“The hour is getting late…all along the watchtower, princes kept the view…two riders were approaching, the wind began to howl.”
Bob Dylan
America and Russia are not engaged in a new Cold War, but Russia is playing the global menace du jour. The U.S. and Europe need to take more aggressive action to prevent the annexation of eastern Ukraine, and time is short. Beyond this crisis the West needs an updated defense posture, but for now the road ahead is clear.
Russia will take as much of Ukraine as the West allows, nothing more, nothing less. Yet few in Washington and Brussels seem to understand this. In recent weeks the view among the cognoscenti was that the crisis over Ukraine was largely over. Yet little in the U.S.-European response has changed. Hence, the incentive structure that failed to prevent the Crimea annexation is not likely to prevent further dismemberment. President Putin views the West as weak, which has kept him emboldened.
True enough, Putin has long been adding up sleights from the West: NATO expansion to Russia’s border, the Kosovo War and the bombing of Serbia without UN Security Council approval, the same for the Iraq War, U.S. support the Ukraine and Georgia revolutions, aiming to install radar stations in Poland and the Czech Republic, and NATO’s nearly offering both Georgia and Ukraine membership.
Russia is not “back” so much as acting out again in its own region of the world. Its 2008 invasion of Georgia, notably, came after the end of the Kosovo War when NATO and Russian troops raced to be the first to occupy a former Yugoslav Army base on the outskirts of Pristina. Russian Foreign Secretary Lavrov at the time flatly stated that the West was forcing Russian to go to war somewhere. After making good on that threat in Georgia, Russia kept troops in two breakaway regions of the country that are now considered in limbo. At the time the Bush Administration did nothing, which was a strategic blunder that is still paying dividends—just not to the West and its allies.
So after a period of virtual strategic irrelevance, Russia has achieved a Pyrrhic victory. Putin has gained Crimea, but he has cost Russia a great deal in both economic and reputational terms, made a mockery of future claims of any imperative for the West to gain approval of the UN Security Council for crisis interventions, and above all lost the rest of Ukraine.
Or has he? Will Putin seek further Ukrainian territory in the Russian-speaking east? Russian has had over 40,000 troops and sizable collection of military hardware massed near the border for weeks, and now a Russian fighter has buzzed a U.S. destroyer. It should now be clear beyond a reasonable doubt that western conventional deterrence has not been restored, and the mere threat of further sanctions is essentially meaningless at this stage.
Far more costly economic sanctions are called for, but in days not weeks western allies need to step up aerial patrols and stage a NATO ground exercise in Poland, in order to establish credible deterrence. A show of force is key to avoiding having to use force, and still achieve one’s objective.
Meanwhile by openly accusing President Obama of appeasement, the American political right has only reinforced Putin’s perception. Yet in the process it made an unintentional but crucial strategic point: other countries also need to be deterred from territorial takeovers, especially China. The aborted Syrian intervention already degraded Western deterrence, and a measured response to the annexation of Crimea could easily lead to a Chinese occupation of the islands it claims from Japan.
The fallacy of those advocating a buildup in Asia and drawdown in Europe is now clear. The U.S. commitment to its alliances in both the Asian and European spheres must be sufficient to achieve its simultaneous security interests. But with economic austerity and a decreased defense budget, the U.S. cannot build back up in Europe AND pivot fully to Asia. As a consequence the U.S. needs to rely on partners to a greater extent than in the past.
In addition to NATO, the most capable and like-minded bilateral partners are France, the UK, and Germany. Despite budget cuts, they have made their military forces more capable and shown an increased willingness to act even when the U.S. is reluctant to lead. This new “lead nation” model calls for rotating which country spearheads a particular crisis intervention, with the others playing support roles by providing smaller scale but vital assistance.
On-the-fly uses of this yet to be fully developed model were on display in the interventions in Libya and Mali, as well as the near intervention in Syria. It is time to put this model fully in place, including in the Pacific theater by partnering with Australia and an increasingly activist Japan under Prime Minister Abe.
But for now the U.S. and Europe need to ignore public opinion and do what it takes to meet their mutual strategic interests: prevent the Russian annexation of eastern Ukraine by using ground troops in a major exercise in neighboring Poland and with Ukraine’s permission using NATO aircraft for surveillance missions inside its territory.
Otherwise, the West can kiss goodbye a major strand of what remains of the current international order. It will have left Ukraine in the lurch—right as it was lurching toward the West—and allowed Vladimir Putin to accomplish more than all the post-Stalin leaders of the former Soviet Union combined.
[This is an updated version of a previous post of mine, but the hour is getting late]
Is the US willing to go to war over Ukraine? If not, I fail to see what this action will accomplish.
In order to achieve deterrence, one has to be credible…no response to taking a piece of Georgia began to degrade western conventional deterrence, and other actions recently further degraded it…in order to achieve a change in Russia’s perceptions, western allies need to appear to be willing to go to war even if they don’t want to…there certainly is a downside to being a democracy at times like these, but the stakes are too high…acquiescing to the annexation of more of Ukraine will reverberate and substantially harm U.S. interests not only in Europe but other hot spots as well
Credibility does not result from posturing, and any threat to intervene in Ukraine would be dismissed as an obvious bluff. In order for it to be credible, a threat must be proportional to the stakes, the benefits of implementation must exceed the costs of inaction, and it must be at least somewhat in line with your past actions and rhetoric. None of that is the case in Ukraine, particularly when considering the potential for escalation. Sanctions, exclusion from IOs and loss of international prestige are the strongest rational response to this land-grab, and if Putin is willing to bear these costs, there’s nothing the US or anybody else can do. Even when you’ve got a lopsided advantage in terms of overall power, it does not mean you’ll be able to stare down any opponent when the conflict revolves around something which they care about a great deal more than you do.
I can’t think of much in line with strategic response to any threat to the Russian base in Sevastapol and control of the Persian Gulf which would shake Russia’s strategic assessment this is about resources – petroleum in particular. It would take a great deal more effort than a rerun of The Charge of the Light Brigade to shake their obvious resolution to maintain friendly conditions in the immediate area of their forward base by making it integral to their territories…again.
Let’s review what has happened, in terms of ratcheting up a response. For if this were to come out of the blue, granted it would be perceived as a bluff. In this case we do have a ratcheting up of previous actions, but what we don’t have is enough to have restored conventional deterrence.
We have strong rhetoric (some publicly delivered, some privately); we have a couple rounds of economic sanctions; we have economic aid packages offered to Ukraine; we have the G-8 kicking out Russia and reversion to the G-7; we have stepped up NATO aerial patrols; we have placement of additional NATO aircraft in the region; we have another round of sanctions in the works, and still another that has been threatened; and we have the visit of the CIA Director, suggesting some form of intelligence aid and/or training has been taking place.
So a ground exercise would be in a line of successively ratcheted up actions, which would augment its credibility. It would send a stronger signal still if it took place in Poland or Romania and not too far from the Ukrainian border. Ground and aerial capabilities would need to be involved.
It is the cost of inaction that is most consistently underestimated by western observers and analysts, who seem to think all of this is confined merely to the eastern edge of Europe. In fact far more is at stake, for a failure to make a second land grab very costly for Russia–before or after–would increase the likelihood of others around the world testing the resolve of the U.S. principally but also its allies, perhaps in similar fashion. And the circumstances in theaters like Asia and the Middle East do not need to be mirror images of this crisis for this to ensue.
Granted, even with the power asymmetry, if Putin cares a lot more about his desired outcome than western allies do then it will not work. And that is ultimately unknowable. But there is a point where this becomes too costly for him. With certitude we know at this stage this point has not been reached. With less certitude about exactly where that point lies, because of the shared interests at stake it is important to take actions that get western allies and Ukraine closer to that point within a limited window of opportunity.
Preventing Further Russian Agression
The title alone signals this as a fit article for The Onion… or Cracked. Or is the U.S. suddenly justified in bitching when other nations follow their own territorial imperatives about securing their borders in the style of the Monroe Doctrine….in their own neighbourhood rather than halfway around the world ?
Let me suggest you take a look at this article and think of it in line with assessment of Russia’s response to NATO provocateur activities : common in Iraq, Iran, Ukraine and Russia.
Changed and unchanged What do the negotiations with Iran tell us about US policy? « Hands Off the People of Iran
https://hopoi.org/?p=2804
I stopped reading when the author claimed a link between the ‘end of the war in Kosovo’ (also known as 1999) and the Russian invasion of Georgia–nearly 10 years later.
This tends to be a mistake observers in the West consistently make in their assessments of Russian motivations. While in fact this link has been made repeatedly by Putin and Lavrov themselves, as well as by a slew of additional officials in or previously in the Kremlin. In the West we tend to think there is some sort of statute of limitations at work, after which Russian officials just won’t care anymore. But the evidence demonstrates that they have a long memory and the patience to go along with it. For example, it is for good reason that the highly regarded former Bush Administration National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley publicly admitted that in retrospect the choice he and his colleagues made to do nothing in response to the Russian invasion of Georgia was a mistake.
You would not have done well with the consistent U.S. representations of ‘The Red Menace’ over a period starting from the end of WW II throughout the dissolution of the USSR : a period of several decades, not merely one. Nor did the preceding period show any lack of paranoia about ‘communists’ – which the Bolsheviks certainly were not.
The article rightly points out all the various things that have played into Putin’s narrative – i.e the 2008 NATO pronouncement on Ukraine and Georgia – and then oddly calls for doing more of the same. How exactly does a major military exercise in Poland signal deterrence in Eastern Ukraine? We could double defense spending in all the NATO countries, conduct exercises all over the NATO area, and it still wouldn’t have relevance to what Moscow does or doesn’t do in Ukraine. NATO is making appropriate steps to reassure the new NATO allies, but the NATO members also have their own interests, work by consensus, and its quite clear already that Germany would put the brakes on this kind of unnecessary step that would be used in Moscow as justifying escalation. I think there is a strong chance Russia will take more area in eastern Ukraine – I think the chance would be even stronger if we do what is advocated for here, and at the same time it would further feed Putin’s narrative, and risk escalation at a time when there remain common interests worth pursuing in de-escalation. I am also curious about the most basic assumptions at the conclusion of the article. For the last 4-5 years, Ukraine and its gov’t were basically a proxy for Russian interests – extending Putin’s sway right up to Poland’s border. No one was hammering for these kinds of things then. Now, Putin has lost Ukraine and is doing a rear-guard action in its east – illegal and inappropriate – but its a major loss for Russia – why would we want to poor gasoline on the situation and risk making that a worse situation – Russia is overstretched, its economy taking massive hits internally and with time Putin will be seen as having been doing grave damage to Russian’s aspirations to be seen as an important and respected country. So, NATO has plans to step up rotational forces in in the new member states, it has ruled out the kind of concept advocated for here – and rightly so because its not necessary. Russia has tactical advantages in the immediate east of Ukraine. Even minus the US, Europe-NATO has over 2 million people in uniform, 2 nuclear powers and despite the Eurozone, one of the most powerful economic platforms in the world – combined the US and NATO allies spend over $1 trillion a year on military capabiltiies – Russia about $60 billion. The strategic advantages overwhelmingly favor the west. Meanwhile, the US has broader interest than eastern Ukraine in the world. Thus if there is to be new presence rotating in the eastern members, let it be Europeans doing it with us facilitating. But at the same time, the idea that we should take a bunch of steps that further compound and feed into Russia’s narrative of the crisis – i.e. major immediate large-scale exercises in Poland – or as Poland wanted – 10,000 troops deployed there? Those are really bad ideas, and its good to see the NATO allies are not going in that direction. They can always re-asses if need be. Meanwhile the west can kiss goodbye of any strand of international order? A lot of countries around the world believe we did that – with the Kosovo war, NATO enlargement, the Iraq invasion. I personally do not, but if we fail to understand that part of the crisis, we also fail to understand the necessary moves to de-escalate it. And, again – for the last several years, Putin had massive influence right up to the Polish border via the Ukrainian gov’t – now he has lost all that – perhaps we should keep some context here – we have all the relative power advantages, Ukraine is turning westward. If anything rather than focus on troops in Poland, we perhaps need to be having a realistic discussion of how much bolstering the Ukrainian economy, which is a disaster, is going to cost the American taxpayer? But then the article says we should “ignore public opinion” – good call in an alliance of democracies? Especially in the case of Europe, where the Eurozone remains a much bigger threat to stability in the larger scheme of things? Finally, what is this fallacy regarding Asia – Europe has the NATO integrated military structure; 2 million people in uniform and a crisis far on the edge of its periphery. Asia has no integrated capacity, major flashpoints and 2x the volume of trade – at a time when capacity is limited and money short. This crisis proves the need for the pivot and to put capable alliles in Europe in the lead – again the article seems to call for that – but if we continue to be the fall back in Europe, then the allies won’t necessarily step up. Either way, SECDEF and the White House have already made clear this crisis won’t affect the pivot. And with good reason, structural relaties of international distribution of power mandate it.
…again, as I reread the piece – please explain to me how an exercise in Poland has anything to do with deterring Russian actions in eastern Ukraine – evidence to date – including that presented in the article, suggests that in line with the security dilemma, this move would as much feed into Putin’s alleged justifications for such actions? Thus if that is even possible, why risk it at this stage? The goal is dissuasion – how would actions in Poland deter Russia in eastern Ukraine? I fail to see the logic in that. Please explain – especially when such things were apparently not needed when Putin had his proxy guy in place in the previous Ukrainian government and has no lost Ukraine – giving Poland dramatic strategic depth? The purpose of the NATO moves now is to reassure these new members and signal further costs to Russia’s moves as things might happen they say they don’t want to happen. No where, by the way, in the piece above is discussion of diplomacy – and in the end, this crisis will only end up being resolved with a negotiation over the future status of Ukraine – as the gov’t in Kiev is signaling – and likely a permanent commitment to neutrality on its part…again, how exactly would a quick and major exercise in Poland contribute to any of that, especially if Putin’s goal is to gain influence in shaping these outcomes diplomatically? I’m really puzzled by this idea that a) major exercises in Poland would somehow deter Russia in eastern Ukraine and not instead risk unintentionally feeding into Putin’s narrative and prolonging the crisis and b) how exactly this contributes to de-escalation and the realities of a diplomatic settlement. Reassurance of allies, yes – deterrence in eastern Ukraine? I’m just really struggling to see the correlation between the two – especially since all it ultimately does is signal a false promise to Ukraine if the implied linkage is what I think is being made here. As to credible deterrence – the west holds all the cards – and they are economic. At the same time, all have relative interests in not seeing it get to that poitn at the same time, given the dangers of ripple effects – both in the Russian economy, but also in the Eurozone – which is why diplomacy is the primary preference of the allies – not russing spearheads into eastern Europe – something that, by the way, advocates have wanted since 1994. Let’s focus on capabilities and the relative balance of power here perhaps – how is having the overwhelming strategic advantage somehow not credible? Yes, there is little that can be done in eastern Ukraine – but that doesn’t mean with time the relative levers that are effective can’t also impact as Russia dramtically overstretches and does damage to its own interests – why take moves that could unintentionally prolong that?
In fact, NATO just announced that it is immediately taking significant steps that amount to most all of what I call for. Its 28 governments are in unison, and the Alliance is moving directly forward on the recommendations of its military staff with additional troop, naval, and aerial deployments that will involve increased exercises, training, and readiness with the aim of deterring and de-escalating the crisis over Ukraine. Clearly the Alliance has not ruled out significantly increasing its force posture vis-à-vis Russia; it is doing the opposite. Moreover, Germany is doing the opposite of putting the breaks on, which is consistent with its increased activism and recent doctrinal shift. Whether all this will be enough to deter Russia remains to be seen; but it is not inflaming the situation or pouring additonal gas on any fires metaphorically speaking.
What increases the chance of Putin taking eastern Ukraine is failing to respond diplomatically, economically, and militarily–and keeping conventional deterrence low, which the recent commenter in fact concedes. Putin is likely to take a bigger chunk of Ukraine based on the status quo. His narrative has already been fully fed, as evidenced by the propaganda all over the Russian airwaves but especially by the unrest already being instigated by Russian intelligence agents and military operatives in eastern Ukraine. The commenter underestimates Putin’s desire and ability to do still more beyond the crisis over Ukraine. Russia is not sufficiently overstretched to prevent it taking Transnistria from Moldova and other parts of what it defines as its near abroad. Putin clearly cares little about Russia’s international reputation, or the economic risks he’s taking. The recent work of Fiona Hill is a good place to look if one wishes to understand what makes Putin and his coterie tick.
The relative balance of power in the West’s favor did not prevent Russia from taking Crimea and won’t absent a force posture strengthening prevent it from taking eastern Ukraine and/or additional territory, as one of the other previous commenters rightly pointed out. In fact there is substantial evidence in this very case that the West’s “overwhelming security advantage” has not been credible enough. It is difficult to think of what greater evidence there could be. Putin will take as much of Ukraine as the West allows, not based on arcane measures of defense spending ratios and the like but on the degree to which the West responds and how credible this response is.
What seems to be motivating opinion of this kind is a commitment to getting the U.S. to further draw down in Europe. But this is what the current Administration has made clear will not happen. The fallacy of calling for reductions in the U.S. presence in Europe is now fully clear. At the same time it is clear that European allies should do more. They haven’t in terms of returning to pre-recession levels of defense spending; but they have in terms of altering their force postures, capabilities, and strategic thinking. Most importantly, they have done so in terms of being not just capable of acting but willing, hence the stepping up that was on display in the operations in Libya, in Mali, and what was ready to go in Syria before the last minute change.
It is equally important for western interests not to set the wrong kind of precedent. Chinese military observers and domestic security experts report that China is watching this crisis closely and already factoring it into its calculations about next moves over the disputed islands with Japan. Japan is also voicing its serious concern that the U.S. will act in accordance with its treaty commitments. This is what our policymakers have been conscious of, namely the precedent that letting more of Ukraine fall without massive costs for Russia would set and how other potential border changers would perceive a more permissive incentive structure in its aftermath. If this were to persist, these very leaders could claim there is a new international norm in effect, or simply act like there is and justify their territorial grabs ex post. What western allies do not need at this stage is additional destabilization around the world. My piece did not call for an end to the pivot to Asia, but instead increased burden sharing in both Europe and Asia as was discussed at the high level security conference in Munich recently.
That diplomacy is important goes without saying. But it hasn’t prevented Russia from its abject violations of international law and territorial sovereignty. The best diplomacy to use against adversaries in crises like this one is diplomacy backed by credible threat of force. Hence, allies are actively working to get more credible. Actually, the next round of sanctions that are rapidly being prepared help make this threat more credible as well, for they would come with certain costs to European economies. Finally, additional major diplomacy is already occurring in the form of the big summit that the West is brokering between Russia and Ukraine and is scheduled for next week. What remains to be seen is whether Russia will cancel this.
…actually NATO has offered very little specifics on what it is doing – but mainly with rotational exercises and minor upgrades in existing air and naval moves – limited to the eastern Med on the naval piece. Land forces would work to increase readiness – but reporting shows that other options like permanent basing in Poland or elsewhere were ruled out – over strong opposition from within NATO. There is also no discussion yet of who will provide what forces – this isi signaling of reassurance. I can see a case for it having a deterrent role in the sense that NATO is basicaly signaling poiltical distaste and a willingness to ratche up or down, as per sanctions, but I still see no real functional military deterrence in these moves that has any relevance to eastern Ukraine, which is the case you are making. Sorry – but that’s just not persuasive. And, if Putin now uses these actions to say “see, now we must go into Ukraine” – how is that de-escalation, rather it plays right into his strategic narrative. (BTW I think the NATO moves are about right and what I would have expected – these are symbolic moves, more than likely to disappoint those who wanted a robust action i.e. 10,000 troops in Poland or the rapid response force made available there – but at this point the symbolic gesture is what was mainly required for signaling reassurance. I see no correlation to effective deterrence as applies to eastern Ukraine, nor do I find much persuasive in the point made above in that regard. If anything, I would look more to the diplomacy, and David Ignatius’s signaling that Obama is prepared to offer up the Finland model and taking Ukraine’s NATO roll off the table. That sound sabout right, especially in the case that Putin won’t likely get the federalization commitments to the degree he woudl hope. As to Germany, by the way, reporting from Brussels is also noting that it was especially German (and others) concern that the NATO moves be limited for risk of makign the situation worse. But I don’t think its just Germany putting the brakes on, its NATO member states overall, none of whom want to get pulled into something in Ukraine – which is the logical escalation risk from the kinds of policies you are advocating for here (which would next step be military aid to Ukraine as per John McCain, which means us taking sides in a proxy war against Russia, which would do more damage to NATO consensus than unite it. Again, you keep talking about fallacies, but without really addressing the logic. The US has drawn down to 30k landforces – which seems about right. No one is calling for further drawdowns – but even minus the US role, the allies have more than adequate combined capabilities to manage this crisis – if we properly engage them to better pool their resources with us helping out – which I believe also to be your case above. But on the other hand, its not the total number of US troops in Europe that matters, its where they are and what they are doing. I’ve been calling for years for the US role to focus exclusively on Art. V contributions while the allies are put in more lead roles – I think that is precisely where this is likely heading, and that too has been confirmed in comments by senior US officials – from Obama’s trip in Europe, to Hagel’s interview with Doyle McManus in the LA TImes recently. So, you say that there has to be political, economic and miltiary response – well, there is no military option on eastern Ukraine – so how, I ask again, is deterrence achieved there, since that is your goal?
…I think too you actually answer the question in your comment above – you say absent force posture changes all the relative power advantages won’t deter Putin in eastern Ukraine. But you fail to show how posture changes per se i.e. a major exercise in Poland would contribute to deterrence in *eastern Ukraine* and not risk further escalation and spiraling conflict models. Also, I remain confused – why is this so importnat now when in relative terms, none of these things were called for when Putin had de facto influence via Yanokovich in Ukraine the last 4 years or so, but now that Putin has lost Ukraine, they are so urgent? Wasn’t there a bigger relative problem previously than now? (Fully understand and would disagree with the response about annexation, etc) but I’m trying to understand the structural levels of analysis you are getting at here, as I’m just not seeing any correlation between appropriate reassurance of new NATO members and conventional deterrence in eastern Ukraine – other than signaling that future outcomes could happen that Russia wouldn’t like…but what matters there is sanctions primarily.
It’s great to engage each other on this Sean, as your new comments confirm we aren’t as far apart as it seemed at the outset. I welcome your more reasoned response, and according to my former colleagues the debate you and I are having mirrors the internal debate in the Administration (though they are moving in favor of tougher moves as seen in preparation of much tougher sanctions and the NATO activities). So we concur that the power imbalance in favor of the West has not prevented Putin’s territorial annexing and that our allies should do more for our collective security, which they have been in the operations in Libya, Mali, and were committed to on Syria before the abort. That is my point precisely, that defense spending levels and troop levels matter much less than strategy, capabilities, posture, and training–“what they are doing” as you say. I think you will find the high level discussions that have been taking place about the model I call for very encouraging from your perspective.
Details are forthcoming from NATO, but the military staff are recommending serious moves not symbolic moves. And Ukraine inside NATO has already been taken off the table. The NATO moves head in the right direction but probably will not go far enough to be fully credible. And the Germans aren’t opposed. Actually most observers predicted Merkel would go easy on Putin because of the gas supply issue, but she and her officials have gone in the other direction e.g. they have already agreed to toughen sanctions in ways that may have some low level effects on their own economy. But yes they aren’t as hawkish as the U.S., though they are closer than most expected. An exercise demonstrates that the West does have a red line somewhere and would be prepared under unspecified circumstances to intervene. Let’s take an extreme: western allies aren’t going to allow Russian to commit mass genocide in Ukraine. Clearly, as the status quo has already demonstrated, doing little to nothing is what has emboldened Putin and led him to believe that if he couldn’t prevent Ukraine from going western by remote puppet rule then he would simply grab himself some. You make an assertion that a more robust force posture a la a serious exercise will ipso facto lead to escalation and spiraling, but no evidence or examination of Russia’s recent behavior is offered. Fiona Hill and other true Putin experts concur that he respects force and demonstrations of it. Einstein’s definition of insanity is appropriate here: why should we expect a different result by doing the same thing over and over? Neither you nor I know precisely what would get him to back off, but I imagine we both agree that there is some threshold that would, even if for argument’s sake we were talking about a credible threat to nuke Moscow. But logically, and consistent with both with his behavior up to this point and those who study him most closely, this will require a tougher response than what has in causal terms led to his taking a valuable chunk of Ukraine already and the massing of troops and hardware poised to take another chunk. In the Cold War no U.S. President actually wanted to use his nuclear football, but by credibly threatening MAD the end result was a positive one. Putin himself respected G.W. Bush because he used force in a manner not entirely unlike himself, but he does not respect the current POTUS in the same way he respects Merkel for example. It is common knowledge that he gained respect for her not so much from her eastern upbringing and knowledge of Russian but from testing her in person by allowing dogs into their one on one meetings knowing that she has a fear of dogs (but she didn’t show it, as he has told the story to journalists).
This matters much more now because of the cues other adversarial leaders will likely draw from a failure to make this too costly for Putin, which you acknowledge. And remember this is a leader that so far has been unmoved by either economic costs or the ruination of Russia’s international reputation, which he so painstakingly tended to by his staging of the Winter Olympics in Sochi. Four years ago there was still a political struggle inside Ukraine that had not played itself out. Even Yanukovych at one point was in favor of moving closer to the EU. But that led of course to Putin literally forcing him to back off, which not long after precipitated his own departure. The EU has gotten a bad rap for pushing its negotiations on membership to the point that Putin had to make a choice about whether to let Ukraine go, but that is a little much to have expected the EU to see that many strategic moves ahead on the chessboard. Prior to this crisis the EU’s ability to get potential member states to make big political and economic changes prior to being allowed to join has been almost universally admired.
It is positive also that you share the concern about the downsides of would be border changers and territorial annexers gleaning a new precedent out of a failure to stop Putin. And it isn’t only President Xi and his top brass who are watching this closely. The last thing we need in light of all the crises in the Middle East we are currently contending with is further destabilization of global affairs in either Europe or Asia. A new international norm of a green light for forceful border changes is in no one’s interest except for a small number of our adversaries.
I’d glad to hear that you think 30,000 U.S. troops remaining in Europe is a good level, which reminds me of how not long ago you and I were planning to write a joint piece that would advocate how to keep western allies from falling into my concept of the joint security trap while simultaneously shoring up our allies in the Pacific. This middle ground between us, i.e. significant burden-sharing in both Europe and Asia, is the way of the future as this is what our joint interests with our allies in both regions calls for.