Members of international institutions typically honor their commitments. But that does not, by itself, tell us much. States are unlikely to join institutions that require them to do things they have no intention of doing. Indeed, some argue that institutions merely act to screen out those least likely to comply. Others, however, have argued that institutions do in fact constrain states – that they are not mere epiphenomena. One prominent mechanism through which institutions are thought to alter state behavior is by mobilizing pro-compliance groups domestically. Institutions may lack enforcement capable, after all, but few governments are entirely insensitive to domestic pressure.
But, as Stephen Chaudoin cogently observes in this working paper, those who stand to lose if the government adopts the institution’s preferred policy are unlikely to give in without a fight. And such groups virtually always exist; if they did not there’d be little need for institutions to promote cooperation in the first place. Put differently, while WTO rulings may raise awareness about the effects of tariffs and Amnesty International might draw attention to human rights abuses, the net effect of such efforts might simply be to increase the amount of effort those advantaged by the status quo invest in defending it.
Stephen analyzes a formal model in which an institution first decides whether to send a signal about the benefits of cooperation, such as announcing that a government’s current policies are not in compliance with the institutional charter/international law/transnational norms; then two groups within that state—one favoring compliance and one opposed to it—simultaneously select mobilization levels. By assumption, the probability that the government comes into compliance the desires of the institution is determined by the pro-compliance group’s mobilization relative to that of the anti-compliance group.
The key insight of the model is that institutional messages are most effective in inducing compliance when the pro-compliance group is relatively equal in strength to the anti-compliance group. If the forces in favor of compliance are more powerful than those opposed to it, then there’s little need for outside pressure. On the other hand, if those advocating compliance are themselves greatly outnumbered, then even if the institution’s message causes them to fight harder for what they believe in, they’re unlikely to be successful. If, however, the two groups are equally influential, a call to action by an international institution may tip the balance.
To illustrate the importance of each side’s relative influence, Stephen then discusses the 2013 election in Kenya. This is particularly interesting case because the ICC indicted two of the presidential frontrunners (Kenyatta and Ruto) during the campaign. A common interest in defying the ICC then led these two to unite. This is particularly noteworthy because the two men were indicted for their involvement on opposite sides of post-election violence in 2007. But for the ICC indictments, it is exceedingly unlikely that Kenyatta and Ruto would choose
to work together. Yet their efforts have proved successful so far, as Kenyatta won the presidency and the Jubilee alliance claimed a majority of seats in parliament. Consistent with the logic of the model, in regions of the country where Kenyatta’s base of support was initially either very strong or very weak, his estimated vote share differed very little from what we would have expected based on polls prior to the ICC indictments. However, in regions where he initially enjoyed a moderate level of support, the ICC indictments appear to have cost him a considerable amount of support. In short, Kenyatta and Ruto successfully defied the ICC despite the fact that the very mechanism through which international institutions are though to promote compliance appears to have been at work among some Kenyans. The problem is that the indictments also mobilized a lot of the wrong people.
International institutions may well induce compliance where none would otherwise exist, and they may do so by mobilizing support. But they’re only likely to have such an effect when those who favor compliance are powerful enough to overcome those advantaged by the status quo, yet not so powerful as to have been likely to get their way absent input from the institution. How often this occurs remains a matter for debate.
Interesting. Look Chavez’s Venezuela or Fujimori’s Peru and their relationship with the Inter-american Court of Human Rights: the opposition groups (builded by those leaders) overcome the strenght of the human rights support groups, so the country could quit withouth difficulties of the inter-american body. Similar logic.
Haven’t read the full paper, so pardon if I mischaracterize the author’s argument. But I think the argument presented here misses the point about how institutions affect behavior. The baseline of comparison here shouldn’t be the balance of power between pro-compliance and status quo groups prior to the institution sending a message, but the balance of power between them prior to the country joining the institution. The point made in the literature against which the author is arguing is that institutions will change state behavior when it is able to change the domestic correlation of forces. More specifically, this is the case when the “pro-compliance” groups (e.g., exporters) are not at all mobilized (or are weakly mobilized) prior to the state joining the institution, while their counterparts — the defenders of the status quo (e.g., import-competing groups) — are. So before joining the institution, politics in that country is dominated by the status quo group. What institutions do is create incentives for the “pro-compliance” groups to mobilize and thus reduce the relative influence of those advantaged by the status quo by creating competition for them. Therefore, the status quo is more likely to be changed after the state joins the institution, as there are now mobilized interests in favor of the change that weren’t there before. The argument presented in the post moves the baseline equilibrium to a situation in which the state is already a member of the institution. In that case, yes, it’s not clear that the institution will have an independent effect on state behavior. But then you’re moving the target and not really addressing the competing explanation.
You’re right, Raphael, that he implicitly assumes the state is already a member. However, I’m not sure that actually changes anything. Whether the impact comes from joining versus a message sent once you’ve joined, the important point is that anti-compliance groups adjust their behavior too, and if the pro-compliance group is weak enough relative to them, they’re likely to succeed in defending the status quo. When you say “What institutions do is create incentives for the “pro-compliance” groups to mobilize and thus reduce the relative influence of those advantaged by the status quo by creating competition for them,” you implicitly assume that those advantaged by the status quo will not push back against that challenge. Stephen’s point is that whether they will or not depends on how successful they’d be if they did, which depends on the strength of the pro-compliance group.
I get your point, Phil. But I’m not assuming the status quo defenders will not push back. In the classic treatment of this issue in the literature, the starting point is that the status quo groups are already highly mobilized and tend to get what they want, while the pro-change groups are not, thus the non-cooperative equilibrium in the international setting. So even if the status quo defenders push back, the point is that their mobilization has only so much room to increase given their high starting point, while the other side can increase substantially more their mobilization levels since they start from from a much lower point. In expectation then the outcome should shift towards more cooperation. Now, as I said, I haven’t read the paper yet. It would be interesting to compare the two models more closely to see where the different predictions come from. My sense is that the two models deal with different mechanisms through which institutions alter the domestic political equilibrium (e.g., reciprocal negotiations of commitments vs monitoring of compliance) and that each might be useful for understanding the effects of institutions at different stages in the institution’s “life cycle”.
I see. Yes, if there’s little room for the anti-compliance groups to increase their effort, the probability of compliance after an increase in the the pro-compliance group’s effort would increase. Stephen’s paper doesn’t directly speak to that, but I think the question to ask is why we should assume that defenders of the status quo try as hard as they can to defend a status quo no one is challenging. There are plenty of examples throughout history of SQ-advantaged groups ramping up their activity in response to challenges, after all.