When I arrived as an incoming graduate student at Ohio State University, I was labeled a realist since I studied extensively under John J. Mearsheimer at the University of Chicago. And despite the fact that I find such labeling exercises rather silly (plus, my advisor at both Chicago and OSU was actually Alex Wendt), there was, and still is, some truth to it. Power does matter in international politics and contrary to many others in our field I think that Mearsheimer’s theory of great power politics does make a lot of sense, and it explains large swaths of international politics throughout history.
However, despite the fact that his recent analysis in Foreign Affairs of the causes of the Ukrainian crisis makes a number of good points, most importantly, that Putin’s actions do not necessarily signal an attempt to build a greater Russian empire and that realpolitik matters, it is at the same time wrong.
Mearsheimer argues that there are three major reasons for why the West has caused the Ukrainian crisis and forced Putin to intervene in Ukraine: Eastern enlargement of NATO, enlargement of the EU, and efforts to spread democracy in Eastern Europe and eventually in Russia. According to Mearsheimer, the ouster of the Ukrainian pro-Russian president Yanukovych and the installment of a new anti-Russian government then only constituted “the final straw” for Putin and provided the trigger for Putin to intervene.
Regarding the first two, Mearsheimer argues that Western leaders were unaware that Russia would feel threatened by NATO/EU enlargement. Obviously that has been true in the past, but the evidence cited is almost a decade old. Back then mistakes were made by Western leaders, but that doesn’t show that they are incorrigible, die-hard liberals who walk around with pink glasses trying to make the world fit into their liberal utopian fantasies. As Mearsheimer notes himself, the missile defense shield on the Eastern border of NATO was essentially abandoned and Western leaders tried to assuage Russian fears by creating the NATO-Russia council. Well, that’s because Western leaders did understand that some of their actions could be perceived as a threat to Russian security. And even though public statements were made that might have given Ukraine and Georgia the impression that they would eventually become NATO/EU members, Mearsheimer of all people should know that oftentimes “talk is cheap,” and that such statements are a far cry from actually admitting those countries.
In addition, the reluctance of German chancellor Merkel to impose harsher economic sanctions on Russia first and foremost constitutes an effort to not further antagonize Putin; it is not primarily based on fears of economic repercussions. Granted, Western Europe might get hurt economically by Russian retaliation to such sanctions, but Russia would get hurt more, a lot more. The country is economically weak and the threat of shutting down gas supplies to the West rings hollow when you consider the extent to which the Russian economy is depending on its sale of gas and oil.
Most importantly, however, Mearsheimer conveniently overlooks the presence and relevance of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, which is rather strange given his claim that realpolitik still matters and that Putin is an adept strategist (which I completely agree with). As Mearsheimer has argued himself, nuclear weapons are the best defense you can have in order to deter foreign aggression. Even if NATO would expand to the Ukraine, which seems unlikely given recent events and developments in the country, why would that matter? Even a missile shield stationed on the Russian border would not be able to prevent a full-scale attack by Russian nuclear forces. The United States knows that, European leaders know that, and Putin certainly knows that, too. So, the fact that Mearsheimer does not even mention the role of nuclear weapons should give you pause.
Now, Western efforts to spread liberal democracy in Eastern Europe and Russia certainly have not only been welcomed by leaders in the region. And the fact that many Western politicians unconditionally, and often naively, supported the revolution in Ukraine certainly did not help to make things better. However, the evidence Mearsheimer cites is clearly biased towards his own argument. John McCain has done many stupid things in the last couple years, no surprise. And Mr. Gershman, leader of the National Endowment for Democracy, might say whatever he likes to say about the prospects of fostering democracy in Russia, but we have clearly seen that the Russian state is more than capable of preventing such efforts, if it deems it necessary. Also, since when do structural realists care about NGOs?
In short, to argue that NATO/EU expansion and efforts to spread liberal democracy created such intense security fears in Russia that Putin was forced to incorporate parts of Ukraine in order to create a buffer zone is simply not credible. What is true is that the events in Ukraine; the ouster of Yanukovych, hostilities against Russians living in Crimea and Easter Ukraine, and the often very hostile rhetoric and actions towards Russia by the new Ukrainian leaders provided ample reason for Russia to become nervous about its neighbor. If events like this would happen in Mexico and a substantial number of American citizen were in the country and under threat, the United States would probably also send in the Marines. Add to that the fact that Russia does have a strong historical claim on Crimea, and that Sevastopol is maybe the most important naval base for Russia, and you have plenty of reasons for Russia to get nervous.
In conclusion, no, Russia is not trying to establish some kind of new great empire, even though I am not sure that actually ever was the ‘conventional wisdom’ to begin with. And yes, Western leaders were unprepared, were not able to put themselves in Putin’s shoes, and consequently exacerbated the crisis. Yet, to argue that this crisis is the result of NATO/EU expansion pushed forward by Western leaders who are almost pathologically believing in the virtues of liberalism without taking power realities into account is simply not convincing either.
I think that what Mearsheimer said sorely had to be said and that he also said it well. But there are a couple of contentious points in is article. I agree, Tim, that it does not make sense for a nuclear Russia to fear invasion via Ukraine. I would argue that it is concern for its status as a great power, not security that is driving the Kremlin. What this also means, however, is that Russia does not merely seek to turn Ukraine into a buffer state, but to bring it into its exclusive sphere of influence. Hence, no agreement to Finlandize, or Belgify Ukraine is workable. Nevertheless, an agreement is possible, provided that Russia offers an adequate compensation elsewhere. I see no reason to concede a sphere of influence to Russia without getting anything in return.
True, in the events of the last year or so the NATO threat did not play a direct role, as you say the event in Ukraine “provided ample reason for Russia to become nervous about its neighbor”. These factors are certainly the immediate causes of the Russian intervention. But I think that Mearsheimer has a point when he blames the West to have made Putin hypersensitive by offering (and note this offer has never been closed!) Ukraine to join NATO. Not only was that senseless (honestly, having Ukraine in the NATO (or the EU…) would be more of a burden then a blessing) but it didn’t take into account the deep paranoia of Russia about being encircled by the West. This paranoia is very deeply rooted, goes back to the USSR (and Putin is a product of the USSR and the KGB) or even earlier, is shared by the population or at least can very easily resurface, and is paradoxically fed by that delusion of being, or wanting to be again, a superpower. On the other hand, and there I don’t agree with him, but neither with you, Putin does have the will to resuscitate maybe not the USSR but an area corresponding to at least the ancient USSR with a total domination of Russia, and -here we are again- be a superpower or at least a dominant regional power. I think one shouldn’t underestimate this will of Putin (didn’t he say that ‘the biggest tragedy of the XXth century was the dissolution of the USSR”) to recreate an exclusive economic and political influence zone. The will of Ukraine to escape was obviously a mortal threat to this plan and couldn’t be tolerated. I think that this aspect played definitely a more important part in the decision to intervene in Ukraine than the -real- mistakes of the West. Blaming the West seems to me make oneself blind to the overwhelming responsability of Russia.
Excellent post Tim! I made a few of gees points in response to Mearsheimer’s last media wave. (https://www.whiteoliphaunt.com/duckofminerva/2014/04/crimea-is-not-a-realist-story.html) In the end, you are completely correct, NATO expansion is just not compelling. As for the inability of Western leaders to put themselves in Putin’s shoes, if Merkel can’t figure the guy out, no one can.
Hey Tim,
I’m a student at UChicago right now (Maclean house, what were you?) studying political science with a focus on IR. I took Mearsheimer’s class on American Grand Strategy and really enjoyed it, he actually turned a lecture he gave on Ukraine back in the Spring into the piece you are referencing. I don’t have anything against realism, but I also haven’t been exposed much to its criticisms or other schools. I’d like to hear more theories than just his. What classes can you recommend from the department? What professors do you think give a more well-rounded view of IR than Mearsheimer? I’d love to hear any advice you have about the department or UChcago in general.
Great piece as well!
Thanks-Mike V
Could you please provide evidence of (substantial, maybe even state-backed) “hostilities against Russians living in Crimea and Easter Ukraine”?
Old western alliance moves did not cause Putin to invade and annex part of Ukraine, nor did the events that you cite provide more than proximate causes…it’s worth noting that Putin did not have a grand plan, that he did come up with a plan pretty quickly but only after two events: the flight of Yanucovych AND the vote in parliament for new elections (the second key catalyst)…the ultimate cause wasn’t Russian nervousness from these events, but rather the fear / probability of Ukraine becoming both part of the EU and NATO…Putin did not and does not fear Ukraine in military terms whatsoever…he fears it becoming like Poland, and thus demonstrating to Russian people that his leadership and regime are a hindrance to Russians becoming prosperous and attracted to having and expressing their human rights.
I’m not sure I agree with the way you phrase and titled your entry. Much of your argument is based on a selective interpretation of Mearsheimer’s article on FP.
He is not saying that the EU/NATO are SOLELY responsible for Putin’s actions. He’s simply saying that it was a factor and perhaps even a significant one.
In addition, titling this entry “Why JM is Wrong on Ukraine” would imply that you disagree with his conclusion. Yet, in your own post you write “In conclusion, no, Russia is not trying to establish some kind of new great empire, even though I am not sure that actually ever was the ‘conventional wisdom’ to begin with. And yes, Western leaders were unprepared, were not able to put themselves in Putin’s shoes, and consequently exacerbated the crisis.” The above is more or less a perfect summary of what Mearsheimer is arguing in his article.
It seems strange that you would title something like the above, even though you agree with his main points.
“As long as Russia shirks an honest debate about why so many of its neighbors seek to orient themselves towards the West,… the NATO-Russia relationship will remain haunted by myths of the past instead of looking to the future.”
The sentence is actually from the NATO page: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/russia-ukraine-nato-crisis/nato-enlargement-russia/en/index.htm
also, good comments:
Marie Antoinette
and
Jeffrey Stacey
I think I understood your position. However, I find it hard to believe that you do not think that Russians really believe that NATO is an anti-Russia alliance. And when you look at things from this point of view, everything makes sense from them to react this way. You also discard Putin’s statements that NATO always humiliated Russia: e.g. Kosovo and Russia’s ally Serbia; continuous opposition of Russia to Ukraine’s NATO MAP expressed in that council NATO-Russia, etc.
Are we to understand that Russia’s protestations against NATO are either exaggerated or false because NATO does not pose a threat to Russia, and it does not pose a threat because Russia is a nuclear power?
The core point is made in the paragraph beginning with: “Most importantly …”
This is presented as serious analysis, and a serious response to Mearsheimer. Oh boy, where to begin by way of reply?
I’ll make just one point: the background presumption appears to be that powers with conventional forces do not pose a threat to nuclear forces. That, I take it, is why Russia, as a nuclear power, has nothing to fear in having NATO conventional forces parked right at its border. But let’s reverse that: why does NATO, being a nuclear power itself (US, France, Britain), bother with expanding its own conventional force presence? Lately we’ve been hearing one NATO official after another come out with ever more alarming claims about this or that “threat”, but especially about the grave Russian threat … but if we follow your logic, all this must be bluster, because NATO is a nuclear power and nuclear powers have nothing to fear (at least from conventional powers). Why are Poland and the Baltics so hysterically fearful of Russia, given that they’re part of a nuclear club? If we take your line of argument to its conclusion, nuclear armed states ought to largely dispense with their conventional forces … yet for some reason none of them appear willing to do so.
Bottom line: if Ukraine were to enter NATO, Russia would be surrounded not just by conventional forces but by a nuclear armed club, and I fail to understand how anyone can fail to see how that’s inherently dangerous. As Stephen Cohen has emphasized, you’d have a situation of a Berlin Wall, and all the inherent tensions that entails, except now this “wall” would be at the Ukraine-Russia border.
As for doubting the extent of US desires to have Ukraine inside NATO, you really need to look carefully at the clear indications of this, e.g., at what the Washington neocons have to say about it, at what the Wikileaks cables dealing with this topic indicate, and then also at what the security provisions of the EU-Ukraine “association agreement” would require.
The conclusion that ‘In short, to argue…is not credible’ does not follow from your arguments. I agree that Mearsheimer oversimplifies. His portrayal of liberals cartoonish. But I think his main point is right. To Putin, the expansion of the EU and especially NATO are a threat. He has always said so. How could they not be? One may very well think he’s wrong, but Putin is the one who will decide what he perceives to be a threat.
Looking at the recent history, I find your critique of John J. Mearsheimer’s comments both superficial and irrelevant. I saw John McCain stand on a platform in the square and literally call for insurrection against Yanukovych. I was flabbergasted, Anyone who has seen the video can not doubt that the US/NATO/EU was plotting to bring Ukraine into the Western orbit.
Also, almost as an aside, I find your nuclear-armed country argument to be just silly.
Fderfler, I watched John McCain’s speech at Maidan, He said, He and the US support the people of Ukraine in their peaceful protest, You say he “Litterally calls for INSURRECTION” did you possibly mean that you interpreted his support for the protest as literally calling for insurrection ?
“…you interpreted his support for the protest as literally calling for insurrection ?” Indeed. A newspaper headline from that day, ”
John McCain tells Ukraine protesters: ‘We are here to support your just cause! And the destiny you seek lies in Europe,” said McCain, a leading Republican voice on US foreign policy. McCain is in Ukraine with a Connecticut Democrat, Senator Chris Murphy. —- The very PRESENCE of two US Senators on that podium in that square at that time was a call for insurrection.