get a majority in the Knesset (with opposition support), than among Israel’s Jewish population in a referendum. And here’s the key point – even before the procedures of a referendum have been set, there are already very significant hurdles given Israel’s demography. Even if the leaders are sincere in their efforts to convince people to vote in favor of an agreement in a referendum (I don’t think they are now, but that could change), I’m not at all certain that among Israel’s 80% Jewish population there’s a majority that would support settlement evacuation or any concession on Jerusalem. What’s more, just debating the legality/legitimacy
of a referendum that requires a Jewish majority is already a distraction from the actual peace process and it very well may cause such a rift in the Knesset and would jeopardize any chance of success of passing an agreement in a Knesset
vote as well.
You are absolutely right – after the 1979 Damp David Accords
Begin, although re-elected in 1981, paid a heavy political price in his own party and had to concede in other areas. Even more, some would argue that the Lebanon War that ensued – including some of the questionable war strategies led
by then Minister of Security Ariel Sharon (who voted against the CDA) were Begin’s way of appeasing his party’s Hawks. And there is no doubt that Netanyahu is aware of this (and of Sadat’s and Rabin’s fates). However, if he is convinced that he is faced with only two options (and that’s not at all clear),
then the chances of him swallowing the bitter pill and advancing an agreement in the Knesset despite vocal (and violent) opposition from within, is higher. And the two options he must be convinced are the only ones available for this to work, are, in my opinion: 1) keep the status quo and suffer severe international isolation, more violence, and an apartheid state; or, 2) sign an agreement that is not popular with his own coalition and risk grave political backlash (this is, by the way, already happening) and even personal security (much like Rabin), and more violence. If these are, in broad strokes, his only 2 options, then it’s a tough decision for him. It will probably come down to the degree of pressure that the Obama Administration would be willing to put on him. Finally, I think Brent Sasley in his Daily Beast piece (link above) summarized well the instances in which the Israeli government passed difficult territorial agreements in the Knesset without a referendum, possibly without a majority of public support, but ultimately with success.