Tag: counterfactuals

How Would Al Gore Have Fought the Iraq War?

imagesEditor’s Note: This is a guest post by Elizabeth Saunders who is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at George Washington University.

In this year of Iraq-related anniversaries, this summer marks the 10-year anniversary of the emergence of the insurgency, when many Americans realized the Iraq War would not be over any time soon. Would things have been different had Al Gore been president? The latest issue of Perspectives on Politics has a symposium that considers this question in light of Frank P. Harvey’s book Explaining the Iraq War: Counterfactual Theory, Logic and Evidence. Harvey makes the provocative argument that Gore would have initiated the war had he won the 2000 election, highlighting structural factors that would have been no different under Gore than Bush. The symposium includes responses from myself, Adeed Dawisha, John Ehrenberg, Bruce Gilley, and Stephen Walt [Editor’s Note: Cambridge has agreed to make the contributions freely available through 29 July 2013; you can access the html version via each contributor’s name or through the abstract page].  I encourage readers to look at the entire symposium, which presents both supportive and skeptical takes on Harvey’s argument.

My own contribution highlights one aspect of the Gore counterfactual that Harvey neglects – what kind of war would Gore have considered fighting in Iraq, and how would that strategy, in turn, affect the likelihood of his administration going to war in the first place? Continue reading

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Foreign Entanglements: Iraq Anniversary Edition

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Tuesday Morning Counterfactual: No 9/11 Attacks

This is an open thread to discuss what the world of 2012 would look like absent the 9/11 attacks. The counterfactual proposes that they never happened, not that the US government thwarted them.

In general, I think the world is a better place. A lot of people who are now dead — in, for example, New York, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq — remain alive. A viable peace process might be underway in Israel-Palestine. The US international position is more secure. I am uncertain as to the strength of transnational jihadism. Core Al-Queda is in better shape, but its offshoots might not be making progress in parts of the Middle East and North Africa. The militant jihadist imaginary is smaller.

Of course, the US might suffer another, different attack. The timing and sequence of events matter a great deal for what would happen next.

Do you agree? Does Gore defeated Bush in 2004 in a close election fought on economic and social issues? Does Gore become a one-term president after the 2008 financial crisis? Does the Bush Administration still invade Iraq? Does President Romney implement a weak cap-and-trade carbon scheme and an individual-mandate based health-care system during the 2009-2010 period? Does international jihadism step up operations in the North Caucuses?

So many possibilities….

UPDATE: I posted a longer piece on this subject last year. Rather than merely provide the link, I’ve decided to repost it below the fold. If the above isn’t enough to spark discussion, perhaps my views in 2011 will be. The post makes clear to me how undecided I am about whether or not Bush wins in 2004 without 9/11.

Counterfactual theses:

  • Absent 9/11 or a 9/11-style attack, the US would not have invaded Afghanistan but might very well  have used force against Iraq. Rationale: despite the Bush campaign’s repeated condemnation of “nation-building” and calls for a more “humble” foreign policy (remember that?), Cheney and others were already singling out Iraq as a policy failure of the Clinton administration.
  • Absent 9/11 Bush would not have been a one-term president, but the 2002 midterm results would have been much more favorable to the Democrats. Rationale: the 2001 slump would largely have been over; I suspect the closeness of the campaign was, in part, a consequence of increasing polarization over his foreign policy. On the other hand, without the “existential threat” card, the Republicans would have faced significant problems in 2002.
  • Absent 9/11 or a 9/11-style attack, attention would have shifted much more quickly toward the implications of Chinese economic growth. Rationale: there were signs of trouble in the relationship prior to 9/11 (Hainan Island). US foreign policy after 9/11 gave the relationship “breathing space” as the US turned toward the jihadi threat (itself a security risk for China) — and generally created a favorable environment for China by angering so many other states. On the other hand, absent 9/11 the US would not be in Central Asia — and thus we that region would not be a possible future flashpoint. Note: I am not suggesting that Sino-US relations would have been deeply fraught. I am suggesting that they would have been a much more important theme of Bush’s presidency than it became.
  • Absent 9/11 the Bush Administration would have much more seriously contemplated force against Iran and/or North Korea. Rationale: Iraq and Afghanistan made serious force projection anywhere else difficult, and undermined of the US to build a coalition in favor of other military action.

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Ten Theses (Mostly Concerning Foreign Policy) About 9/11

Counterfactual theses:

  • Absent 9/11 or a 9/11-style attack, the US would not have invaded Afghanistan but might very well  have used force against Iraq. Rationale: despite the Bush campaign’s repeated condemnation of “nation-building” and calls for a more “humble” foreign policy (remember that?), Cheney and others were already singling out Iraq as a policy failure of the Clinton administration.
  • Absent 9/11 Bush would not have been a one-term president, but the 2002 midterm results would have been much more favorable to the Democrats. Rationale: the 2001 slump would largely have been over; I suspect the closeness of the campaign was, in part, a consequence of increasing polarization over his foreign policy. On the other hand, without the “existential threat” card, the Republicans would have faced significant problems in 2002.
  • Absent 9/11 or a 9/11-style attack, attention would have shifted much more quickly toward the implications of Chinese economic growth. Rationale: there were signs of trouble in the relationship prior to 9/11 (Hainan Island). US foreign policy after 9/11 gave the relationship “breathing space” as the US turned toward the jihadi threat (itself a security risk for China) — and generally created a favorable environment for China by angering so many other states. On the other hand, absent 9/11 the US would not be in Central Asia — and thus we that region would not be a possible future flashpoint. Note: I am not suggesting that Sino-US relations would have been deeply fraught. I am suggesting that they would have been a much more important theme of Bush’s presidency than it became.
  • Absent 9/11 the Bush Administration would have much more seriously contemplated force against Iran and/or North Korea. Rationale: Iraq and Afghanistan made serious force projection anywhere else difficult, and undermined of the US to build a coalition in favor of other military action.

Even more speculative theses:

  • Would the sub-prime mortgage landing have been softer? Rationale: absent 9/11 the Fed might have been less averse to raising interest rates to slow the housing bubble.
  • Would US-Latin American relations been much more problematic? Rationale: the focus on the “global war on terror” distracted the US from turning Venezuela President Hugo Chavez — and his neo-Bolivarist movement — into a bigger boogeyman. 

Forward-looking theses:

  • Terrorism against US citizens and interests will continue, but decline in significance to the general policymaking community. Rationale: a laserlike focus on terrorism amounts to something of a luxury good made possible by an absence of possible peer-competitors. The “Obama Formula” (use the phrase with caution) of heavy emphasis on covert ops, intelligence, drone strikes, and interdiction is likely to continue to be reasonably successful; it also, like other “shadow wars,” has taken on a life of its own.
  • Great-Power Politics are Returning. Rationale: a continuation of the above — the decline of the US is much less dire than many alarmists believe, but its relative decline will prove sufficient to end unipolar politics in the coming decades. Future power politics, however, will more resemble wars of position and maneuver than “hot wars.”
  • We haven’t seen the peak of Islamophobia. Rationale: ongoing economic pain, in conjunction with growing transnational ties among right-wing anti-Muslims, will sustain and feed one of the uglier dimensions of contemporary western politics. Events in the greater Middle East, such as participation in the democratic process by Islamist groups, won’t help either. 
  • The international community’s headaches from Pakistan will get worse. Rationale: policy options aren’t great, and sufficient doggedness in their pursuit is unlikely; key actors in the country remain “just fine” with patchwork effective sovereignty, instability, and poor economic performance; Pakistan has nuclear weapons.

I’ve left out anything concerning the future of Iraq and Afghanistan. I invite readers to weigh in with speculation on these, or any other, 9/11-related issues.

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Debating at the first level of analysis

Dave Schuler and I are arguing (again) over the counterfactual question: would a Gore Administration have invaded Iraq?.

I say, predictably, “no.” Dave says, “yes.” Weigh in, if so inclined, at his place.

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