The evidence that President Putin has lost Ukraine in the most important senses has been around for months–Ukrainians want to be western even more now, eastern Ukrainians in majority terms continue to want this as well, Ukrainians elected a pro-western President, the EU trade deal is going forward, and Poroshenko is pushing for NATO membership with NATO not ruling this out–but crucially what was not in place until recent days is credible conventional deterrence against additional territorial annexation by Russia. In an even more substantial indication of Putin disastrously overplaying what not long ago was a pretty good hand, Russia’s invasion/annexation of Ukraine was all NATO needed to renew and reinvigorate itself in addition to successfully reassuring eastern European allies and deterring Russia from serious intervention in them. NATO is stronger and more vigorous than it was even 6 months ago, and Sweden and Finland are likely to join its ranks in the near future.
I called for this in my pre-summit Foreign Policy piece, and we now have two examples of Russia heeding the redrawn strategic landscape. First, the incredibly harsh response from Moscow and a slew of empty threats of retaliation (with the expected nonadmission that Russia’s aggression caused the NATO response in the first place) and second an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine that Russia called for, that was verbatim from Poroshenko’s ceasefire proposals from last month, that occurred despite rebel/Russian advances on the ground, that caused Russia to admit and demonstrate it does have influence over the rebels, and that occurred before the NATO summit Wales even ended. [Note in the Foreign Policy piece, I did not title it “How to Beat Down a Bully”; the editor did that without telling me in advance; the original title was “How to Oppose the Putin Doctrine”]
NATO has numerous flaws, the most important one until this Summit being its failure to have kept credible conventional deterrence in place in Europe and its immediate bordering regions. But the successful renewal of Article 5, the new rapid reaction force with forward deployment, the 3500 British troops to both be part of it and augment it, the forward placement of aircraft, the forward basing arrangements, a slew of new exercises (recent, current, and in the near future), and the successful reassurance of eastern members of the Alliance, together amount to a major success and an unquestionably history-making achievement. A remaining flaw is its inability to get all of its members to meet their defense spending targets, but there are three important points here that demonstrate things are better than they seem. First, eastern Alliance members are all increasing spending with Poland in the lead and on target to get to 2.5% of its GDP next year (the NATO requirement is 2% defense spending). Second, western allies who aren’t members of the Alliance but coordinate with it and sometimes join it on operations are also doing so, with Sweden in the lead. Third, defense spending is not the most important indicator–that is the quality of one’s military capabilities. Even while spending has gone down across Europe in recent years and including the U.S., countries like France, Britain, and Germany have actually improved their capabilities while spending less.
Another important remaining flaw, which is less NATO’s than one plaguing the U.S. and the rest of its western allies combined, is that while NATO has deterred Russia from future incursions on eastern NATO territory, the West has failed to fully deter Putin from taking additional territory from Ukraine. This ceasefire may not hold, and a political deal on increased regional autonomy for eastern Ukraine’s Donbass region may not come to pass. As my co-author John Herbst and I argue (he was our Ambassador to Ukraine during the Orange Revolution and my boss at the State Department), at this stage only a combination of giving Ukraine direct military assistance and threatening Ukraine membership in NATO if Russia doesn’t cease and desist will actually get it to fully cease and desist. It is possible but not probable that Putin’s current fears of both of these may just be enough for him to allow a deal to be done and Russia to respect Ukraine’s border and sovereignty. But this does not seem better than a 50 / 50 chance. As we argue in the piece, it is in the West’s national security interests to fully come to Ukraine’s aid. Protections against militarily interfering in one’s territorial sovereignty constitutes the principal pillar of the postwar international order, and Russia’s aggressive pursuit of the Putin Doctrine has eroded this pillar. It needs to be made whole again by compelling Russia to cease major interference in Ukraine, and economic sanctions as we have already seen are insufficient for the compellence required.
Hi Jeffrey,
I was wondering, do you think that actually admitting Ukraine into NATO is the right course? Or should NATO just bluff and simply threaten to admit it?
Secondly, how do you think that NATO can further encourage nations to meet the 2% requirement. Your point that states like Germany are contributing even while decreasing their spending is also important. Do you think the 2% number should be changed to reflect this?
Thanks!
At this stage I would merely threaten it, as it will be both credible and the last thing that Putin wants to see happen, so it is useful leverage to use. First, threaten to arm Ukraine…if Putin doesn’t back down, go ahead and do so…this is not going to lead to wild escalations as some talking heads argue, for the pain/costs to Russia continue to go up…getting closer and closer to Putin’s pain threshold…then it he still doesn’t back down, threaten NATO membership. Actually admitting them however may cause Putin to be far more aggressive ahead of Ukraine actually being formally brought in, so that would be a bridge too far in risk terms.
We actually have Putin to thank for the barbarous downing of the Malaysian flight, which has steeled the resolve of numerous European governments that were taking a pass and enabling Russia…starting with the Netherlands, but also including France and Italy inter alia…so his ongoing aggression is the best encouragement for meeting the 2% requirement that there is…short of this, allies at the Summit in Wales did agree to all meet that requirement by 2020…but the other surge in momentum is coming from the East-Central NATO members whose citizens truly fear Russian incursions…but domestic pressure is also likely to lead others like the UK and the Netherlands to join Sweden, Poland, and the others…so I think the requirement should remain, and meanwhile all that can be done to augment capabilities even where spending increases aren’t happening quickly ought to be done.
Spot on Jeffrey Stacey. Best piece I’ve read on NATO and Ukraine the last couple of months.
I’m struggling, however, to see the logic between decreased defence spending and increase of countries’ military capabilities. While military expenditures cannot be equated with military capabilities (especially concerning the caveats surrounding the measure), I struggle to overcome the logical inconsistency of the effect you claim military expenditures may have. How can Sweden and Poland increase their military capabilities by increasing their expenditures while the US, France, Britain and Germany achieve the same result by doing the opposite. Wouldn’t making you military more efficient only get you so far? Would you really say that the US has strengthened their military hegemony the last couple of years?
Thanks Pal R., good queries…it isn’t logical, but it is possible…it is more likely that a given state will have better capabilities if it has higher defense spending, but that is not always the case…thankfully we’ve had an array of examples during this era of austerity, when politicians decrease budgets but military leaders still have national security interests to tend to…a simple example is a government that decreases defense spending, but moves a battalion out of the barracks and upgrades it to operational readiness…voila, it has increased its military capability while decreasing its defense budget…we can think of a 2 x 2 table, there are 4 possibilities for any given country’s military force posture (it isn’t likely, but in theory you could increase your defense spending and decrease your capability)…France is a great example, for after chopping its budget it actually came out with a new strategic doctrine to alter its force posture by having the capability to deploy its forces on three simultaneous operations in different theaters…right now only the U.S. can do this, but the French — who were very agile in Mali — are about to be the second state with this kind of capability