The Indo-Pacific is an increasingly contested space. Literature on the region revolves around the notion that China’s deepening regional footprint has exacerbated apprehensions in Washington, Canberra, New Delhi, and Tokyo. Some worry that Xi might institute a security architecture with the ‘Middle Kingdom’ at the center rivalling the US hub-and-spokes model. Others, less apprehensive (and possibly more realistic), believe that China intends to reconfigure certain aspects of the security order to better suit its interests, while keeping large parts of it intact. Whichever, approach China pursues, its economic weight and corresponding tendency to wield its influence around the region is argued to make the other great powers anxious. The existing consensus is that this drives minilaterals such as the Quad and AUKUS as well as their respective ‘Indo-Pacific Strategies’. Scholarship has either focused on the Quad members apprehensions, Chinese criticism of the ‘Cold War bloc mentality’ driving this synergy or both.  

But what of the region’s littoral states situated at the faultline of this heating geopolitical struggle. They have witnessed changing balances of power as Chinese and American alignment in the 1970s morphed into growing hostility between the two since 2010. Do they believe that they lack the agency necessary to play a role in the present context? Are they dismissive or threatened by the new minilaterals? Will they be bystanders, or will they instead, strive to exercise agency and be an independent and significant actor in this milieu? Let’s dive into the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) outlooks on the Indo-Pacific to make sense of these questions.

The IORA and ASEAN Outlooks’

The IORA is a, less well-known, composition of nations with significant stakes in the Indian Ocean region. It was established chiefly for the purpose of enhancing economic and political cooperation between its members and thereby advance ‘balanced development’ in the Indian Ocean region. Quad members such as Australia and India and P5 members such as France are grouped together with relatively smaller littoral geographies like Sri Lanka, Singapore, UAE, and Maldives. This heterogeneous membership is important for two reasons. Firstly, the range in state ‘power capabilities’ creates a corresponding variance in their engagement with regional and extra-regional powers. More importantly, it also engenders a differing assortment of foreign policy postures in the backdrop of China’s economic resurgence. This diversity may also enable states with greater military and economic power to decidedly influence the trajectory of the organization. Possibly, as a consequence of this, the 2022 IORA outlook on the Indo-Pacific advances a welcoming approach vis a vis emerging mini-lateral initiatives. Although the document does not directly reference the Quad or AUKUS, it encourages IORA members to ‘strengthen and collaborate with relevant sub-regional and regional associations and organizations’ and ‘acknowledges that member states will find opportunities to work with other countries and organizations in the ‘Indo-Pacific’.

The document expects nations to adopt a consensus-based and non-intrusive approach to settle disputes. Maritime activities, according to it, should be based on respect and adherence to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) and the wider rules-based order. Interestingly, the outlook explicitly specifies that ‘issues that may generate controversy will be excluded from deliberations.’ On the surface, this may appear to help prevent disagreements between members, thereby strengthening unity. Even so, the fact that such issues are not discussed at summit meetings tells us that the organization may not be able or willing to take up any incident involving a violation of the UNCLOS by a great power if such discussions lead to disagreements amongst its members. Consequently, the blanket omission of contentious issues calls in to question the efficacy of the organization in the face of increasing geopolitical competition and tensions between China and the Quad. Complicating this matter further is the fact that some Quad members are also part of the IORA. Can we therefore anticipate the IORA exercising agency if it refuses to even discuss any issue that may create disagreements between its members?

The 2021 ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific, on the other hand, appears to be more steadfast in emphasizing its importance/‘Centrality’ in the regional landscape and the necessity of it taking the initiative in shaping regional dynamics.  The outlook explicitly states that ASEAN intends to create an ‘inclusive regional architecture’, establish ‘collective leadership in forging and shaping’ developments in the region and be an ‘honest broker’ within this evolving strategic environment. The decision to use the phrase ‘inclusive’ can be viewed as an indication to Beijing of ASEAN’s desire to distinguish its position against Quad members Indo-Pacific strategies which Beijing has termed ‘exclusionary’. Moreover, the fact that ASEAN hopes to be viewed by contending great powers as a ‘honest broker’ demonstrates a desire by the organization to exercise its agency and be a determinate force in regional geopolitics.

Similar to the IORA, the ASEAN outlook calls for the peaceful resolution of disputes, renunciation of the threat or use of force, and the need for all nations to uphold the rules based regional architecture, specifically the UNCLOS. Although the ASEAN outlook alludes to a willingness to work with other sub-regional mechanisms in ‘specific’ areas of common interest, it prioritizes unity among its members above all else. In contrast IORA, on two separate occasions in its outlook, encouraged its members to partner with other mini-lateral initiatives.  

As would be expected, both outlooks reiterate the importance of great and small powers adhering to the UNCLOS and the larger rules-based order. However, as mentioned above, the IORA appears to be more accommodative towards new mini-lateral initiatives than the ASEAN, even welcoming its members to join them if synergies exist. More importantly, the ASEAN outlook and Charter does not exclude contentious issues from discussion. Additionally, unlike the IORA, the ASEAN repeatedly emphasizes its centrality / significance in forging the regional maritime order. This demonstrates a visible apprehension among ASEAN members of being sidelined from important geopolitical issues as and when they may arise.  

Both outlooks are, essentially outcomes of necessity, not desire, reflected by the fact that they are not titled as strategies but rather as outlooks. They are products of the realization that the Quad and AUKUS augur increased great power involvement in the Indo-Pacific. As ‘outlooks’ they also symbolize a desire to distance themselves from the ‘strategies’ advanced by the Quad members. The emergence of these and future minilaterals may crowd out the IORA and ASEAN to the point that they may become witnesses to escalating tensions and conflict. ASEAN appears deeply apprehensive of this possibility in contrast to the IORA.

Why introduce outlooks on the Indo-Pacific then? The outlooks should be viewed as admissions by both organizations of the central role played by the US and its allies in preserving stability in the region’s maritime landscape. Moreover, the Quad’s Indo-Pacific strategies encapsulates a vital point of convergence with Indian and Pacific Ocean littoral states – the need to preserve the rules-based order, specifically the UNCLOS.

Thus, it appears clear that the ASEAN remains apprehensive of being sidelined as regional and extra-regional great power presence intensifies in the region’s maritime sphere. The IORA, possibly due to its great power members, adopts a more accommodative posture towards minilateral initiatives. Given the fact that the latter also refuses to address any issue that may create disagreements between members, it is likely that the IORA will remain a bystander if tensions between China and the Quad intensify to the point of open hostilities. In contrast, it is likely that if conflict does break out in Southeast Asian waters, ASEAN will strive to play the role of a significant third-party mediator actively seeking to diffuse tensions between the great powers. In that sense, the outlooks reveal a lot about how these regional organizations would operate in defense of the UNCLOS and deal with any outbreak of conflict between contending great powers.  

What about the locals?: Taking stock of the ASEAN and IORA positions on the ‘Indo-Pacific’

The Indo-Pacific is an increasingly contested space. Literature on the region revolves around the notion that China’s deepening regional footprint has exacerbated apprehensions in Washington, Canberra, New Delhi, and Tokyo. Some worry that Xi might institute a security architecture with the ‘Middle Kingdom’ at the center rivalling the US hub-and-spokes model. Others, less apprehensive (and possibly more realistic), believe that China intends to reconfigure certain aspects of the security order to better suit its interests, while keeping large parts of it intact. Whichever, approach China pursues, its economic weight and corresponding tendency to wield its influence around the region is argued to make the other great powers anxious. The existing consensus is that this drives minilaterals such as the Quad and AUKUS as well as their respective ‘Indo-Pacific Strategies’. Scholarship has either focused on the Quad members apprehensions, Chinese criticism of the ‘Cold War bloc mentality’ driving this synergy or both.  

But what of the region’s littoral states situated at the faultline of this heating geopolitical struggle. They have witnessed changing balances of power as Chinese and American alignment in the 1970s morphed into growing hostility between the two since 2010. Do they believe that they lack the agency necessary to play a role in the present context? Are they dismissive or threatened by the new minilaterals? Will they be bystanders, or will they instead, strive to exercise agency and be an independent and significant actor in this milieu? Let’s dive into the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) outlooks on the Indo-Pacific to make sense of these questions.

The IORA and ASEAN Outlooks’

The IORA is a, less well-known, composition of nations with significant stakes in the Indian Ocean region. It was established chiefly for the purpose of enhancing economic and political cooperation between its members and thereby advance ‘balanced development’ in the Indian Ocean region. Quad members such as Australia and India and P5 members such as France are grouped together with relatively smaller littoral geographies like Sri Lanka, Singapore, UAE, and Maldives. This heterogeneous membership is important for two reasons. Firstly, the range in state ‘power capabilities’ creates a corresponding variance in their engagement with regional and extra-regional powers. More importantly, it also engenders a differing assortment of foreign policy postures in the backdrop of China’s economic resurgence. This diversity may also enable states with greater military and economic power to decidedly influence the trajectory of the organization. Possibly, as a consequence of this, the 2022 IORA outlook on the Indo-Pacific advances a welcoming approach vis a vis emerging mini-lateral initiatives. Although the document does not directly reference the Quad or AUKUS, it encourages IORA members to ‘strengthen and collaborate with relevant sub-regional and regional associations and organizations’ and ‘acknowledges that member states will find opportunities to work with other countries and organizations in the ‘Indo-Pacific’.

The document expects nations to adopt a consensus-based and non-intrusive approach to settle disputes. Maritime activities, according to it, should be based on respect and adherence to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) and the wider rules-based order. Interestingly, the outlook explicitly specifies that ‘issues that may generate controversy will be excluded from deliberations.’ On the surface, this may appear to help prevent disagreements between members, thereby strengthening unity. Even so, the fact that such issues are not discussed at summit meetings tells us that the organization may not be able or willing to take up any incident involving a violation of the UNCLOS by a great power if such discussions lead to disagreements amongst its members. Consequently, the blanket omission of contentious issues calls in to question the efficacy of the organization in the face of increasing geopolitical competition and tensions between China and the Quad. Complicating this matter further is the fact that some Quad members are also part of the IORA. Can we therefore anticipate the IORA exercising agency if it refuses to even discuss any issue that may create disagreements between its members?

The 2021 ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific, on the other hand, appears to be more steadfast in emphasizing its importance/‘Centrality’ in the regional landscape and the necessity of it taking the initiative in shaping regional dynamics.  The outlook explicitly states that ASEAN intends to create an ‘inclusive regional architecture’, establish ‘collective leadership in forging and shaping’ developments in the region and be an ‘honest broker’ within this evolving strategic environment. The decision to use the phrase ‘inclusive’ can be viewed as an indication to Beijing of ASEAN’s desire to distinguish its position against Quad members Indo-Pacific strategies which Beijing has termed ‘exclusionary’. Moreover, the fact that ASEAN hopes to be viewed by contending great powers as a ‘honest broker’ demonstrates a desire by the organization to exercise its agency and be a determinate force in regional geopolitics.

Similar to the IORA, the ASEAN outlook calls for the peaceful resolution of disputes, renunciation of the threat or use of force, and the need for all nations to uphold the rules based regional architecture, specifically the UNCLOS. Although the ASEAN outlook alludes to a willingness to work with other sub-regional mechanisms in ‘specific’ areas of common interest, it prioritizes unity among its members above all else. In contrast IORA, on two separate occasions in its outlook, encouraged its members to partner with other mini-lateral initiatives.  

As would be expected, both outlooks reiterate the importance of great and small powers adhering to the UNCLOS and the larger rules-based order. However, as mentioned above, the IORA appears to be more accommodative towards new mini-lateral initiatives than the ASEAN, even welcoming its members to join them if synergies exist. More importantly, the ASEAN outlook and Charter does not exclude contentious issues from discussion. Additionally, unlike the IORA, the ASEAN repeatedly emphasizes its centrality / significance in forging the regional maritime order. This demonstrates a visible apprehension among ASEAN members of being sidelined from important geopolitical issues as and when they may arise.  

Both outlooks are, essentially outcomes of necessity, not desire, reflected by the fact that they are not titled as strategies but rather as outlooks. They are products of the realization that the Quad and AUKUS augur increased great power involvement in the Indo-Pacific. As ‘outlooks’ they also symbolize a desire to distance themselves from the ‘strategies’ advanced by the Quad members. The emergence of these and future minilaterals may crowd out the IORA and ASEAN to the point that they may become witnesses to escalating tensions and conflict. ASEAN appears deeply apprehensive of this possibility in contrast to the IORA.

Why introduce outlooks on the Indo-Pacific then? The outlooks should be viewed as admissions by both organizations of the central role played by the US and its allies in preserving stability in the region’s maritime landscape. Moreover, the Quad’s Indo-Pacific strategies encapsulates a vital point of convergence with Indian and Pacific Ocean littoral states – the need to preserve the rules-based order, specifically the UNCLOS.

Thus, it appears clear that the ASEAN remains apprehensive of being sidelined as regional and extra-regional great power presence intensifies in the region’s maritime sphere. The IORA, possibly due to its great power members, adopts a more accommodative posture towards minilateral initiatives. Given the fact that the latter also refuses to address any issue that may create disagreements between members, it is likely that the IORA will remain a bystander if tensions between China and the Quad intensify to the point of open hostilities. In contrast, it is likely that if conflict does break out in Southeast Asian waters, ASEAN will strive to play the role of a significant third-party mediator actively seeking to diffuse tensions between the great powers. In that sense, the outlooks reveal a lot about how these regional organizations would operate in defense of the UNCLOS and deal with any outbreak of conflict between contending great powers.