Pyongyang’s “pay attention to me! right! now!” routines seem calculated to convince the United States, South Korea, and Japan of one thing: that military force is the only effective long-term solution to North Korean intransigence. Which means, naturally enough, that Pyongyang’s recent rounds of “WTF” are most likely driven entirely by domestic DPRK politics.
World history is flush with with examples of more prosperous states repeatedly buying off uncouth and belligerent barbarians. But one has to wonder how far Pyongyang can push the South Koreans. Will there come a point when Seoul decides to risk war rather than see the DPRK’s retrograde regime become even more awash in “Sampson Option” capabilities? I assume that the South Korean policy toward North Korea is rooted in a belief that, if Seoul waits long enough, the regime will implode. But what if that calculation changes?
What makes this interesting (and dangerous), is that ROK forces–even without U.S. help–are more than a match for anything that the North Koreans can field. This means that the South Korean leadership has any number of plausible military options; if the South Koreans begin to significantly alter their assessment of current trends, these military options will likely appear increasingly attractive.
Still, none of this suggests an alteration in the basic factors that restrain Seoul:
- Before they collapse, North Korean forces will kill a lot of South Koreans and do a lot of damage to South Korea’s economy;
- The United States has no appetite for taking part in an additional large-scale military conflict;
- Uncertainty surrounding Beijing’s likely actions in the event of a conflict; and
- The significant challenges that would come from assuming control of North Korean territory if the conflict leads to ROK victory in a full-blown war.Â
These four factors–two of which aren’t particularly manipulable–make significant escalation unlikely. But with the developments of the last two days, I’m less sanguine than I was even after the sinking of the Cheonan–especially about the long-term prospects for a peaceful Korean peninsula.
UPDATE: that there’s some serious brinksmanship.
South Korea warned today that it will unleash “enormous retaliation” if North Korea launches fresh attacks against its territory.
North Korean troops bombarded Yeonpyeong, an island in disputed waters, with dozens of rounds of artillery earlier today, reportedly killing two South Korean soldiers and injuring around 20 people.
Seoul placed its military on its highest non-wartime alert level, scrambling F-16 fighter jets to the western sea and returning fire, officials said. It warned that the attack was a violation of the armistice that ended the Korean war in 1953.
The South Korean president, Lee Myung-bak, who convened an emergency security meeting shortly after the initial bombardment, said an “indiscriminate attack on civilians” could never be tolerated.
“Enormous retaliation should be made, to the extent that [North Korea] cannot make provocations again,” he said.
While war remains unlikely, audience-cost dynamics can combine with political miscalculations in unexpected, and unpleasant, ways.
Military retaliation is extremely unlikely. Recall that President Lee said the same sorts of things after the Cheonan sank, but nothing happened. The tough talk is not really even for the general domestic audience who want nothing more than for NK to just go away. It is for the anti-communist hawks inside Lee's Grand National Party, particularly those around former dictator Park Chung-Hee's daughter. She is Lee's primary in-house opponent and nearly defeated him in the 2007 election.
1. SK is extremely vulnerable. 50% of the population lives within 50 miles of the DMZ in easily destroyed apartment towers in the massive urgan agglomeration around Seoul. NK has stationed 10-20,000 rockets and canon purposefully to hold these people hostage and block retaliation (think the WTC collapse a thousand times). This is why nothing happened after the 1976 tree-cutting incident, 1983 cabinet bombing, the 1987 KAL 858 bombing, and the Cheonan. The military's hands are tied even though they were calling for blood after the Cheonan. The public is dead-set against escalation.
2. SK public opinion, like West German public opinion by the 1980s, is slowly turning against unification. The cultural gap of time and distance is growing. The youth especially just don't care that much anymore – NK is practically a foreign country to them now – and they are terrified of the costs, including the ruin of their wealthy, comfortable democracy and possible nuclear use on their soil. South Korea is now practically a status quo power in peninsular affairs. If NK can hang on long enough, the South won't want unification anyway…