This is a guest post from Erika Weinthal, a Professor at Duke University and Jeannie Sowers, an Associate Professor at the University of New Hampshire
What is often referred to as environmental peacebuilding – the process of governing and leveraging the use of the environment and natural resources for building a sustainable peace through improving livelihoods, strengthening the economy, rebuilding trust, and fostering cooperation – has been a core component of US-supported projects in Israel and Palestine.
part of the US government strategy to promote a two-state solution in the
aftermath of the 1993 Oslo Peace Process, all US administrations until the most
recent have provided economic and security assistance to the Palestinian
National Authority (PNA) and Palestinian civil society. This assistance was always dwarfed by the
military and economic assistance provided by the US to Israel, but nevertheless
was an important component in supporting Palestinian civil society and human
projects included scientific exchanges through USAID’s Middle
East Regional Cooperation program and support
for regional NGOs like EcoPeace
Middle East, which sought to build a peace park in the
Jordan River basin and create dialogue among local mayors on both sides of the
Jordan River. Most importantly, the US was the single largest donor to the UN Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which runs
schools, health clinics, social services, and infrastructure projects for 5
million Palestinian refugees and their descendants in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria,
Gaza, and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.
last two years of the Trump administration have, however, cemented the loss of
US credibility in mediating the conflict between Israel and Palestine. There
are no shortages of key moments, but the most notable include the
administration’s decision to move the embassy in Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in
December 2017, the elimination of all funding to UNRWA in late 2018, the
cessation of development assistance to the Palestinian people in early 2019,
and the US Ambassador to Israel taking a hammer to break ground in a tunnel in
occupied East Jerusalem in June 2019.
Awhile back, when cross-posted here and at Lawyers, Guns and Money to harp on the Game of Thrones denouement, LGM Commenter “Dogboy” clicked a link in that post to this article by Stanford researcher Scott Sagan (with Benjamin Valentino), purporting to show (via survey experiment) that Americans would be fine carpet-bombing civilians in Iran. Dogboy’s rightful reaction: “WTF, WHY DID I CLICK THE LINK?” To which I was happily able to reply, “Don’t worry, I’ve studied this data and the authors are wrong. Stay tuned for my follow-up essay in the next few days.”
It has taken many days to issue my follow-up, partly because, while I was busy completing replications on the Iran study and preparing a rebuttal for publication, Sagan and his team published another similar study on North Korea just before Trump headed over there.
This time, their survey
respondents were not asked to saturation bomb an Iranian city (a flagrant
violation of the Geneva Conventions), but to violate the UN Charter through a
preventive strike on North Korea, with nuclear or conventional weapons
depending on your treatment group, weighing the strategic gains against various
game-theoretic likelihoods of various levels of civilian casualties in both North
and South Korea, ranging from 15,000 to 1.5 million.
Naturally, of course, the mediareported on
this study, published in the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists and titled “What Do Americans Really Think
About Conflict With Nuclear North Korea? The Answer is Both Reassuring and
Disturbing” by focusing on the DISTURBING: the quote from the article most
frequently mentioned in the media is this one:
“As we have previously found, the U.S. public exhibits only
limited aversion to nuclear weapons use and a shocking willingness to support
the killing of enemy civilians.”
Well, having just
replicated the original Iran study,* and also looked closely at this new North
Korea one, I can tell Dogboy and everyone else that
we can (mostly) relax. Here’s why: what Sagan’s team calls “disturbing” is not
really that disturbing, and even if it is, the “Reassuring” way outranks the
“Disturbing” in statistical terms. Below are three reasons why you shouldn’t
worry too much about the blood-thirstiness of your fellow Americans.
“A Large Hawkish Minority
Lurks.” Basically, Sagan’s team found Trump supporters are happy
to bomb foreigners. Why the authors want to focus on (or have the media focus
on) the minority of voters who would support war crimes over the large majority
of Americans that don’t is unclear. But what they find “disturbing” is these
voters also appear “appear insensitive to informational cues that most security
experts would expect to reduce such levels of support.”
Voters may ‘appear’ that way, however, because
Sagan and his team did not include ‘informational cues’ on knowledge or
exposure to the Geneva Conventions in their experiment – something lots of
‘security experts’ including my co-author and I found matters tremendously in
such matters. Indeed, when we replicated the original Iran Study we found that
providing these cues reverses the result on saturation bombing:
What this means is that in real life, where
international and domestic human rights groups (plus generals) would invoke the
Geneva Conventions or UN Charter, support for these acts would be much lower
than a carefully controlled survey experiment might suggest.
“A Shocking Willingness to
Support Killing Civilians.” No. Absolutely not. What they found is
that a large majority of Americans (77%) opposed killing civilians, whether or
not this was done through conventional bombing or nuclear weapons. Again, this
is “reassuring” not “disturbing” and it is also entirely consistent with the
Geneva Conventions, which prohibit killing civilians no matter what weapons you
This new North Korea
finding is actually consistent with what Alex Montgomery and I found on our
replication of the original Iran study, as reported in this companion piece in Foreign Policy on audience
reactions to the firebombing of King’s Landing: the vast majority of Americans
believe it’s wrong to target civilians under any circumstances.
“A Strong Retributive Streak?” Sagan and his team also write that, even though “the majority of Americans do not want President Trump to return to threats to attack North Korea,” there is a “strong retributive streak in US public opinion.”
This is a stretch. On the original Iran study, the authors developed this claim, because they found that among those willing to bomb the city, some Americans used a sort of “they deserve what they get” or “bomb them all” kind of explanation. On our replication, we found that only a minority of Americans really preferred to target civilians once you control for framing effects embedded in the original prompt, and of those that only a tiny minority (12%) evinced this sort of mentality when we studied the open-ended comments explaining the answers. This dropped to 6% if we gave an open-ended version of the question itself, rather than forcing respondents to choose between terrible options:
Now that’s an augmented
replication of the original Iran study. In the new North Korea study, Sagan and
his team argue death penalty support predicts retributive attitudes toward
civilians and maybe so (we haven’t explored that), but this is hardly a
“disturbing” finding about Americans, since death penalty support is at
The Media Does Like
Whether these findings
are legitimately disturbing or not, the media sure latched on to the claim that
they were, and circulated the erroneous conclusion that this means Americans
are happy to kill civilians – just as they did when the original (and flawed)
Iran study came out.
This is a shame because
what Americans think about what other Americans think can actually influence
what Americans think – and that can influence what policymakers do. If the
media’s misappropriation of this survey finding, due to a carelessly worded
title in a research paper, leads Americans to think many of their countrymen
are fine disregarding the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions, that
really is terrifying. Because research shows those rules are sometimes
the thin red line encouraging restraint in war.
Sorry, clickbait! But admit, it, after an apology of race science in Quillette or “The Case for Colonialism” in TWQ you probably rage-clicked on the thumbnail to let me have it. Periodic IR Twitter flares over teaching “Stoddard light” (i.e., Huntington) also show that not all scholars are aware of racialized origins of world order, existing color lines in global capitalism, or even “race relations” pedigree of IR as a discipline. This post is about a case for teaching about nationalism because it seems like different versions of racist primordial rhetoric just won’t die.
As a blog post by John Jackson made it clear, race science is a vampire science that comes back every so often [Twilight joke edited]. I see from time to time some type of “IQ difference” and “levels of criminality” arguments coming up among students because these arguments are essentially polished up turds from the 19th century anthroposociology and Social Darwinism that keep stinking up even supposedly an academic debate through mainstreaming of far-right rhetoric around the world. If a “Leader of the Free World” can say that “Mexicans are rapists” and “they bring drugs and crime” on prime-time television while the news dutifully resort to both-sidism and place chyrons with direct quotes, is our last hope education?
I have taught a course on theories of nationalism for several years now and we always start with the primordial stuff: blood, speech, custom, region, and religion. At this point, I invite students to create a ‘fake nation” in groups. This usually yields a very fun and diverse set of nations from island matriarchate with coconut cult to unicorn-blooded mermaid atheists. This exercise, of course, does not reverse or heal all the prejudice that might have collected in the backs of the minds of students (I have another 13 sessions for that) but at least it gives them an opportunity to reflect on the artificial nature of nation-building projects.
Another important session is on the role of collective memory and politics of commemoration. Especially on the undergraduate level where high school memories are not that far off, it’s important to reflect what was chosen to remember and what was chosen to forget in history books, why certain public holidays make the cut, and how national projects begin in the everyday, often unnoticed practices of creating a “culture”. But, as Huntington’s resilience on the syllabi shows, “culture” still serves as an ontological category that elevates constructed differences to political ones. So, after 14 sessions of talking imagined communities, “scientific” racism, and ontological security among others, I rarely get the boiler plate “Western civilization” in the exam answers, but how do I know the vaccination against racism has been successful?
As Paul Musgrave noted, right-wing media tells me that I can turn my students into socialists, but my experience tells me that I can’t even make them do the reading. So, what can we as political scientists do to inoculate against racism and xenophobia? What should we encourage the students to read? Because I don’t want to see the vampire science rise again.
American medicine is
globalizing. Medical students request more “things global” on their curriculum,
and universities rush to offer global health tracks to a global generation of students. While the types of programs vary
enormously between specializations and campuses, most feature short-term
experiential learning trips as a core element. These experiences – herein
called Global Health Electives (GHEs), but also known as clinical tourism –, enjoy enormous popularity. It is estimated that around a third of all US, Canadian, and
German, and even 40% of all British medical doctors have participated in a GHE.
In the US, this is an increase from a mere 6% in 1984.
This scramble for the
Global South has been amply criticized as a new form of colonialism and an
epitome of the white savior complex. GHE participants have been blamed for practicing beyond competence, for disrespecting
the patients and faculty in the host country, for producing extra costs for the
host institutions, and for reproducing an ideology of normative whiteness while
engaging in “service learning” abroad. In response, the search for more equitable, sustainable, or at least
not harmful international learning partnerships is high on the agenda of
organizations such as the Consortium of Universities for
In the shadow of these
debates, however, a counter-narrative is emerging, which seeks to shed a
different, and more optimistic, light on the impact of GHEs. A growing body of
research centers on the lessons that US students and residents learn from their
overseas experience. Educators in fields ranging from nursing to orthopedics
and family medicine now publish evaluations that aim to show how US medics’
skills and careers are transformed through GHEs.
The underlying reason for the outcry went unspoken: The deliberate targeting of civilians from the air, using incendiary weapons that are impossible to escape, is rightly recognized by Americans as a terrible crime—something good actors just don’t do. Our research confirms the evidence from reactions to the show’s finale. Americans would have wanted Daenerys to use air power but only against military targets such as the Iron Fleet. They would have wanted her to limit its use inside the city walls to avoid collateral damage. They would have wanted her to target the Red Keep, if needed, but not the streets of Flea Bottom. They would have chosen to let boots on the ground do the work of breaching the Red Keep and capturing Cersei Lannister and expected the Unsullied, Dothraki, and Northmen to fight soldiers rather than massacre civilians. All of these arguments show a clear and consistent understanding of, and sensitivity to, the international laws of war.
If public opinion can indeed constrain the executive – and there is evidence it can – this matters for foreign policy.
The article, I hope, does three other unstated things:
Demonstrates the kind of analysis Paul Musgrave mentions IR scholars could and should be engaging in vis-a-vis pop-culture artifacts.
Develops a testable hypothesis: that audience reception of pop culture artifacts could be as reliable a source of information on public opinion as fictionalized survey experiments, if only we start paying closer attention.
Reminds us that American concern for the protection of civilians is a fragile thing, and not a historical inevitability.
Folks have been picking on the last Game of Thrones episode for a variety of unrealistic or unearned developments. Here’s my take on the secessionist element. Folks have been picking on the last Game of Thrones episode for a variety of unrealistic or unearned developments. Here’s my take on the secessionist element.
Much ink has been spilled since last Sunday about
the massacre at King’s Landing. Why did Dany carpet-bomb a civilian population
after a city had surrendered? Was this a sign of her growing madness?
Or a rational
strategy to cement the legitimacy of her claim? Why didn’t the showrunners
build it up better?
Did they compromise Dany’s story arc as a civilian-protection advocate or were
her actions always foreshadowed by her worst “fire and blood” tantrums?
In the handwringing over what Daenerys did, scant analysis
has focused on how she did it. This
is important since audiences draw inferences from popular culture about causal
effects in real world foreign policy scenarios – such as a looming
conflict with Iran. Since dragons represent air
power, we should understand the historical analogy for
the firebombing of King’s Landing not as the sack of medieval cities in a feudal
era, but rather the saturation bombings of World War II, where undefended
cities were systematically incinerated from the air.
Viewed this way, “The Bells” badly missed the mark
in accurately portraying the humanitarian, operational and strategic costs of
such campaigns, which the US has used before and Republican politicians have threatened
to use again. In so doing, the showrunners missed an opportunity to educate its
audience on the true horror of firebombing, and the way in which political
actors use it at their own peril.
Is Not a Precision Weapon. When Drogon begins his assault on
King’s Landing, he begins with military targets – the Greyjoy naval fleet.
Conceivably, fire on the ocean could be contained from spread to the civilian
population on land. But once the burning of the city perimeter from the
interior begins, it already beggars belief that the city’s inhabitants could be
protected from the fire’s spread. This is because fire is notoriously
uncontrollable – one in a category of weapons banned
under international law in the real world, when civilian
populations are nearby, due to its ability to spread once deployed. In short,
contrary to its portrayal in the episode, Dany’s use of dragonfire already
threatened the civilian population even before she targeted them directly.
When Drogon began targeting the city inhabitants
directly, the showrunners portrayed the fires burning where they were ignited:
in city streets, largely contained by the surrounding structures. But in
reality, fire engulfs structures. Cities burn in sheets, not rivers. Fire eats
air, creating windstorms, which feed and speed the fire. The Tokyo firebombing
created walls of fire, ripping through closely packed, mostly wooden homes. In
Dresden, a city where many of the buildings were reinforced with concrete, the
Allied firestorm still destroyed over half the structures in the city with
Rather than seeing civilians running away down
streets and hiding around protected corners, audiences should have seen them
facing ever-growing, shifting, enveloping tsunamis of fire once the first few
streets were lit. Rather than Cersei watching ribbons of flame from the
distance, she should have seen whole neighborhoods swallowed up progressively. The
ignition of wildfire would have only exacerbated this trend.
For this reason alone, it seems incomprehensible
that Dany would unleash this holocaust in an area where her own troops were
present – or that her soldiers would have any chance at a protected route of
retreat. Historically, the strategic bombing of civilians from the air is not a
method used in areas where ground troops are already engaging the enemy on foot
– for good reason. Dany’s willingness to sacrifice her own remaining men to an
indiscriminate firestorm – not her willingness to punish civilians, an act
often undertaken during the siege of medieval cities – is actually the best
indicator that she was acting irrationally. That the showrunners allowed us to
believe that a large portion of her military survived the siege only
underscores the cinematic sleight of hand at play.
Kills Loudly and Slowly. Through a number of cinematic
choices, the creators of “The Bells” also led audiences to think that death by
firebombing is quicker, less painful, less terrifying and less certain than it
actually would be.
In real life, a city under incendiary siege is a
noisy place. Survivors of the firebombings of Dresden and Tokyo refer back
above all to the screaming. Of course, there were panicked shouts and screams
of fear in King’s Landing last week, but we did not hear the shrieks of the
dying, as the showrunners chose to include in previous episodes.
Think of the screams of Mirri Maz Dur in Season One,
or the cries of Shireen Barratheon in Season Five: the sounds of only one
person at a time dying slowly by fire. When the Sept fell in Season Six, only a
handful of political elites and surrounding civilians died in the resulting
blaze, but their shrieks could be heard by King Tommen from his window at the
Red Keep. Multiply that by tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians burning
slowly to death in ongoing waves – what Cersei should have been listening to
from the same window – and suddenly the episode we saw becomes eerily,
Visually, instead of choosing to portray fire’s
lethal heat effects, and the full fury of their humanitarian consequences, the
showrunners instead gave us primarily fast-killing blast effects. We see
civilians overrun by bursts of flame and incinerated quickly and soundlessly –
disappearing from sight into the flame, instead of convulsing before our eyes.
We see civilians panicking and running from the fire, but we do not see mothers
running away while listening as the babies on their backs actually catch fire
and begin burning alive. We do not see people pile up in desperation at the end
of city blocks as the flames overtake them.
To be fair, audiences were permitted to see the
aftermath of death by fire: charred bodies appropriately reminiscent
of images from the aftermath of Dresden, Tokyo and the countless
other Asian and European cities targeted from the air in that period. But we
are allow to imagine the inhabitants of King’s Landing died quickly, their
corpses blackening in the aftermath. Just as we do not hear them, we do not see
civilians slowly burning.
We also do not see civilians suffocate. In real
firebombing campaigns of the 1940s, many civilians took shelter in cellars or
other structures. But the heat of an inferno sucks away oxygen, dooming even
those who escape the flames. In World War II, families were found huddled in
blast shelters after suffocating together – a lingering death which can take up
to three minutes.
Instead of capturing this
reality, “The Bells” portrays interiors as vulnerable
primarily to demolition and explosive violence. Civilians are seen sheltering
inside buildings from the flames and melee. Cersei and Jaime find temporary
respite in the catacombs. When Arya encourages a group to flee instead of
sheltering in place, they are quickly killed, suggesting they would have been
safer inside. In reality, they would likely have traded one death for another.
The Lannister twins would likely have asphyxiated long before being buried
As Tyrion says, “I do not want to hear the sound of
children screaming as they burn alive.” Perhaps, the showrunners decided,
audiences would also not wish to hear that sound. It is, as Qyburn reminds us,
“not pleasant.” Yet by sanitizing the sound of the siege, by sanitizing the
sight of it, by limiting its complexity, the showrunners dulled audiences’
senses to the reality of firebombing. By making the intolerable slightly more
tolerable, they deadened our understanding of what massacre by air truly entails.
Civilians is Strategically Ineffective. Though Dany may yet
atone for her sins, by all appearances thus far the following episode depicts a
successful claim to the throne, her army victorious, the remaining inhabitants
(and her own people) cowed. Yet in the real world, there is no instance where a
firebombing campaign yielded the result sought by its perpetrator – and often, it
has yielded retaliation in kind.
Strategic bombing proponents in World War II
believed terrorizing civilians from the air would induce surrender. But even
the most oft-cited argument – that the atomic bomb forced a Japanese surrender
– is historically
disputed. The Hiroshima bombing took place on August 6th,
1945, but for three days the Japanese continued to refuse surrender and did not
even meet to discuss the bombing. What convinced Japan to surrender was a different
event occurring days later: Stalin entered the war, invading Japan from the
north. Burning civilians with nuclear fire was little more effective than using
regular incendiary bombs.
Which is to say, ineffective: there is no
case in history where conventional firebombing produced
the desired effect. When Nazi Germany tried it against Britain between
1941-1940, hoping to shock British civilians into demanding surrender, the
Blitz only galvanized Brits and made them blood-hungry. Yet the British
firebombing of German cities was equally counter-productive: German industrial
production went up the more ordnance Britain dropped, and the age range for men
and boys enlisting in the Wehrmacht expanded. Firebombing civilians has
domestic blowback effects as well. In Vietnam, the use of napalm and
carpet-bombing galvanized the peace movement at home and delegitimized the war.
Recent use in Syria has led to renewed
international efforts to more comprehensively outlaw incendiary
If the Game of
Thrones finale is at all true to life, history will punish Dany for her
crimes. Yet just as the show produced a devastatingly sanitized depiction of
incendiary warfare, it is equally plausible that tonight’s finale will portray
saturation bombing as an effective way to bolster a ruler’s legitimate claim to
the throne. This would be a dangerously unrealistic portrayal of the political
consequences of indiscriminate air power.
It Matters. It is now well known by social
scientists that pop culture influences attitudes about real-world events. Audiences
false lessons about history and causation through
narrative storytelling loosely based on historical analogy. Depictions of
political violence can sensitize or desensitize. They can influence political
beliefs and public
opinion. The messages audiences take from a show like Game of Thrones have political
While fans were obsessing over whether Dany had gone mad or whether Arya’s horse symbolized death or peace, the Trump Administration quietly began inching closer toward war with Iran. US public opinion polls have already been fielded testing American support for a saturation bombing strike on an Iranian civilian city in the event that the US finds itself in an intractable ground war unable to induce a surrender.
Pop culture can convey cautionary tales, and Game of Thrones has often done so. But the most popular show in history, known for its soberingly grisly portrayals of political violence, just whitewashed the implications of firebombing a civilian population. In so doing, it missed its chance to show American how terrible such an act would be for civilians on the other side and – if the enemy retaliated in kind – here at home.
Here’s my argument: Late 80s/early 90s Soviet Union. The United Kingdom in 2016. The United States 2016 to now. Three contemporary examples of international suicide that conventional IR neither predicted nor can account.
Ok, so perhaps suicide is too hyperbolic a concept and we should go with appetite for self-destruction . Certainly in the case of the Soviet Union any agential claim regarding the state is overdrawn. But either way I think there is a point here. All three states, and particularly the last two, undertook an internally driven diminution of international standing and capacity—dare I say, power.
I assigned Plato’s Theaetetus this semester in my foreign policy class. It was the very first thing we read in a course that included more standard text’s like Walter Russel Mead’s Special Providence, Tom Schelling’s Arms and Influence, and selections from Andrew Bacevich’s edited volume of primary sources, Ideas and American Foreign Policy. On first glance, reading a work of political philosophy—and one which is widely considered one of the more difficult texts in the Western canon—might seem like a poor fit. But, my experiment paid off and I may continue assigning the Theaetetus or similar texts in my courses on foreign policy in the future. Its theme is epistemology, knowledge, and specifically it challenges the idea that humans can actually know anything. I have plans to write something up for a journal, but in this piece, I want to explore how it might be used in the classroom should anyone feel ambitious enough to replicate.
One thing that Trump hasn’t done today yet (which he should have if he wants to stay in Putin’s good graces) was to congratulate Russians with Victory day. It’s an incredibly important holiday in contemporary Russia and its commemoration dynamic can help understand a large chunk of Russian foreign policy.
One of the (many) concerns about the Trump Administration’s foreign policy is the impact it will have on US influence around the world. Will Trump’s rhetoric and actions restore US dominance in the international system, or will they aggravate the world, leading them to look elsewhere for leadership? We can find some answers in the reports that Trump is considering branding the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization.
Most debating US influence under Trump think it’s waning. Dan Drezner has pointed to public opinion polling suggesting a turn away from the United States. The UN Secretary General agrees. And others have suggested America start learning lessons in hegemonic decline from Great Britain.
Cue in the Twitter hot-takes in which Ukrainians elected themselves “a TV show star” with “no political experience”. Relax, not all TV stars are racist ignoramuses who want wall and try to spoon state flags. Despite winning the elections with a whopping 73% (and beating his own onscreen presidential score in his hit TV show), this one is different.
If you grew up in post-Soviet Russia you already know Ukraine’s incoming president – Volodymir Zelensky. He was a regular on the Soviet Union’s stand-up comedy show KVN (Club of Funny and Quick-witted), which propelled him to Russian-speaking international fame back in the 90s. His skit of a “person born in dance” made him one of the most recognizable KVN members, most of whom still represent the backbone of the Russian-speaking comedy industry in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. New generations might be more familiar with his later work in “Servant of the People” (also the name of his newly formed party) – a TV show about a history teacher who accidentally won the presidential elections in Ukraine, – as well as a host of other comedy shows and movies. The incumbent Poroshenko called Zelensky “a bright candy wrapper” (and that’s something coming from a chocolate candy king of the Post-Soviet space) that conceals a bunch of external interests and “fifth column”, even going as far as plastering Ukraine with election posters that showed Poroshenko against Putin, alluding to the fact that Zelensky is supposedly the latter one’s puppet.
This is a guest post from Brent Sasley, Associate Professor at the University of Texas at Arlington. He tweets at @besasley.
Israel holds a prominent place in the
American popular imagination. It’s a major source of news
reports, as well as an increasingly partisan issue in American electoral
politics. Perhaps it’s not surprising, then, that American journalists and
western journalists more generally seek out American and western analysts and
academics for commentary on Israeli politics, such as the recent
On Twitter I suggested that
western journalists look beyond western academics and analysts for insight into
the Israeli election results, and in particular toward women, Arab, Mizrachi,
and Ethiopian specialists. Someone then suggested that I compile a list for
journalists to access, since most of these scholars and analysts are not likely
to be known to western reporters. Below is a list I’ve put together that I hope
can be useful. It is surely not a complete list, and the boundaries between the
categories are not hard and fast; an analyst of Palestinian-Israeli politics
can of course provide effective commentary on Israeli politics more broadly.
I enjoyed @mchorowitz on GoT Dragon airpower, but it’s time for @RyanGrauer to give the people what they want- an analysis of how Westerosi alliance politics will affect military command structure and battlefield effectiveness.
An amazing series of tweets must be re-posted here so that IR profs everywhere can use them for syllabi and for the first day of class. A grateful nation owes Herb Carmen, former naval aviator, a tremendous debt. Continue reading
It’s happened to all of us (or least those of us who do quantitative work). You get back a manuscript from a journal and it’s an R&R. Your excitement quickly fades when you start reading the comments. One reviewer gives a grocery list of additional tests they’d like to see: alternate control variables, different estimators, excluded observations. Another complains about the long list of robustness checks already in the manuscript, as it obscures the important findings. Sometimes both of these reviewers are the same person.
And it gets even more complicated if the article ends up rejected and you send it to another journal. Now that list of robustness checks–some of which were of questionable value–expands under a new set of reviewers’ comments. And those reviewers irritated by voluminous appendices get even more annoyed by all the tests included with little clear justification (“another reviewer told me to add this” not being an acceptable footnote).
This is a guest post from William Kindred Winecoff, Incoming Chair
and Brent E. Sasley, Outgoing Chair of the Online Media Caucus
The Online Media Caucus’s 2019 Duckies have come and gone. The reception celebrating Online Achievement in International Studies, generously sponsored by SAGE Publishing, included three fascinating Ignite speakers and the presentation of five awards to very deserving scholars.
Meg Guliford, PhD
candidate at Tufts University, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, spoke about
“Operation Hedge of Protection,” which contains her strategies for dealing with
trolls on Twitter.
Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and Co-Director of Bridging the Gap, presented some
ideas for thinking about best practices in online activity.
Associate Professor at the University of Chicago, explained how and why he created
for his Introduction to IR course.
I arrived in Toronto for ISA on Thursday and went straight
to the annual luncheon hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations, which
featured some of my favorite policy oriented scholars, Kori Schake, Dan
Drezner, Charles Kupchan, and Barry Posen. It was a lively discussion about the
rise of illiberal nationalism and what it means for world order.
Someone from the audience asked about climate change, and
the topic got lost in the shuffle. The last questioner, an older guy in a
brilliant purple shirt, asked again about climate change and whether the
international community was up to the challenge. Drezner said he wasn’t all
that optimistic, though the U.S. military is a bright spot given the impacts on
bases and its relatively consistent concern. And then it was over.
As we got up to leave and say hello to familiar faces, I
thought that the field has to have more to say about the importance of climate
change. In a 2017 TRIPS survey,
IR scholars ranked climate change as the most important threat foreign policy
issue facing the United States over the next 10 years, and yet, we have not had
a reckoning for how climate will change both the reality of international
relations and the study of it.
Is it a mistake to push back on a senior scholar (whose work you admire) right before ISA? Maybe. Is it overkill to post twice in one week? Probably (sorry Duck superiors). But I had to say something about this Christian Reus-Smit piece in Foreign Policy–based on his new book—claiming IR doesn’t understand culture. It’s an example of the sort of well-meaning critique that fails to really engage with work being done in IR, which can divide and undermine scholars who should be working together.
Reus-Smit argues IR sees culture in an outdated manner, approaching cultures “as tightly integrated, neatly bounded, and clearly differentiated” entities that are “causally powerful.” He argues this misrepresents reality, ignores advances in other fields, and is a common failing across realist, rationalist and constructivist theories.