Donald Trump’s second term in office is causing great concern about the future of the Liberal International Order (ILO) in Western capitals and headquarters of international organizations (IOs). Over the course of the last months, Trump fundamentally attacked international institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Paris Agreement, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The blueprints for his second administration by the “America First Institute” and “Project 2025” suggest that the U.S. should systematically review its support for international institutions and terminate membership if they are considered in conflict with their definition of the national interest. Will we witness a large-scale withdrawal of the U.S. from numerous international institutions?

Based on our research about negative institutional power and institutional contestation, we argue that Trump 1.0 only escalated attacks against those institutions in which the U.S. lacked control. This strategic pattern allows us to derive concrete predictions about in which institutions Trump 2.0 will voice reform demands, engage in subversion, or withdraw membership.

Trump 1.0’s strategic escalation of contestation

Our Negative Institutional Power Theory (NIPT) posits that a state’s choice of contestation mode is shaped by its ability to influence or at least prevent undesired outcomes within an institution. The less control a state has over an institution it is dissatisfied with, the more likely it is to escalate contestation. While Trump 1.0’s “America First” foreign policy was either characterized as irrational, impulsive, erratic, and thus unpredictable, or as a fundamental “withdrawal doctrine”, his attacks against international institutions show a clear strategic pattern:

When a dissatisfied state can shape decisions of an international institution, we expect contestation to be limited to public criticism since the institution and remaining member states will likely yield to its demands. This influence can stem from a strong dependence on a dissatisfied state’s contributions, correspondingly weighted voting rules, or the appointment of citizens to important positions in IO bureaucracies. For instance, in the case of NATO, Trump 1.0 only issued threats and reform demands, which were quickly met by NATO allies who increased their defense spending. His criticism of the World Bank also fell silent after its President Jim Yong Kim won over Trump’s daughter Ivanka through the introduction of the “Ivanka Fund” for female entrepreneurs in developing countries.

The fact that the attacks on international institutions by the U.S. under Trump 1.0 followed a strategic pattern leads us to expect that Trump 2.0 will also not blindly escalate contestation.

When a dissatisfied state falls short of positive power to shape institutional outcomes but at least has the negative power to prevent unpopular decisions, we expect it to undermine the institution from within. For instance, Trump 1.0 not only criticized the WTO but used its privileged position to block its dispute settlement process, which allowed the U.S. to prevent binding rulings against its own protectionist trade policy. But the U.S. remained a member of the WTO. Trump 1.0 also did not give up the permanent membership of the U.S. in the UN Security Council. Many of its initiatives failed, such as the reinstatement of UN sanctions against Iran. Yet, its right of veto at least enabled Trump 1.0 to prevent undesired resolutions, for example against Israel.

Only when a dissatisfied state lacks meaningful options to prevent undesired decisions do we expect it to terminate its membership in the institution. For example, Trump 1.0 withdrew the U.S. from the UN Human Rights Council where it was unable to block dissatisfying majority decisions condemning Israel. Trump 1.0 also terminated U.S. membership in the WHO, which takes important decisions by majority or through an independent expert bureaucracy.

Predicting Trump 2.0’s contestation of international institutions

The fact that the attacks on international institutions by the U.S. under Trump 1.0 followed a strategic pattern leads us to expect that Trump 2.0 will also not blindly escalate contestation.

Trump, the “America First Institute” and “Project 2025” have been critical of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, NATO, and the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). In the case of these IOs, we expect Trump 2.0 to limit contestation to voice because the U.S. wields ample influence over these institutions. For instance, in the IMF, the U.S. wields de facto veto power due to its voting share exceeding 15%, allowing it to unilaterally block any major proposal requiring an 85% supermajority for approval. Similarly, the U.S. dominates the USMCA whose built-in review mechanism provides Trump 2.0 with plenty opportunities to shape its rules. Due to the privileged position of the U.S. in these institutions, we expect Trump 2.0 to be swiftly appeased (again) by other member states and IO secretariats.

In the instances of the WTO and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), where the U.S. retains comfortable blockade options, we expect contestation to stop at subversion. In the WTO, Trump 2.0 will likely continue the blockade of the Appellate Body. In the OECD, the U.S. will use its veto against undesired decisions. In both cases, Trump 2.0 is unlikely to terminate U.S. membership and thereby sacrifice institutional control over future policies that might go against its interests.

Our expectations are direr for international institutions in which the U.S. has no negative power to prevent undesired outcomes. For these institutions, we anticipate Trump 2.0 to escalate contestation to membership termination. The withdrawal from the WHO and the Paris Agreement on his very first day in office are illustrative. Exit is also a real possibility in the case of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), and the UN Human Rights Council. In these institutions, decisions are taken by a majority and the U.S. thus lacks power to avoid undesired decisions. For entities such as the UNRWA and the UNFPA, where terminating membership would mean leaving the UN in general, we expect the U.S. under Trump 2.0 to disengage from governing bodies and terminate all financial contributions.

Why Trump 2.0 could still surprise us

Our predictions presuppose that key decision-makers in the U.S. under Trump 2.0 will understand the value of international institutions as means to achieve their objectives or at least block undesired outcomes. One might object that, this time, his cabinet is packed with loyalists from day one. Moreover, through Schedule F, Trump could replace numerous career civil servants who are aware about the strategic benefits of international institutions for U.S. power projection with less experienced and ideologically aligned followers. Finally, Trump personally might feel emboldened by his re-election and could be even more resistant to advice.

As long as the U.S. can avoid undesired decisions in these institutions or even push through its preferred policies, they will continue to have strategic value also for Trump 2.0.

However, influencing other states through international institutions is considerably less costly—even for the U.S. as the most powerful state—than relying on coercive means such as sanctions. The fact that our expectations applied to Trump 1.0 even after “the adults in the room” left further increases our confidence that also Trump 2.0 will not generally abandon international institutions. As long as the U.S. can avoid undesired decisions in these institutions or even push through its preferred policies, they will continue to have strategic value also for Trump 2.0.

Taming contestation through concessions

Another reason why we could be wrong about the escalation of Trump 2.0’s contestation is the agency of the LIO’s defenders. The future is not determined but can be shaped by the responses of other Western governments and IO bureaucracies. While we expect that they will yield to Trump’s demands in institutions where the U.S. wield ample influence, they can go further to de-escalate contestation through strategic accommodation while preserving multilateral cooperation.

In institutions where we expect the U.S. to remain and block decisions, defenders of the LIO can push for reforms that allow states to opt out of undesired policies without leading to the gridlock of the complete institutions. In the case of the WTO, for example, a consensus procedure could be re-introduced for decisions of the dispute settlement body. This would provide individual members the opportunity to block rulings that they perceive against their national interests without having to block the entire institution.

Even in institutions where we expect Trump 2.0 to withdraw due to a lack of negative power, defenders of the LIO can still intervene through reforms. They can grant the U.S. (and other important states) special veto rights or important positions in IO bureaucracies to prevent policies that conflict with core interests. The introduction of a P5 veto right that allows the U.S. to block undesired decisions in international institutions that adopt decisions by majority voting, such as the UN Human Rights Council, might prevent Trump 2.0 from terminating U.S. membership.

Strategic accommodation may make institutional decision-making harder and less fair, but it promises to keep the U.S. at the table and thereby preserve international institutions as cornerstone of global governance. If appeasement keeps Trump 2.0 in more institutions than expected, we are glad to be proven wrong!

This post is based on Benjamin Dassler, Tim Heinkelmann-Wild, and Andreas Kruck: “How negative institutional power moderates contestation: Explaining dissatisfied