It is no secret in the academic IR community that securitization theory, an approach developed in Europe as part of the Copenhagen School of security studies, has struggled to get traction here in the United States. While the approach is widely used elsewhere in the world, from Europe to Asia, American IR scholars have been very reticent reluctant to accept the merits of the approach. Which is a shame because the approach has the potential to offer significant insights. One possible objection to securitization theory might be that, since it argues threats are political and intersubjective rather than objective, the approach offers little in the way of guidance to policymakers—an important aim of security studies in the U.S. This reading of securitization theory is incorrect. There are a number of ways in which securitization theory can enable better policy analysis and policy making. In this post, I am interested in how securitization theory helps us to evaluate the long terms costs of the persistent tendency in the United States to evaluate matters in security terms.
Securitization theory enables such an analysis because it, unlike approaches that seek to identify and prescribe measures for ‘objective’ threats, securitization theory points the analyst toward the political dynamics that give rise to shared perceptions of threat, and the effect on the political system of those shares perceptions of threat. According to securitization theory, security is a particular kind of politics, one in which extraordinary measures are justified by imminent existential threats. But the nature of security politics is acute: in all polities the extraordinary measures undertaken to address threats are corrosive to the political system, and are thus difficult to sustain for very long. This leads to an emphasis on short-term responses that address the immediate problem over sustainable long-term measures that tackle the underlying conditions that gave rise to the problem/threat in the first place.
Ebola
Consider the situation of Ebola in west Africa. According to the CDC, more than 5,000 people have been infected with Ebola, and more that 2,500 have died. The incidence rate of Ebola is doubling roughly every 3 weeks, which means that West Africa could be looking at 10,000 cases sometime in October. And yet, it only last week that the Obama announced a major effort by the US to address the outbreak, and not surprisingly the militarized policy (U.S. military will be deployed) was couched in security terms. Leaving aside the problems associated with waiting until the Ebola outbreak reached a level that could support securitization, this policy may be effective in the short term. In the medium-to-long term, however, a sustained policy for dealing with Ebola, and more broadly public health problems in west Africa, is not likely to emerge because the security basis for the current policy cannot support long-term engagement. This in turn leaves west African countries little better prepared for future public health problems.
Because of the political nature of security, turning to threats to enable policy produces short-term policy action through extraordinary measures but cannot sustain the medium-to-long-term policies necessary to manage and address the underlying forces that create the conditions that are eventually securitized. This imbalance between short-term security policy and long-term nonsecurity policy reflects the imbalance between threat and opportunity noted by Bobrow in his essay on American strategic style. Coming back to the example of Ebola, viewing the outbreak in terms of opportunity would result in a very different—potentially more sustainable and long-term—set of policies than viewing it in terms of threat. Thus, the invocation of security has very real policy implications—sacrificing long range planning to the immediate demands of security—and securitization theory does an excellent job of drawing our attention to them. And as with any problem, the first step toward developing a solution is to recognize the problem’s existence in the first place.
Jarrod,
I’m glad you broached the subject of securitization theory’s policy relevance here. It is coincidentally the topic of my second paper for ISA New Orleans, a paper on panel which you happen to be chairing (small world!).
On the point of securitization theory’s inability to gain traction in America I once discussed with Dan Nexon the possibility of an online symposium focused on this exact issue featuring contributors from America and Europe. The proposal fell by the way side as Dan and Patrick took up their new role at ISQ (I frankly also didn’t pursue it because of other projects). Let me know if you would have any interest in reviving this idea.
That sounds like a fantastic idea Eric! Let’s see if we can make that happen.
I have no particular position one way or the other on securitization theory (not having read deeply on it), but I’m not convinced one needs securitization theory to get to the conclusion that policy should focus more on the long-term than just the short term. There are such things as ‘objective’ emergencies, in my opinion, and the Ebola outbreak wd seem to be one; therefore a short-term response to contain the spread and bring the situation under control, to the extent possible, wd seem to be a necessary prerequisite to focusing on the longer-term problems of strengthening public health systems in the affected countries, etc. I understand the pt that there is a bias built into seeing things in terms of threats rather than opportunities, but Ebola wd seem to be both. (Ditto climate change.)
Btw, a non-substantive point: why don’t people use the word “reluctant” any more? — as in “American IR scholars have been reluctant [not “reticent,” which means “reserved” or “taciturn” or “shy”] to accept the approach.” This is not a criticism of Jarrod, since *everyone* seems to be using “reticent” this way these days — which is a shame, since it’s not what the word means and there are a lot of words that can be properly used in the context: reluctant, disinclined, unwilling, loath. (I know language evolves and all that, but I don’t have to like it. ;))
On reluctant, point well taken LFC! Not unwillingly, I’ve edited the post. Loath to take credit for the change myself, I’ve left the original wording in place and simply struck it out :)
On Ebola and Climate change as threats and opportunities, what I think securitization draws our attention to is the ways in which how these things are understood have systematic political impacts which in turn have systematic policy impacts. I agree that you don’t necessarily need securitization theory to get to the conclusion that short termism is often counter-productive, but I think securitization theory does a very good job of highlighting how logics of security can be disruptive and counterproductive. This is particularly useful in the US case because security is invoked so often, which lends the disinclination of US academics to take on securitization theory a tinge of irony.
Jarrod,
On securitization theory: fair enough. I’m generally in favor of U.S. IR scholars expanding the range of approaches etc that they take seriously.
Just to follow up, Thierry Balzacq puts it better than I do when he says, “the social design of a security problem conditions and legitimates the kind of means used to stop it.” (Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, pg xiii)