I’ve been hearing rumors to the effect that US negotiators have cut a deal with the Kyrgyz government to allow continued use of Manas. But media sources remain silent, except to note that the Russians are sending additional warplanes to their own base in Kyrgyzstan.
Instead, they report on a new US-Tajik agreement to allow transit rights for non-military supplies to Afghanistan. This adds to existing deals with Uzbekistan and Russia.
Because the United States does “a lot of different things through the base on Manas,” Boucher said, “it is not just a matter of picking it up [in Kyrgyzstan] and putting it over there [in Tajikistan].”
He also said that the United States has six months to discuss Manas’s closure with the Kyrgyz authorities, after which Washington will decide what to do.
On Monday I presented Alex Cooley’s and my working paper on the structural dynamics of the US basing network at the Mortara Center for International Studies. My new–and extremely impressive–colleague, Matt Kroenig, suggested that we might be wrong about the advantages of “heavy footprint” bases over “light footprint” ones because the latter allow the US greater exit options: if the US loses on base it isn’t that big a deal, because it can always shift to another one in the region.
What I said in response bears repeating here: that’s great in theory, but in practice we’re vulnerable to the kinds of cascading effects we’ve seen in Central Asia. With K2 gone [for analysis before Karimov kiccked us out, see here], and Manas in jeopardy, the US has been unable to develop equivalent assets to substitute for those bases.
On the other hand, the rumors I hear suggest that any new deal on Manas won’t be particularly unfavorable to the US.
We’ll see how this continues to unfold.