With the United Nations First Committee on Disarmament and International Security convening in New York this month, one point of debate will be the potential health risks of depleted uranium weapons in post-conflict zones. And rightly so: depleted uranium is a byproduct of nuclear enrichment processes used in armor-piercing incendiary projectiles to penetrate tanks, and correspondingly to harden armor against attack. Since the Gulf War, veterans groups, doctors and civil society groups have raised concerns about the possible health effects on humans of radioactive DU dust left in the environment. Now, A10 gunships are headed back to Iraq, a nation that has already absorbed 400,000kg of DU contamination, according to the International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons. This month’s discussion at the UN follows a UNGA report released earlier this year, in which Iraq, not so surprisingly, joined a handful of other nations in calling for an outright ban of these weapons.
Early in my research for my new book ‘Lost’ Causes, I considered depleted uranium as an interesting case of agenda-vetting in the humanitarian disarmament NGO arena. A far-flung network of organizations has been lobbying for a ban since 2003, and language has been percolating in General Assembly First Committee resolutions since 2007, culminating most recently in the Secretary-General’s report on the topic this summer. In short, the issue is gaining momentum in non-binding “soft law.” But the DU issue has not been as prominent to date in disarmament circles of NGOs pushing treaty prohibitions on weapons in general, and major organizations like the International Committee for the Red Cross and Human Rights Watch have not prioritized the issue of DU on their formal agendas. Instead the most prominent issues on the NGO disarmament agenda since 2005 have included cluster munitions, small arms, autonomous weapons and, to a more limited degree, incendiary and explosive weapons. As this graph of NGO campaign affiliations from 2012 shows, organizations associated with the ICBUW are relatively disconnected from other disarmament campaigns, with more ties to the nuclear and environmental movements than to the humanitarian disarmament mainstream.*
In many respects, this is not at all surprising given the nature of the DU issue, which cuts across health, environment and arms control. My research has found that highly inter-sectional issues often have the hardest time finding a foothold in existing advocacy terrain. Also, elite advocacy NGOs gravitate for strategic reasons toward campaigns where they can a) combine testimonial and statistical evidence, and b) identify a clear causal link between the cause and effect of a humanitarian problem. Testimonial evidence is abundant here – much anecdotal evidence points to carcinogenic effects, including increased birth defects in areas exposed to DU. But generalizable scientific evidence is less so: few large-scale epidemiological studies have been carried out. “We know without a doubt that DU in humans is harmful and that contamination needs to be cleaned-up,” ICBUW Coordinator Doug Weir told me. “The main question is to what extent are civilians being exposed to it.”
Despite these obstacles, in recent years the ICBUW has made some noticeable strides in messaging and networking its issue in transnational civil society. This is both indicated by and reflected in changing network dynamics: ICBUW advocates are now invited to speak at side events at NGO humanitarian disarmament settings and UN meetings, and bigger, multi-issue disarmament organizations are beginning to develop web content and publish reports on DU. These organizations – like Article36.org, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and PAX (formerly IKV Pax Christi) – may not be network “hubs” like Human Rights Watch in terms overall connectedness, but they possess a different kind of network centrality: ties between otherwise disconnected actors across disparate spaces in the disarmament network.
For example, looking just at NGOs with memberships in three or more disarmament campaigns, where node size correlates to number of campaign memberships, you can see below that the Dutch organization then known as IKV Pax Christi (a steering committee member) and UK-based NGO Article36 (a non-member which has nonetheless endorsed the DU issue on its website) have the highest “betweenness centrality” of any organizations in the disarmament arena. WILPF, a long-time member, is close behind. The endorsement of these “brokers” (and especially the active involvement from PAX) is exerting a mainstreaming effect on this previously marginalized issue, increasing the likelihood that the most powerful NGOs – the “hubs” like ICRC and HRW with highest “in-degree centrality” in the network – will pick it up. Weir told me “being able to tap into PAX’s network has made a big difference to networking, issue perception and getting a seat in various rooms.”
Several factors over the past years have helped ensure this more effective marketing of the DU cause in elite disarmament NGO circles. One is the interest of the Norwegian government in the issue, which resulted in an influx of funding to ICBUW in 2009. Over time these resources have enabled the campaign to improve its advocacy savvy. It now has a professional website. It has the money to produce and disseminate slick research reports, like this. And activists like Doug Weir have had the ability to travel to, observe and participate in UN and NGO settings around adjacent issues like cluster munitions. For campaigners new to the UN system, this is a crucial way to develop procedural expertise as well as to develop cross-network friendships, promote information exchange, and learn to speak the same language as like-minded others. These processes had a cumulative effect, strengthening ICBUW’s formerly grassroots resource base in practical as well as symbolic terms. For example, the alliance with PAX allowed the coalition a beachhead for research in Iraq with an NGO that already had a programme there – something they had been unable to muster previously.
But resources aren’t everything. Another important development has been framing strategies of the campaign itself. Previously the campaign sought to focus specifically on banning a specific category of weapons. More recently, ICBUW has adeptly dis-aggregated the DU issue into component parts that connect to other prominent currents in the disarmament arena, creating new synergies. Some of these shifts represent scaling down: DU has become not just a weapons issue but a “transparency” issue; an issue where the “precautionary principle” should apply. These “sub-frames” enable ICBUW’s message to resonate with groups concerned more generally with “reversing the burden of proof” or increasing military accountability for the impact of weapons on civilians.
A separate shift in strategy has involved “scaling up” to a master frame around environmental effects of weapons more generally. Thus, ICBUW and its allies speak now of “toxic remnants of war” as a way to broaden the category of harm of which DU munitions is an example. Philosophically and scientifically, they are drawing connections between civilian harm and environmental damage from a wide variety of conflict and military pollutants. But this maneuver also links DU conceptually to wider, already accepted disarmament discourses. After all, the idea that states were responsible for explosive “remnants of war” left littering post-conflict zones resulted in an Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, and set the stage for the later Cluster Munitions Convention. The ICRC may not be ready to join a call to ban depleted uranium per se, but according to Weir, the hope is that the “toxic remnants of war” will be viewed as building on the ICRC’s emerging focus on “conflict and the environment.”
If the buzz about DU at the General Assembly this month is any indication, the strategy may be succeeding. And none too soon for civilians in post-conflict zones.
*Many thanks to Alex Montgomery who assisted in converting my campaign affiliation data to these cool pictures using R. For more on betweenness v. indegree centrality in advocacy networks, see our article (with Sirin Duygulu and Anna Rapp).
Without minimizing the considerations you offer here, I would offer another one: that DU is simply not the hazard that it is made out to be. As a “byproduct of nuclear enrichment processes,” it is the less radioactive of the two major uranium isotopes. Enrichment removes the uranium-235. The hazard DU presents is chemical (heavy-metal poisoning) much more than radiological, and the battlefield leaves behind other chemical hazards.
The evidence for its residual harm, sadly, is largely anecdotal, so we don’t know the level of hazard. But DU is about as radioactive as dirt, and when it’s dispersed, as it is by use in weapons, not a radioactive hazard.
Cheryl, you have a point, although I would add that evidence is not going to be found until some organizations conduct serious studies. The fact that we “don’t know the level of hazard” would, according to the precautionary principle, be a reason to avoid using these weapons until it could be shown conclusively that they were NOT linked to long-term civilian harm.
Hi Cheryl, as Charli points out, there are a lack of studies but the IAEA, WHO and UNEP are in agreement that contaminated sites needs to be dealt with, because they pose a health risk, particularly to children and workers in the informal scrap trade. But that is not happening right now in Iraq. Their concerns are based on its radiological and chemical toxicity and the fact that the use of the weapons creates a particulate that can be inhaled. Contaminated vehicles are particularly problematic and the risks from each site needs to be assessed individually.
Your views on the radioactive side of things are a little off the mark. Enrichment removes some of the U235, not all, and as soon as it leaves the centrifuges U238 starts to decay on its way to lead, which makes DU unusual in so far as it gets more radioactive with age. I’m the first to agree that there is a lot of sensationalism around the issue so would recommend avoiding most of the internet, except http://www.icbuw.org/publications if you’d like to learn more. Doug
The particulate form is indeed the most likely to cause damage. But it gets rained out, agglomerated, etc. with time. The scrap trade is a different and also serious issue, but it has to do with chunks of DU that may have been scattered around.
As to decay, all radioactive elements are constantly decaying, not just “as they leave the centrifuge.” The idea that DU “gets more radioactive with age” has become current recently, but, as a chemist who has worked with actinides, I’m not at all clear on what it means. Given that the half-life of U-238 is 4.5 billion years, if there is an increase, it will be tiny. Do you have a reference that gives some numbers?
All explosive weapons leave toxic residues. Under the precautionary principle, we shouldn’t use any of them. I’d be happy with that, because of the direct damage they do.
On the particulate, we were surprised to learn this year that it’s considerably more persistent than thought (https://www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/new-studies-on-du-environment) with samples from a very damp UK firing range largely unaltered after 30 years. True, movement may disperse them to a degree but again, it’s difficult to generalise as conditions and quantities and exposures vary so widely from site to site.
On the vehicles, again it’s particulate that is the problem, UNEP and others found levels within damaged vehicles to be far higher than anticipated, and much of this will not be open to the elements.
On the decay there’s a graph on page 13 (https://www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/docs/195.pdf) the increase in specific activity is largely down to the ingrowth of daughter products such as thorium and protactinium as unlike natural U, DU is not at secular equilibrium.
On weapons residues, we would suggest that it might be reasonable for the militaries to have an idea of the quantity of residues they generate in conflict but this has only been investigated on firing ranges thus far – due to the pressures of domestic environmental legislation – and not particularly effectively at that. However we view toxic remnants as far broader than munitions use, much more on that here: https://www.toxicremnantsofwar.info/category/blog/
I get “404 not found” on the first two links. I would be interested to see the articles.
What you are saying about the ingrowth of daughter products is that DU is less radioactive than natural U, but may get there in time. Given the long half-lives, that will be a long time.
Uranium is a heavy metal and can cause kidney and other damage, as heavy metals do. The radiation dose, however, probably does not exceed the blue area on Randall Munroe’s radiation chart. Scavenging chunks of uranium can lead to problems of incorporation into steel, which can lead to heavy metal poisoning.
In a war-torn area like Iraq, there are many needs and too little money, as has been noted upthread. So prioritization is essential. Accurate hazard assessment is essential for that prioritization. Food, shelter, and clearance of explosives are much higher priority than DU.
ah, it had added a bracket to the end of the url, try:
https://www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/new-studies-on-du-environment
and https://www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/docs/195.pdf
On the ingrowth, surprisingly it’s less than a year to get to 75%, and of course DU metal is far more concentrated form of uranium.
On the health effects, there has been much focus on the kidney previously but more work in the last decade on DNA damage, see: https://www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/depleted-uranium-cancer-evidence-overwhelming
On radiation effects, obviously there is much debate, particularly on risks from internal emitters and low-level radiation, though the WHO classifies all alpha emitters as Group 1 carcinogens when inside the body. Dose and exposure are obviously key but right now there has been little interest in examining the extent of civilian exposure so it’s hard to determine the risks with any precision.
Again, we would suggest that if states wish to use these weapons they should take a moment to concern themselves with civilian exposure.
On priorities, I would agree to a certain extent but currently there are no obligations on states to clear DU, nor to say where it has been fired, which has left Iraq struggling to assess and manage sites. Indeed it’s got to the point where they have just called for help from the international community. And it would seem that the use of DU has not been restricted to armoured vehicles, with buildings and civilian infrastructure targeted. Lack of capacity, insecurity and other factors have also ensured that the IAEA’s international standards for managing low level and intermediate level waste have not been followed.
So, while there are relatively simplistic arguments in favour and against DU, until you actually drill down into how it’s used and how it is not effectively managed post-conflict, getting to the bottom of whether its use is acceptable is pretty difficult.
Thanks! Those links work.
I am agnostic about the longer-lasting effects of the military use of depleted uranium. Too much of what I have seen is an exaggerated response to its radiation hazards. The report you linked is more balanced than many I have seen, but it has a number of what I think are overstatements. The use of becquerels in the graph on page 13, with an ambiguous M prefix (thousands? millions?), for example, provides large numbers that, however, are not as hazardous as those large numbers seem to indicate. And a log scale for time makes the radiation level seem to increase much more rapidly than it does.
And, for one other example, “self-stigmatizing”? No – humans stigmatize, and in this case, it’s largely been fear of radiation and a stigmatizing campaign.
Certainly people who have been subjected to radioactive fallout in a number of places – northeastern Kazakhstan, Pacific islands, the American Southwest – perceive that they have been damaged by that fallout. The studies have been all too few to determine the science, and their fear continues. As the report points out, more studies are needed, but my experience in working with some of those situations is that those studies won’t be done. That can be an argument for the Precautionary Principle.
At the same time, the military and their suppliers will argue that the longer-lasting damage from DU is insignificant relative to the direct damage those munitions do, a different sort of risk assessment.
For me, the priority works out to avoiding war. But banning particularly harmful aspects of war is essential. I encourage you to build your arguments on the best science available.
can I just add that so many people gets the DU issue wrong – Any health effects are not due to radiation but due to the toxicity of the metal – similar to that of lead and other heavy metals. It is a great pity that people keep getting sidetracked on the issue of radiation.
In certain parts of the body – bone, liver etc heavy metals such as U, Pb and others can concentrate and lead to heavy metal poisoning. It may be that there are other effects too. Studies on uranium miners should be looked at here also. Nothing to do with radiation. So this is a spurious argument.
Well Patricia, of only we could say that with certainty. Research by the US Armed Forces Radiobology Research Institute demonstrates there indeed the the combined effect of radiation and chemicial toxicity, found in in vivo and vitro studies.
Which also demonstrates the need for civilian exposure studies, as little to no studies have been conducted. Again, this is also hindered by transparency over the use of DU, making it near to impossible to do good research on that.
An other interesting area to look at would be the ‘bystander effect’ of exposure of cells to radiation. Alpha radiation inside the body is known to damage cells, so I wonder where you base you information on that radiation isn’t the problem?
It’s true, people out if they hear about radiation. Having done the research in Iraq, I can acknowledge that indeed it has psycho-social effect on civilians living in these areas. But than again, our government (as part of the IAEA) have developed clear safety standards how to deal with low/intermediate level radioactive waste. These clearly outline the problems with exposure to this materials. Hence, in wartime the standards as set a side and affected States are left with cleaning up the mess.
I think in general the whole idea of putting radioactive waste in conventional munitions in preposterous.
And one shouldn’t be surprised civilians in these areas freak out and want it cleaned up. You can only imagine who the reaction in Europe or the US will be if a similar scenario occurs in their backyard, and what would be done to clean it up.
So the point made that civilians shouldn’t hype it and not be afraid cause there is no reason to be worried isn’t really working in reality.
Interesting article, thanks. I would like to add another factor that contributes to the increasing awareness of the damage done by depleted uranium munition: the persistance and dedication of individual advocates with knowledge and experience, like American/Iraqi Dr. Dahlia Wasfi. The ongoing unselfish effort by individuals like her to raise attention for the suffering that has been caused created an impact that can hardly be measured.
Sad to see a comment full of denial here, in spite of all the evidence… Let me share a new article here, with statements by several Iraqi doctors, for people with little knowledge.
https://www.truth-out.org/news/item/26703-iraqi-doctors-call-depleted-uranium-use-genocide
Great post Charli. Facinating read and excellent visuals. As an astrophysicist in a past life, I also very much appreciate both the subject of DU and the comment stream that accompanied the post. I have a small question. Regarding “My research has found that highly inter-sectional issues often have the
hardest time finding a foothold in existing advocacy terrain”, is this in part due to organizational agendas/interests that are resistant to taking on issues where they canno claim clear ‘comparative advantage’ or where they would have to share leadership/credit/attention in a substantial way with other advocacy organizations?